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 2 
Abstract 
 
This thesis examines why capital punishment was abolished in Britain in spite of 
the consistent retentionism of the majority of the electorate. It addresses the 
period between 1947, when abolition was debated as part of the Criminal Justice 
Bill, and 1969, when capital punishment was abolished permanently for murder. 
 In explaining why capital punishment was abolished, this thesis engages 
primarily with two broad historiographical narratives for the period: public 
opinion and liberalisation. It investigates how politicians used public opinion 
within their arguments and why the electorate’s retentionism did not convince a 
sufficient number of them to oppose abolition. It places abolition alongside the 
other socially liberalising legislation of this period, notably the legalisation of 
homosexuality and abortion and the other permissive reforms. In doing so, it 
assesses the relationship between abolition and this wider liberalisation. The 
emerging liberalising ethos after the Second World War is an important context 
for understanding abolition.  
 This thesis identifies the collective identities of the abolitionists and 
retentionists. It examines the abolitionists’ and retentionists’ cases separately, 
assessing how they argued their cases, why they supported or opposed abolition 
and why the abolitionists succeeded and the retentionists failed. It also considers 
whether the abolitionists were social liberals and, conversely, whether the 
retentionists were social authoritarians.  
This thesis engages with the political discourse on civilisation, which 
permeated both these debates and many of the justifications for politicians’ 
beliefs. In addressing and considering these issues, this thesis provides an original 
explanation for the abolition of capital punishment in Britain. 
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 8 
Introduction 
 
In May 1969 James Callaghan, the Home Secretary, and William Ross, the 
Secretary of State for Scotland, prepared a confidential memorandum for the 
cabinet about the process by which capital punishment could be abolished 
permanently. Under the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965, 
Parliament could make the temporary abolition of capital punishment permanent 
by resolution, thus avoiding the lengthy series of debates that had been a feature 
of the previous attempts to abolish capital punishment. Since the Second World 
War, politicians were always free to vote on abolition without pressure from the 
party whips. As part of this tradition, abolition had always been introduced as a 
Private Members’ Bill rather than by the government. In 1969, Harold Wilson’s 
Labour government broke with this tradition by introducing the resolution itself, 
although the free vote was preserved.  
In preparation for the debate on the resolution, Callaghan and Ross 
outlined why the abolitionists despised capital punishment: 
The essential case for abolition is in our view a moral one. Capital 
punishment is a barbarous penalty which the community has no 
right to exact, however heinous the crime. There are however 
other subsidiary arguments in favour of abolition. The death 
penalty is a denial of the principle underlying the rest of our penal 
thinking, that no criminal is beyond the hope of redemption. In the 
event of doubt arising about the verdict after the sentence has been 
carried out, there is no opportunity to right the wrong. We think 
that those who advocate capital punishment are under the onus of 
establishing that this barbarous penalty is a unique deterrent; but 
there is no conclusive evidence, either here or elsewhere, to support 
such a contention.1 
Callaghan and Ross placed moral outrage at the heart of their and other 
abolitionists’ beliefs, labelling the punishment as being uncivilised and not a 
unique deterrent to murder. Callaghan’s and Ross’ memorandum, which was 
                                                   
1 The National Archives: Public Records Office (TNA:PRO), Confidential memorandum by the 
Secretary of State for the Home Department and the Secretary of State for Scotland on the 
Permanent Abolition of Capital Punishment for Murder, CAB/129/141, C(69) 48, 6 May 1969. 
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one of the clearest statements of why the abolitionists wanted to remove the 
death penalty, was made as the abolition process was reaching its conclusion. 
The parliamentary journey to this moment has been documented within the 
sparse historiography of capital punishment. What remains unexplained, though, 
is why the death penalty was abolished. 
 Callaghan’s and Ross’ memorandum is interesting in part because it 
touched on the two themes which are most pertinent for understanding the 
abolition process. They described capital punishment as a right that should not 
be permitted within the community and cited a reformed penal policy that was 
based upon redemption rather than retribution. This placed abolition within the 
liberalising ethos of the age, as the death penalty denied the criminal the 
possibility of redemption and reform. This was contrary to a common Christian 
belief. Furthermore, the description of capital punishment as community penalty 
alluded to the fact that the government was acting against the will of the 
electorate. As the memorandum went on to explain, politicians abolished capital 
punishment despite knowing that the electorate wanted it to be retained. Every 
opinion poll on capital punishment had found support for retention. During the 
period between 1947 and 1969, opinion polling grew in both volume and 
prominence. That Callaghan and Ross dismissed it so freely is indicative of 
politicians’ dismissive attitude towards public opinion. Liberalisation and public 
opinion are the two well-established historiographical themes with which this 
thesis engages. However, neither the association of capital punishment with 
liberalisation nor the opposition to the reform from public opinion have been 
challenged or examined within the historiography. These are important themes 
within this thesis’ examination of politicians’ arguments and beliefs on capital 
punishment. 
This thesis examines why Parliament abolished capital punishment after 
the Second World War despite British public opinion being overwhelmingly in 
favour of it, as it is today. Until now, the historiography of abolition has 
chronicled how the death penalty was removed. It has not explained why 
parliamentarians distanced themselves from the electorate when arriving at their 
decisions on capital punishment. In addressing this issue, this thesis examines the 
formative causes of politicians’ beliefs on the death penalty. Hitherto, there has 
been no attempt to explain why politicians believed that capital punishment was 
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either repugnant or desirable. In addressing this issue, this thesis provides the first 
historical explanation for why capital punishment was abolished.  
This thesis sheds light on the relationship between politicians, both 
elected and non-elected, and the public in post-war Britain. This was an 
important moment for several reasons. First, successive Conservative and Labour 
governments introduced liberalising reforms that their critics blamed for creating 
a ‘permissive society’ that rejected conventional morality, variously described as 
Christian or Victorian. These reforms represented a revolution from above, a 
coup d’état by a liberal elite whose endeavours forced a form of liberalisation 
upon society, with regard to abolition at least, that was not wanted by the 
majority of the population. Abolition was a liberalising reform because it relaxed 
penal policy towards murder, but it was not permissive as it did not permit any 
behaviour that was previously illegal or restricted. Abolition was part of the 
liberalisation that members of Margaret Thatcher’s government blamed for what 
they perceived to be the problems facing Britain in the 1980s, as vocalised by 
Norman Tebbit in his 1985 Disraeli Lecture.2 Secondly, these debates occurred 
at a time when the rise in popularity of opinion polling techniques was 
challenging the notion of what constituted public opinion. This thesis provides 
new ideas within the historiographical debates on liberalisation and public 
opinion, explaining politicians’ negation of public opinion for an issue of 
conscience and identifying the liberalising mentality that was at the heart of 
abolitionism and the growth of the permissive society. These points aside, 
campaigners for abolition in the USA have sought to draw inspiration and 
lessons from the British experience, and might learn much from considering how 
abolition succeeded in the face of political opposition. While this is a national 
study, it forms part of a wider transnational story that lies beyond the contextual 
remit of this investigation, which is located within the post-war British political 
culture. This thesis’ engagement with the themes of liberalisation and public 
opinion and its original research into MPs’ voting records and backgrounds, 
                                                   
2 The Times, 14 Nov. 1985. This article quoted the key points from Tebbit’s speech, which blamed 
the ‘era and attitudes of post-war funk’ for the contemporary crime and violence. Tebbit referred 
to the public desire for sterner penalties for criminals, which the article inferred to be a reference 
to capital punishment, and to the ‘valueless values of the permissive society’. 
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which is explained later, has led to its new explanation for why capital 
punishment was abolished. 
This thesis arrives at the conclusion that capital punishment was 
abolished because the determination of the vast majority of Labour MPs to 
remove the death penalty was bolstered by the abolitionism of a significant 
minority of the Conservative MPs born after 1920. These younger abolitionist 
Conservatives, who entered the House of Commons after the 1955 general 
election, enabled abolitionism to become entrenched within the House. Since this 
election, the abolitionists have been victorious in every debate on the subject, 
regardless of the party in government. They were becoming politically active at a 
time when Britain’s legal and political culture was secularising and embracing a 
liberalising ethos. The need for the state to maintain strict control over society, 
which included the severe penalty of death for murder, was being challenged. 
The diminishing influence of religion within British political culture, and in 
particular of traditional Anglican morality which many if not all Anglicans would 
have agreed provided tacit support for retention, meant that an important 
element of doctrinal support for the death penalty had reduced in value as a 
justification for politicians’ arguments and beliefs. The marginalisation of public 
opinion from the debates meant that the electorate’s retentionist opinions did not 
compel the abolitionists to vote against their consciences. The politicians believed 
that they alone were sufficiently informed on the subject to decide whether 
capital punishment should be abolished. 
Most abolitionists opposed capital punishment because they felt 
repugnance towards executions. Their desire to abolish capital punishment 
within this liberalising ethos was supported by the concept of civilisation. The 
widespread perception that British and European civilisation was eroded in the 
interwar period, before being destroyed during the War, led to a recognition that 
reform was required to make Britain civilised once again.3 The dominant trend 
in the civilising process after the War was to move away from the austere 
Victorian morality and instead permit individuals to have greater freedom from 
state interference. Roy Jenkins’ and Tony Crosland’s visions for a civilised, 
progressive Britain applied to a state that was becoming increasingly secularised. 
                                                   
3 Richard Overy, The Morbid Age: Britain between the Wars (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 2009), 13-
25. 
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Their visions were based upon a more humanitarian appreciation of individual 
liberties through encouraging gaiety and full enjoyment in society, including 
permitting behaviour that was sinful according to Christian doctrine.4 Capital 
punishment had no place within these visions. This liberalising, civilising, 
abolitionist ethos was already dominant within the Labour Party, although many 
of their number were uneasy with the permissive reforms. The younger 
Conservatives, who matured and entered politics whilst this liberalising ethos was 
developing within the House of Commons, were more receptive to this process. 
This caused a number of them to eschew their party’s orthodoxies on the death 
penalty to support abolition. With almost total support from Labour and from a 
few Conservatives, the Commons voted for abolition on every occasion that the 
reform was debated after the 1955 general election. This enabled capital 
punishment to be abolished.  
This thesis is the first history of abolition to examine the retentionists in 
detail. The retentionists, who were primarily the older Conservatives, failed to 
retain capital punishment because they could not counter the liberalising ethos 
that encapsulated the abolition debates. Their defeat in Parliament was assisted 
by the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment’s report, which concluded that 
the death penalty could not be proved to be a unique deterrent to murder. This 
provided evidence for the abolitionists’ causalist argument that the death penalty 
was neither a unique nor necessary sanction against murder. The retentionists 
lacked the evidence to counter-balance this argument. The legal and political 
secularisation of this period reduced the influence of traditional Anglican 
morality within politician’ beliefs and arguments, thus removing a doctrine that 
had traditionally provided tacit support for the retention of the death penalty. 
Most importantly, their desire to see murderers executed did not correlate with 
the increasingly liberal, abolitionist ethos within the Commons and, after the 
passage of the Life Peerages Act, the Lords. A significant recognition of the 
retentionists’ defeat occurred during a meeting in September 1964 between the 
retentionist Prime Minister, Alec Douglas-Home, and the soon-to-be abolitionist 
Home Secretary, Henry Brooke, who together acknowledged that the next 
                                                   
4 C.A.R. Crosland, The Future of Socialism (London: Jonathon Cape, 1956); C.A.R. Crosland, The 
Conservative Enemy: A Programme of Radical Reform for the 1960s (London: Jonathon Cape, 1962); Roy 
Jenkins, The Labour Case (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1959). 
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government, formed by whichever party, would have to abolish capital 
punishment.5 
Politicians’ calculation that they could ignore public opinion placed 
abolition alongside other social reforms that opponents of reform considered to 
be permissive. These are better characterised as liberalising reforms. Although 
capital punishment was linked to this liberalisation both chronologically and, 
through Jenkins and Crosland, conceptually, its status as a reform that helped to 
liberalise Britain should not go unchallenged. This thesis assesses abolition’s place 
alongside the permissive legislation as a liberalising, civilising reform. Abolition 
was liberalising as it relaxed the state’s control over crime within society and 
shifted the emphasis of punishment from deterrence and retribution towards 
prevention and rehabilitation. It was not permissive, though, as mentioned 
earlier. This difference has not been appreciated within the historiography and is 
examined within this thesis. 
The dwindling ranks of retentionists were unable to challenge the 
abolitionists, whose numbers grew with the arrival of a new generation of 
Conservative MPs from the mid-1950s onwards, which framed the issue. Lack of 
funding and poor leadership compared to the abolitionists explained much, but 
the retentionists’ unwillingness to challenge the Burkean notions of 
representation to let them bring public opinion, as measured and defined by the 
polls, within the debates was also important. For the crucial issue of deterrence, 
they lacked the evidence to counter-balance that that supported the abolitionists’ 
argument. 
Before embarking on an overview and analysis of the relevant 
historiography for this thesis, it would be useful to outline the parliamentary 
events that led to the abolition of capital punishment. The following brief 
synopsis is designed to orientate readers to the chronology of the post-war 
abolition process. It has been included because this thesis deliberately avoids the 
chronological, narrative approach of other studies, providing instead a more 
analytical examination of abolition.6 
                                                   
5 TNA:PRO, PREM 11/4690, Notes for the Record, 22 Sep. 1964. 
6 For a more detailed chronological narrative of abolition, see: Neville Twitchell, The Politics of the 
Rope: the Campaign to Abolish Capital Punishment in Britain 1955-1969 (Bury St. Edmunds: Arena 
Books, 2012). 
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The abolitionists’ success in 1969 was consolidated over twenty years after 
the post-war abolition process began. Clement Attlee’s new Labour government 
tabled a Criminal Justice Bill without any provision to abolish capital 
punishment.7 However, there was a determination amongst the rank and file of 
the Parliamentary Labour Party for abolition to be included within the Bill. The 
most prominent of their number, Sydney Silverman, tabled an amendment to the 
Bill, which was approved by the Commons in April 1948 but defeated by the 
Lords. Although abolition was excluded from the Criminal Justice Act 1948, the 
debates forced the government to act on this matter to satiate the MPs’ 
abolitionist desires. To achieve this, they appointed a Royal Commission to 
investigate capital punishment. 
 The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-53, examined most 
of the contentious aspects within the death penalty question, with the significant 
exception of abolition. However, the Commission concluded that the unique 
deterrent effect of the death penalty could not be proved, which provided support 
for the abolitionists’ case.8 
 Abolition was next debated when the Commons passed a motion to 
recognise the Commission’s report in February 1955. This was the only occasion 
during this period that the Commons voted for retention. The 1955 general 
election, though, resulted in a demographic change within the House of 
Commons that created an abolitionist majority under a retentionist Conservative 
government. The following year, the Commons voted for abolition once again. 
The new Conservative government’s retentionist motion was defeated in 
February 1956. The defeat of the government’s motion contained some of the 
most eloquent arguments for and against capital punishment in what was, with 
hindsight, the first debate after abolitionism had become entrenched in the 
Commons.  
The following month, the Commons voted in favour of Silverman’s 
Death Penalty (Abolition) Bill, although as in 1948 this Bill was defeated in the 
Lords. However, the strength of feeling amongst the majority of MPs, including a 
significant minority of the younger Conservative MPs, meant that the 
                                                   
7 Kevin Manton, “Labour Governments and Capital Punishment, 1924-1970,” Labour History 
Review 76, no. 1 (2011): 20-1. 
8 Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 1949-1953: Report, Cmnd. 8932, (London: HMSO, 1953). 
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government could not ignore the desire for reform. The outcome was the 
compromise Homicide Bill, which created degrees of murder and became law 
with the help of the government’s whips. However, this did not satiate the 
reformist appetite of the abolitionists and was decried as being illogical by 
politicians and commentators of all opinions on capital punishment. The 
Homicide Act was widely perceived to have failed to address the problems with 
capital punishment. The foundations were laid, therefore, for an abolitionist 
Labour government to remove the death penalty. 
 
Historiography  
Party identity has been recognised within the historiography as a common 
background amongst both the abolitionists and retentionists. The vast majority of 
Labour MPs were committed abolitionists. The retentionism of Clement Attlee’s 
Labour government was relatively anomalous. Kevin Manton notes that 
retentionism was not uncommon amongst the older Labour elite. Although he 
overemphasises this point, as 87 per cent of the Labour MPs to take part in at 
least one abolition debate were committed abolitionists, he acknowledges that the 
peculiar social context in the years immediately after the Second World War 
meant that the Labour government felt unable to support abolition.9 Despite the 
retentionism of their leadership, though, a large enough majority of Labour MPs 
supported abolition to enable the abolition amendment to become part of the 
Criminal Justice Bill, although it was defeated in the Lords. The Conservatives 
were an overwhelmingly retentionist party, although this situation changed 
somewhat with the arrival of the younger Conservatives into the House of 
Commons after the 1955 general election. As these young Conservatives enabled 
abolition to become entrenched within the Commons, they are the key group to 
understand when examining the abolition of capital punishment. The 
importance of the younger Conservative MPs for the abolition process has not 
been recognised previously within the historiography of the death penalty. 
Until recently, Britain’s abolition process has been the preserve of 
political scientists on both sides of the Atlantic. Many of these studies were 
contemporary narrative accounts that drew on newspaper reports and official 
                                                   
9 Manton, “Labour Governments and Capital Punishment,”16-33. 
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publications. Of note are the monographs by James Christoph and Elizabeth 
Tuttle, which chronicle the abolition process in Parliament as far as the passage 
of the Homicide Act.10 Over the past two decades a handful of historians, 
beginning with Harry Potter’s account of Church opinion and activism on 
abolition, have begun to pay more attention to the subject as the relevant 
archives opened. Potter, Victor Bailey, Kevin Manton, Mark Jarvis and Neville 
Twitchell have added considerably to the understanding of what happened 
when. However, the focus of their work is largely upon the abolitionists and 
Labour. There are some deviations from this within the literature, as Jarvis looks 
at the Conservatives during R.A. Butler’s tenure at the Home Office and Manton 
highlights the retentionism of a few senior Labour politicians. Nevertheless, the 
focus does not stray dramatically from these groups. In a recent article, Claire 
Langhamer has presented a new perspective on the abolition process with regard 
to the nature of public opinion. Her study examines the public’s emotional 
reactions to capital punishment, although she does not extend the analysis to 
consider the influence of popular emotion on politicians’ voting behaviour. This 
study, therefore, does not explain why politicians distanced themselves from 
public opinion in order to abolish the death penalty.11  
The most detailed study into abolition is Twitchell’s The Politics of the Rope. 
Twitchell is the first historian to examine the entire abolition process. His work 
provides a detailed account of the parliamentary discourse, campaigners’ 
activities, famous murder cases and the recorded opinions of newspapers, 
religious groups, professional organisations and the general public, the latter 
expressed through the poll. This work, though, is more akin to a comprehensive 
chronicle than an analytical study. For instance, Twitchell examines public 
                                                   
10 James Christoph, Capital Punishment and British Politics: the British Movement to Abolish the Death 
Penalty 1945-57 (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1962); Elizabeth Tuttle, The Crusade 
Against Capital Punishment in Great Britain, (London: Stevens and Sons Ltd., 1961). 
11 Victor Bailey, “The Shadow of the Gallows: The Death Penalty and the British Labour 
Government, 1945-51,” Law and History Review 18, no. 2 (2000): 305-49; Mark Jarvis, Conservative 
Governments, Morality and Social Change in Affluent Britain, 1957-64 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2005); Claire Langhamer, ““The Live Dynamic Whole of Feeling and 
Behavior”: Capital Punishment and the Politics of Emotion, 1945–1957,” Journal of British Studies 
51, 2 (2012): 416-41; Manton, “Labour Governments and Capital Punishment,”16-33; Harry 
Potter, Hanging in Judgement: Religion and the Death Penalty in England from the Bloody Code to Abolition 
(London: SCM Press Ltd., 1993); Twitchell, The Politics of the Rope (2012); Neville Twitchell, “The 
Politics of the Rope: the Campaign to Abolish Capital Punishment in Britain 1955-1969,” (PhD 
dissertation, London Metropolitan University, 2009). 
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opinion on abolition by chronicling the opinion poll results without examining 
how they were used in Parliament, any other forms of public opinion or their 
influence on politicians’ decisions. Like the contemporary political scientists, he 
does not examine the causes of the politicians’ beliefs on abolition or the reasons 
for their use of certain arguments, despite benefitting from access to many of the 
relevant archives.12 His work, therefore, is of limited use as an explanation for 
why abolition occurred. 
Victor Bailey provides a useful account of the Attlee government’s 
retentionism during the passage of the Criminal Justice Bill through Parliament. 
He attributes their retentionism, and that of wider British society at this time, to 
the impact of the Second World War and the associated rising crime rate after 
the end of the War. His study takes the form of a narrative account of the events 
in Parliament and of the decisions taken by the Labour government when 
formulating their Criminal Justice Bill. He briefly outlines a number of possible 
hypotheses for the Labour government’s retentionism, including that abolition 
could have cost Labour votes and that the post-war crime wave meant that the 
time was not right to remove the death penalty. He does not offer a detailed 
analysis of these hypotheses though, which means that his suggestions remain 
undeveloped. 13  His article is of limited use for explaining why Attlee’s 
government opposed capital punishment despite the abolitionist beliefs of the 
majority of backbench Labour MPs. Of greater use is Kevin Manton’s article 
“Labour Governments and Capital Punishment”. Manton attempts to explain 
why Attlee’s government supported retention, focusing on the potential political 
ramifications of being portrayed as soft on crime. As this thesis explains in the 
following chapter, though, psephology was still in its infancy as a discipline in the 
1940s. The government would have been unable to discern the issues on which 
the electorate based their votes. Furthermore, as politicians marginalised public 
opinion from these debates, they had no intention of making it an electoral issue. 
It is impossible to ascertain, therefore, how far the Labour government feared 
any electoral ramifications from supporting abolition. Although he over-
represents the level of retentionism within the Labour Party, his article is an 
important addition to the understanding of the nuances within Labour’s opinions 
                                                   
12 Twitchell, The Politics of the Rope, 310-28; Twitchell, “The Politics of the Rope,” 56-88.  
13 Bailey, “The Shadow of the Gallows,” 328-32. 
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on capital punishment.14 However, like Bailey he also does not examine the 
backgrounds of these MPs in an attempt to understand the reasons for their 
beliefs on capital punishment. This is necessary to understand why capital 
punishment was abolished. 
Capital punishment has been placed within the wider framework of post-
war liberalisation by a number of academics, including Twitchell. Stuart Hall 
and Christie Davies include abolition within their analyses of the liberalising 
legislation of the 1950s and 1960s. Abolition was liberalising through its role in 
reducing the state’s strict social control over crime. Davies, however, is explicit in 
listing abolition as a permissive reform. This label is erroneous as abolishing the 
death penalty did not legalise an action that was previously illegal or restricted. 
Abolition was associated with the permissive reforms by contemporary 
politicians, including Roy Jenkins and Anthony Crosland, through the common 
purpose of liberalising and civilising society. It is a mistake, though, to 
homogenise abolition with permissiveness.15  
Arthur Marwick uses the concept of civilisation to link abolition to the 
permissive reforms, describing it as ‘the most significant of all the pieces of 
civilising legislation’.16 This overstates the importance of abolition within the 
corpus of social liberalising legislation, as the legalisation of homosexuality, 
abortion and suicide were at least as significant, if not more so. Indeed, H.L.A. 
Hart highlighted the significance of the legalisation of suicide as it was the first 
Act of Parliament ‘for at least a century’ that legalised an act deemed sinful 
within Christian morality. 17 However, Marwick’s description recognises the 
importance and widespread appeal of this concept for the abolitionists and also 
for historians who agree that the socially liberalising agenda was civilising.  
Richard Overy has explained that civilisation was a common theme in 
political and popular discourse in the interwar years, with many people 
perceiving that civilisation was declining in Britain and Europe. It is 
                                                   
14 Manton, “Labour Governments and Capital Punishment,” 16-33. 
15 Crosland, The Future of Socialism, 521-2; Crosland, The Conservative Enemy, 131; Christie Davies, 
Permissive Britain: Social Change in the Sixties and Seventies (London: Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons Ltd., 
1975); Stuart Hall, “Reformism and the Legislation of Consent,” in Permissiveness and Control: the 
Fate of the Sixties Legislation, ed. National Deviancy Conference (London and Basingstoke: The 
Macmillan Press Ltd, 1980), 1-43; Jenkins, The Labour Case, 135-7. 
16 Arthur Marwick, British Society Since 1945 4th ed. (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 2003), 117. 
17 H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), preface. 
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understandable that the discourse on the decline of society became the discourse 
for its regeneration after the War. Overy explains that those who wrote about 
civilisation, namely the political and social elites, defined the concept. The 
decline of society’s civilisation was perceived to trigger the decline of the 
individual’s state of mind.18 This understanding continued after the War, except 
that those who wrote about civilisation now focused upon society’s progression 
rather than its collapse. This progression was charted by the Left, notably Jenkins 
and Crosland, who wanted to steer Britain away from the Victorian morality that 
existed whilst its civilisation crumbled. Matthew Grimley has explained that 
Christianity was a defining element of Englishness prior to the end of the Second 
World War.19 The process of secularisation that diminished the influence of 
Christianity within Britain’s legal and political culture would have impacted upon 
this national identity. The progressive civilising programmes of Jenkins and 
Crosland, which were to be applied within an increasingly secularised political 
culture, were an attempt to alter Britain’s, or at least England’s, national identity. 
In the context of post-war Britain, it is understandable why Jenkins’ and 
Crosland’s liberalising, civilising programmes found support amongst a number 
of politicians and faced little active opposition from those who disagreed with 
their ambition. Furthermore, abolition fitted into the civilisation discourse neatly. 
The way in which a society treated its weakest was an established test of a 
society’s civilisation, a notion supported by the Gospel according to Matthew 
amongst other sources.20 Winston Churchill extended this definition of the 
weakest to explain that civilisation was measured by looking at the treatment of 
prisoners.21 Abolition was part of the liberalising process after the Second World 
War, and arguably a necessary part of the civilising process. 
No historian, though, has explored this concept in its function as a both a 
reason and justification for abolishing the death penalty. A belief that capital 
punishment damaged society’s civilisation was an embodiment of the emotional 
reaction against the death penalty. Those politicians who were repulsed by the 
                                                   
18 Overy, The Morbid Age, 15-6; 22-3. 
19 Matthew Grimley, “The Religion of Englishness: Puritanism, Providentialism, and “National 
Character,” 1918–1945,” The Journal of British Studies 46, no. 4 (2007): 884-906. 
20 Matthew 25: 31-46 (New International Version). 
21 HC Deb 20 Jul. 1910 vol. 19 c. 1354. 
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death penalty believed that this immoral act harmed society. Similarly, those 
politicians who did not find capital punishment sufficiently repulsive to support 
its abolition, or whose emotional response to murder was to desire the execution 
of the murderer, argued that the death penalty was necessary to protect society’s 
civilisation. The retentionists’ uses of civilisation were less common than those of 
the abolitionists. Nevertheless, civilisation was a major theme within the 
parliamentary discourse on abolition. It was both the expression and justification 
of the emotional reactions to a particularly emotive issue.  
This thesis engages with the concept of civilisation, particularly in the 
chapters on the retentionists’ and the abolitionists’ cases. It is the first historical 
study to examine this concept in detail with reference to capital punishment. This 
helps to explain why capital punishment was abolished, as it provides an insight 
into politicians’ emotional reactions to the death penalty and into the morality 
that directed their arguments during debates. This thesis applies Overy’s 
framework for civilisation outside its context of interwar decline, using it for a 
post-war political culture of social liberalisation. This adds to the historiography 
of civilisation in twentieth century British politics, as it improves the 
understanding of how the concept was interpreted within this liberalising issue of 
conscience. Thus far within the historiography, it has been used somewhat as a 
synonym for liberalisation. Although the two were closely linked in this period, 
they were not identical concepts. This thesis recognises these differences and 
analyses them as separate concepts. 
The concept of modernisation has not been engaged with as frequently as 
civilisation and liberalisation within either the historiography of capital 
punishment or the parliamentary debates. When the abolitionists used it, it was 
often as a synonym for civilisation in describing capital punishment as being 
anathema within a modern state such as Britain.22 It was more frequently used in 
the debates to describe the developments in criminal psychiatry and the Home 
Office’s penal reforms.23 The historiography of modernisation encapsulates the 
wider aspects of social, political and cultural reform after the Second World War. 
                                                   
22 John Paton used modernisation to argue that capital punishment was anachronistic in the 
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Apr. 1948 vol. 449 cc. 1014-5. 
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An excellent example of this is the edited volume by Becky Conekin, Frank Mort 
and Chris Waters.24 However, this concept does not add an extra dimension to 
the frameworks provided by the civilisation and liberalisation discourses, which 
were used more frequently within the debates. For this reason, it is these concepts 
rather than modernisation that are focused upon within this thesis. 
This thesis engages with a number of accounts of the wider reformist 
culture in Britain after the Second World War. Noel Annan’s memoir of his 
generation, Our Age, describes the reformist characteristics of the new 
establishment, of which he was part, that campaigned for and enacted the 
socially liberalising legislation. Although it does not address capital punishment, 
his representation has informed this thesis’ understanding of the generation of 
politicians and campaigners who championed abolition and the permissive 
reforms.25 Annan’s work offers a vision of the post-war liberalisation that credits 
the political and cultural elites for the socially liberal reformist culture. Annan’s 
revolution from above was present for abolition, as the politicians demonstrated a 
form of liberal paternalism in acting against the will of the electorate by enforcing 
a reform that they believed would benefit society, despite the opposition to the 
reform from that society. The liberalisation that occurred through abolition was 
not the result of the increasingly dominant youth culture, the ‘youthquake’ as 
termed by Diana Vreeland and explored by Kenneth Leech, although it was a 
significant minority of the young Conservatives in the 1950s and 1960s who split 
from their Party’s orthodoxies to support abolition, thereby securing its enduring 
support within the Commons.26 Although the ‘youthquake’ was an important 
part of the broader social liberalisation, for abolition the opinions of young 
people should be viewed as part of public opinion and therefore distant from 
politicians’ decision-making processes, as there was no vocal movement or 
sentiment for abolition within the youth counter-culture. This thesis, therefore, 
engages with Annan’s portrayal of the liberal elite steering the liberalising 
reformism of the post-war decades, as abolition was a reform from above. 
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Mark Jarvis includes capital punishment within his account of the 
liberalisation that has been associated with R.A. Butler’s tenure at the Home 
Office. Jarvis focuses upon Butler’s efforts to introduce liberalising legislation 
through his actions in Parliament, in government and at the party conferences. 
He exposes the levels of opposition that Butler faced in these arenas. Jarvis’ 
account outlines the strength of Conservative opposition to abolition, portraying 
Butler as the principal reformer of the death penalty in the Party.27 As with the 
rest of the historiography of capital punishment, though, Jarvis does not examine 
why the more traditional Conservatives opposed abolition or why a significant 
minority of the younger Conservatives supported this reform. His work is another 
largely narrative account of the abolition process in the mid-1950s that does not 
explain why the death penalty was abolished. Even so, Jarvis’ monograph is the 
most detailed historical account of Conservative opinions on capital punishment. 
The recent scholarship on public opinion in Britain has examined the 
advent of polling and the ways in which it was used by politicians. Notable works 
include articles by Laura Beers, Joe Moran, Mark Roodhouse and Andrew 
Taylor. These examine the methodology and impact of public opinion, as 
represented by the poll, on the presentation and shaping of policy. Beers arrives 
at the conclusion that public opinion influenced the presentation of policy only 
and did not affect its creation or amendment. Moran focuses upon the work of 
Mass-Observation (M-O) and offers some analysis of the political and newspaper 
reactions to those people who answered ‘don’t know’ to relatively straightforward 
survey questions. Roodhouse examines the rise of the Gallup poll in Britain, 
noting many of the methodological weaknesses within its practice that reinforced 
the politicians’ apprehension towards its evidence. Moran and Roodhouse’s 
findings are useful for this thesis’ examination of the abolitionists’ rejection of 
mass public opinion as being uninformed. This thesis develops these ideas to 
explain why the abolitionists were able to separate parliamentary opinion from 
that of the electorate. Taylor focuses more upon the Conservatives’ evolving 
electoral strategy in the burgeoning age of polling. Its subject is primarily 
psephology rather than the formation of policy, and thus is of limited use for this 
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thesis. Nevertheless, as part of the recent corpus of historical literature on public 
opinion, it is noteworthy within this analysis.28  
Langhamer has examined the nature of public opinion towards the death 
penalty. Her study explores emotion within public opinion, which is drawn 
particularly from M-O’s surveys. This is an important development in the 
historiography of capital punishment as, to use Langhamer’s phrase, it examines 
the ‘texture’ of the electorate’s retentionist opinion. She does not extend her 
study, though, to consider in detail the influence of public opinion on politicians’ 
divisions during the parliamentary debates on abolition.29  
James Thompson’s monograph on public opinion within political affairs 
examines the capital punishment debates of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. He devises a framework for dividing and defining the public 
based upon politicians’ prejudices about the groups within society. The general 
socio-economic prejudices that formed this framework were similar to those used 
by the politicians studied within this thesis, although the nineteenth century 
politicians used enfranchisement and active engagement in politics to categorise 
the population. The politicians studied within this thesis viewed one’s 
professional background and education as a key factor in determining whether a 
person was informed or uninformed. Although Thompson’s work is not directly 
relevant to the study of public opinion within the capital punishment debates, it is 
noteworthy that he has identified a similar division of the population within his 
recent study.30  
Politicians ignored the bulk of the public when it came to matters that 
parliamentarians considered to be issues of conscience or technical matters. One 
of the interesting facets of abolition is that politicians conflated the two. This was 
an issue of moral conscience upon which only experts, moral or legal, could 
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decide. Politicians made use of the Burkean rhetoric about representation to 
justify this position, whether they believed it or not, and positioned themselves as 
the experts. This thesis draws upon Langhamer’s appreciation of the nature of 
public opinion as being more complex than that represented by the opinion poll. 
It extends Beers’ conclusion to apply it to an issue of conscience. Furthermore, it 
identifies the politicians’ recognition of the multiple publics that were within 
society and the different influences that were afforded to each. These are original 
developments within the wider historiography of public opinion in Britain. 
This thesis develops the malnourished historiography of capital 
punishment by analysing the beliefs of the two main parties on capital 
punishment and their influences upon the judgements of their own and other 
politicians. Although most studies recognise a party split on abolition, only Jarvis 
and Manton have written in any detail on the party dimension. Their works do 
not extend sufficiently beyond narrative accounts to explain fully the importance 
of this factor. On the influence of religion and religious morality, Harry Potter’s 
Hanging in Judgement is a chronological account of church opinion towards the 
death penalty. This focuses in particular on the views of the Church of England 
and discusses its leadership’s swing towards abolition in the early 1960s. Potter’s 
work too suffers from the perennial problem within the historiography of 
providing little more than a narrative account of opinions and of events in 
Parliament, extending this to the Convocations of Canterbury and York.31 This 
thesis draws upon Potter’s narrative and the academic studies into secularisation 
during this period, notably by Matthew Grimley, Callum Brown and Jeremy 
Morris, in assessing the influence of religious beliefs, primarily from Anglican 
morality, upon the politicians’ beliefs and arguments. In particular, it follows 
Grimley’s argument that secularisation was more evident in law and politics than 
in wider society during this period. Given that public opinion did not greatly 
influence politicians’ beliefs on capital punishment, the continued prominence of 
the Church and Anglican morality within wider society would not have 
influenced greatly the politicians’ arguments and beliefs. Legal and political 
secularisation, therefore, had a pronounced influence on the abolition debates.32 
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This thesis’ examination of secularisation focuses upon the Church of England 
and Anglican morality. As this was the established Church, both it and its leaders 
had a particularly significant role within the political process, a role which 
diminished as a result of legal and political secularisation. 
Twitchell’s work is noteworthy because he uses a wider range of sources 
to examine Britain’s post-war capital punishment debates than any previous 
historical study. It is not, though, the first narrative of the abolition debates. 
Brian Block and John Hostettler provide an almost-exclusively parliamentary 
narrative of the death penalty debates for this period in a survey of capital 
punishment that extends back to Anglo-Saxon Britain. Almost all of their sources 
for the post-war debates are taken from newspapers, notably The Times, and from 
the parliamentary debates as recorded in Hansard.33  The more analytical 
examinations of capital punishment have focused on other countries in which the 
death penalty is still applied for civilian crimes, notably the United States. Austin 
Sarat has published extensively on capital punishment in the United States. 
Recently, David Garland has examined the United States’ continued use of the 
death penalty within an international context in which many other western 
countries have already abolished the death penalty. On a broader international 
scale, Peter Hodgkinson and William Schabas outline the contemporary 
abolition processes in a variety of countries. Roger Hood attempts to provide a 
contemporary overview of abolition and the application of the death penalty 
from an even wider range of states.34 The analytical depth that is afforded to the 
capital punishment debates within other countries, in particular the United 
States, is absent from the historiography of Britain’s abolition debates. 
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This thesis addresses the gaps identified within the historiography to 
provide the first explanation of why politicians supported or opposed capital 
punishment and why the death penalty was abolished. It draws upon a number 
of factors that are ill-developed or absent within the historiography, including the 
importance of the politicians’ ages, their professional backgrounds, the 
conceptual and emotional bases for their beliefs and their associations with other 
liberalising campaigns and reforms. Other historians, notably Twitchell, have 
examined many of the archives accessed for this thesis, although they have not 
focused on identical sources to those used within this thesis. By not considering 
why capital punishment was abolished and not engaging with a broad 
historiography of liberalisation and public opinion, previous histories of capital 
punishment have not utilised these sources effectively to explain why, rather than 
how, capital punishment was abolished. This thesis’ database of MPs’ votes on 
capital punishment and of their backgrounds is the most significant analytical 
resource for this thesis. It can be found within the enclosed CD-R. Figures 
derived from it are located within the body of this thesis and in the Appendix. It 
has been compiled by the author for this thesis and is of the utmost importance 
for demonstrating and identifying the common backgrounds and beliefs that 
directed politicians’ decisions on capital punishment. The existing 
historiography’s analytical potential has been restricted by the absence of the 
evidence that has been derived from this database. This thesis, therefore, is the 
first history of capital punishment that attempts to understand and explain the 
formative causes of MPs’ beliefs on capital punishment. 
 
Methodology 
This thesis’ examination begins in 1947, the year that the Criminal Justice Bill 
was introduced. This was not the first year that abolition was discussed in the 
British Parliament. It was debated briefly in the mid-nineteenth century before 
public executions were outlawed.35 In the 1920s and 1930s there were protracted 
abolition debates in Parliament. During this period, the National Council for the 
Abolition of the Death Penalty (NCADP) campaigned for abolition in a similar 
manner to the National Campaign for the Abolition of Capital Punishment 
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(NCACP) in the 1950s and 1960s.36 Furthermore, capital punishment continued 
to be debated after permanent abolition in 1969, particularly in the context of 
the fighting in Northern Ireland and terrorist acts throughout the country. 
However, the debates before and after the period from 1947 to 1969 have not 
been included within this thesis. This is because the political context provided by 
the post-war social liberalisation was peculiar to the two decades after the Second 
World War. This thesis, therefore, focuses upon this period in isolation, as to 
include the debates from other periods would require engaging with other 
contexts, for which there is insufficient time and space within this study. The 
limitation of this period to between 1947 and 1969 charts the post-war abolition 
process from its first debate to permanent abolition. 
 One of this thesis’ additions to the historiography is its investigation of the 
formative causes of politicians’ beliefs on capital punishment. It is necessary to 
examine these in order to understand why most politicians wanted to abolish 
capital punishment, and why the others did not. No previous study has attempted 
to identify the factors that directed politicians’ beliefs on the death penalty. 
Callaghan’s and Ross’ memorandum indicates that emotion was the driving 
factor behind the abolitionists’ rejection of capital punishment. What neither it 
nor any other source can provide is a definitive explanation of the formative 
causes of politicians’ beliefs. This thesis, therefore, cannot explain conclusively 
why politicians supported or opposed abolition, but it can provide original 
hypotheses about the factors that directed their beliefs. 
It is not possible to examine the beliefs on capital punishment of every 
individual politician beyond examining their voting records. This is due to both 
the impracticality of accessing the private papers of all politicians involved in the 
debates and the lack of files on capital punishment that existed in the papers of 
politicians who were prominent within the abolition debates. One cannot use the 
politicians’ arguments within parliamentary debates as definitive evidence of their 
beliefs, as the factors used to support an argument often would be deployed to 
justify an argument and to persuade others to agree with it. They cannot be 
presumed to be accurate representations of beliefs. A common example of this 
was the abolitionists’ frequent citation of the Royal Commission’s conclusion that 
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capital punishment could not be proven to be a unique deterrent to murder. This 
was a key argument within the capital punishment debates, but it did not 
represent the emotional repugnance towards the death penalty that directed 
many abolitionists’ opposition to capital punishment. Despite the problems 
associated with using parliamentary debates to analyse politicians’ beliefs, 
though, they are examined for this purpose within this thesis, as in most cases 
they are the only available evidence. Parliamentary debates were one of the few 
occasions when politicians outlined their views on capital punishment. Although 
other factors have been examined, including the politicians’ ages and 
occupational backgrounds, given the dearth of sources available to analyse 
politicians’ beliefs the parliamentary debates are a necessary resource for this 
research.  
Causalism is a key concept for this thesis that requires some explanation. 
In Permissive Britain, Christie Davies coined the term ‘causalist morality’ to 
describe the justifications for supporting or opposing legislation that were based 
upon the consequences of that reform for the individual and for society. This was 
the antithesis of the moralist justification, which used an often religious-based 
morality to support or oppose legislation on the grounds of whether or not the 
relevant action was sinful.37 This framework succinctly describes the impact of 
secularisation within the political discourse on abolition and other socially 
liberalising reforms within post-war Britain. For capital punishment, the primary 
justification for an argument on abolition became the causalist issue of 
deterrence. This causalist argument was based upon the measurable 
consequences of retaining or abolishing capital punishment rather than the 
morality of the application of the death penalty. This was based upon evidence 
from the Royal Commission’s report and from foreign countries that had 
abolished the death penalty without experiencing an increase in the murder rate. 
This evidence largely supported the abolitionists’ case. The moralist justification 
was based on various interpretations of Biblical doctrine and could be found to 
support both sides, though importantly the Church of England and Anglican 
morality had often provided a level of tacit support for retention. Although 
moralist arguments were used throughout this period to support either position 
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on the death penalty, a consequence of the secularisation of the law was that such 
arguments became less convincing justifications within political discourse. It was 
the causalist issue of deterrence that dominated the post-war discourse, despite 
the various methodological problems with capital punishment statistics. It is 
important to note, though, that this secularisation within the political discourse 
did not mean that causalism was the determining principle behind politicians’ 
beliefs on capital punishment. Their desires to abolish or retain the death penalty 
were based upon the moralist emotions of repugnance towards the notion of 
executions and retribution against the convicted murderer. The impact of 
secularisation and causalism was to be found in the justifications for politicians’ 
arguments rather than in their beliefs. This framework of causalist arguments 
overtaking moralist ones is analysed within this thesis’ chapters on the 
abolitionists’ and retentionists’ cases. 
The primary source for the analysis of MPs’ beliefs is a database of the 
votes of every MP who took part in at least one of the principal capital 
punishment debates during this period. For a comparison between the votes on 
abolition and on other liberalising reforms, the divisions from the second 
readings of the Sexual Offences Bill and the Medical Termination of Pregnancy 
Bill are also included. These Bills sought to legalise homosexuality and abortion 
respectively, and both became Acts of Parliament. They are two of the most 
notable permissive reforms from the 1950s and 1960s.38 This database also 
includes the MPs’ ages, occupations and their affiliation with political parties and 
other relevant organisations and campaigns. This database has been created by 
the author of this thesis. The information within it has been gathered from the 
division records from Hansard and from the politicians’ profiles from Who Was 
Who, the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography and the catalogues published by 
Andrew Roth, Michael Stenton and Stephen Lees.39 This identifies some of the 
                                                   
38 The debates included in the database are: HC Deb 14 Apr. 1948 vol. 449 cc. 979-1098; HC 
Deb 15 Jul. 1948 vol. 453 cc. 1411-545; HC Deb 10 Feb. 1955 vol. 536 cc. 2064-183; HC Deb 
16 Feb. 1956 vol. 548 cc. 2536-655; HC Deb 12 Mar. 1956 vol. 550 cc. 36-151; HC Deb 6 Feb. 
1957 vol. 564 cc. 454-568; HC Deb 21 Dec. 1964 vol. 704 cc. 870-1010; HC Deb 13 Jul. 1965 
vol. 716 cc. 358-465; HC Deb 16 Dec. 1969 vol. 793 cc. 1148-297; HC Deb 11 Feb. 1966 vol. 
724 cc. 782-874; HC Deb 22 Jul. 1966 vol. 732 cc. 1067-165. 
39  Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, various pages, http://www.oxforddnb.com, 
[accessed 2011-2013]; Who’s Who and Who Was Who, various pages, 
http://www.ukwhoswho.com, [accessed 2011-2013]; Andrew Roth, The Business Background of 
 30 
abolitionists’ and retentionists’ common backgrounds and their attitudes towards 
contemporary permissive legislation.  
The collection and collation of information for this database was 
occasionally problematic. The database requires politicians to be labelled as 
either abolitionists or retentionists. The debate on the third reading of the 
Homicide Bill complicates this division somewhat, as MPs voted on whether or 
not to limit capital punishment to certain murders, thus creating degrees of 
homicide. This division, therefore, was not on abolition. However, the Bill was 
introduced by the Conservative government to wreck Sydney Silverman’s 
abolition Bill before its third reading in the Commons. The government applied 
its whips to their Bill to ensure its success. This placed it at odds with the divisions 
on abolition Bills, for which MPs were permitted a free vote. In voting for the 
Homicide Bill, therefore, MPs would have been aware that they were voting in 
opposition to abolition. Very few abolitionists voted for the Homicide Bill, with 
the exception of a number of Conservative abolitionists who were pressured by 
their Party to support the reform. Therefore, this database’s labelling of 
politicians in this debate as abolitionists or retentionists is valid. 
There are a couple of factors, though, that have not been included within 
the database. It does not consider the location of the politicians’ constituencies as 
this factor is closely connected to the political parties. The religious backgrounds 
of the MPs have been analysed by Peter Richards for the debate on the second 
reading of the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Bill in the Commons.40 Due 
to the detail of his investigation and the impracticalities of accessing the religious 
beliefs of politicians, the database for this thesis has not included this factor. 
Finally, there is more biographical information available for some MPs than 
others, in particular regarding their professional backgrounds. An occupation has 
been obtained for all MPs, but it is possible that some were employed primarily 
in other careers than that which is recorded in the database. This database is 
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reliant on biographical catalogues that sometimes provide bare descriptions of 
politicians’ careers before and during their time in Parliament. The careers given 
within this database are the most accurate occupational backgrounds available. 
Furthermore, a year of birth has been obtained for all MPs who took part in an 
abolition debate, with the exception of Sir William Bennett, Unionist MP for 
Woodside, for whom surprisingly only a year of death is recorded within the 
catalogues. He has been excluded from the analysis of MPs’ ages. 
Through the evidence from parliamentary debates, this database and the 
government, party, politicians and campaigns’ archives, this thesis arrives at 
hypotheses on the factors that can be expected to have directed politicians’ beliefs 
on capital punishment. The formative causes are examined principally within the 
chapter identifying the retentionists and abolitionists and within the beliefs 
sections of the chapters on the retentionists’ and abolitionists’ cases.  
 
Sources 
Due to the limited historiography of this subject, the majority of the evidence for 
this thesis is derived from primary sources. A significant amount of evidence is 
taken from the principal parliamentary debates on capital punishment, 
government publications, notably the report of the Royal Commission on Capital 
Punishment, and government departmental papers.41 Although the vast majority 
of the work on abolition was conducted and discussed by the Cabinet and Home 
Office, other departments sporadically provided extra evidence and opinions on 
capital punishment from Britain and other countries. There are many sources 
drawn from the archives of various professional, religious and campaigning 
organisations, political parties, the private papers and memoirs of many 
politicians involved in the debates, published programmes and manifestos written 
by influential politicians and newspaper and television reports on capital 
punishment.42 
The largest archives of private papers available belonged to members of 
the NCACP. Gerald Gardiner’s papers at the British Library contained many of 
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the most relevant files for this thesis. They were concerned primarily with the 
activities of the NCACP but also contained many of Gardiner’s opinions on 
capital punishment and the progress of legislation. There is similar material in 
the archives of Victor Gollancz and Arthur Koestler, both of whom were 
influential members of the NCACP. Archbishop Michael Ramsey’s archive at 
Lambeth Palace contains a significant number of sources on his opinions and 
actions on the death penalty. There are equivalent resources available at 
Lambeth Palace for Geoffrey Fisher, Ramsey’s retentionist predecessor as 
Archbishop of Canterbury. The only other retentionist who retained a significant 
number of files on capital punishment was Duncan Sandys, who was the only 
figurehead for the retentionist campaign. R.A. Butler’s archive contains a larger 
number of files on capital punishment than the archives of most other politicians 
who were prominent on either side of the debate. Yet, in total he retained few 
relevant sources within his archive. The lack of sources demonstrates that, on the 
whole, political parties and governments honoured politicians’ free votes on 
abolition by not attempting to persuade them to vote in a certain way. It 
indicates also that politicians did not discuss their views with or seek inspiration 
from others. This supports this thesis’ argument that politicians adhered to the 
Burkean principle of using their own judgements when voting on issues rather 
than following the opinions of others. 
There have been a few restrictions within certain archives that have 
prohibited access to important sources. Roy Jenkins’ papers, which are held at 
the Bodleian Library in Oxford, are currently being catalogued and, therefore, 
are inaccessible. The papers of Sir Hartley Shawcross, the staunchly abolitionist 
Attorney General during Clement Attlee’s premiership, and Sydney Silverman, 
arguably the pre-eminent abolitionist politician after the Second World War, are 
both held privately and have proved to be inaccessible. These three were 
amongst the most vocal abolitionists within Parliament and access to their 
archives would have benefitted this thesis. The papers of a number of other 
politicians who were prominent within the capital punishment debates have been 
accessed for this thesis. Although some provided valuable sources, most of the 
archives had very few, if any, files on capital punishment. The archives of James 
Callaghan, James Chuter Ede, Quintin Hogg, William Jowitt, Gwilym Lloyd 
George, David Maxwell Fyfe and Frank Soskice contained either very few or no 
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files on capital punishment, despite the prominent role of these politicians within 
the debates. It is reasonable to expect that these were the politicians who were 
most likely to have kept files on capital punishment, as they were all either Home 
Secretaries or Lord Chancellors during key moments of the debates. The 
exception to this was Hogg, who was especially vocal within the debates 
throughout the period and was the shadow Home Secretary when Harold 
Wilson’s Labour government tabled the resolution to make abolition permanent 
in December 1969. He later became Lord Chancellor. This absence of material 
from their archives again supports the point that politicians’ free votes on 
abolition were deliberately preserved. 
Some of the gaps within the private papers of the prominent politicians 
are filled partially by their published memoirs and autobiographies. These are 
more subjective than private papers as they have been written to present the 
author in a certain light, with some aspects of the history overemphasised and 
other areas omitted. However, they do provide the best insight into the opinions 
and actions of many of these protagonists. The research for this thesis has 
engaged most closely with the publications by Roy Jenkins, R.A. Butler and Jim 
Callaghan. The other key politicians who published memoirs did not discuss 
capital punishment in great detail. This indicates again that capital punishment 
was not a party political issue about which there were likely to be many 
interesting anecdotes. 
The Conservative and Labour Party archives include some discussion of 
capital punishment, although they contain fewer sources on capital punishment 
than Gardiner’s and Sandys’ papers. Although there was a strong party identity 
amongst the abolitionists and retentionists, it is unsurprising that there was 
limited discussion of capital punishment recorded by parties, as politicians were 
generally afforded a free vote on the subject. There was more discussion of 
capital punishment within the Conservative Party’s archive than within Labour’s. 
Again, this is not surprising. The vast majority of Labour Party politicians 
supported abolition and, with the exception of Attlee’s government, their 
leadership concurred with this opinion. There was no need for the Party’s 
leadership to attempt to persuade its members to support abolition through any 
forum other than parliamentary debates. The Labour Party, therefore, did not 
need to exert much pressure on their MPs to convince them to support abolition. 
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They did not have the same luxury within the House of Lords, though they did 
not appear to have made any determined attempts to appeal to the retentionist 
peers. The retentionists dominated the House before the Life Peerages Act 
enabled the appointment of a number of liberalising, abolitionist Lords. On the 
other hand, the retentionist Conservative leaders did attempt occasionally to 
persuade a number of their MPs to support capital punishment when the debates 
assumed a more party political nature. This occurred twice, first in 1956 during 
the passage of the Homicide Act and then in December 1969 when the Labour 
government attempted to make abolition permanent before the Murder 
(Abolition of Death Penalty) Act’s five-year experimental period of abolition had 
elapsed. These efforts generated a greater volume of sources than those produced 
by the Labour Party, which did not need to persuade its members to support 
abolition. The Conservative leadership’s efforts in 1956 and 1969 to persuade 
their abolitionist members to support retention demonstrates that the abolitionist 
cabal within the Party was recognised to be large enough to produce an 
abolitionist victory in the Commons, even whilst there was a retentionist 
Conservative government. 
This thesis would benefit from research in constituency archives to 
ascertain further the extent to which MPs were influenced by constituents’ 
opinions. By examining the MPs’ constituency surgery files and newsletters, it 
would be possible to analyse the manner in which they attempted to persuade 
their constituents that it was correct for them and their fellow politicians to vote 
on capital punishment according to their own judgements rather than public 
opinion, if indeed they did attempt to persuade them of this at all. These archives 
would also shed further light on the MPs’ backgrounds and religious beliefs. 
Unfortunately, during the study for this thesis there has been insufficient time to 
conduct this research. It is, though, an area for further research beyond this 
thesis. 
This thesis does not examine the published treatises on abolition that 
were written by abolitionist campaigners, although it recognises their significance 
in forming part of the NCACP’s campaigning strategy. There were no equivalent 
publications in support of the retentionists’ case, as the retentionists lacked the 
support and finances to publish such material. Unlike the abolitionists’ campaign, 
the retentionists’ rather humble campaign was out of keeping with the 
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liberalising, agitating movements of the period, such as the Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament (CND). These texts can be categorised as both an attempt 
to inform public opinion and as an expression of public opinion. They are 
examined in the following chapter as part of the NCACP’s campaign.  
 
Structure  
This argument is presented within four main chapters. Chapter One examines 
the place of public opinion within the capital punishment debates. Chapter Two 
identifies the collective identities of the retentionist and abolitionist politicians. 
Chapters Three and Four analyse the retentionists’ and abolitionists’ arguments 
and beliefs respectively. The thesis has been structured in this manner in order to 
ascertain first what influence public opinion had within the capital punishment 
debates before analysing the politicians’ arguments and beliefs in order to explain 
why the death penalty was abolished. The role of public opinion is examined first 
in order to explain why the majority of politicians were willing to vote against the 
desire of the electorate. 
 Chapter One, titled “Marginalising the mob: the influence of public 
opinion within the capital punishment debates”, provides an original framework 
for understanding politicians’ interpretations of public opinion after the Second 
World War, which adds to the recent historiography of the subject. It recognises 
that the abolitionists split the public into two groups, which were labelled the 
informed public and uninformed public. Many politicians’ arguments in 
parliamentary debates adhered to this division of the public. However, this 
chapter explains that there were actually three identifiable groups within the 
political discourse on public opinion: expert, informed and uninformed. The 
retentionists cited opinion polls as the representation of the popular will. The 
abolitionists decried these as representing irresponsible, uninformed opinion, and 
instead claimed that the loosely defined informed public was more important to 
the political process. Expert opinion, which was not explicitly separate from 
informed opinion within the political discourse on public opinion, could be found 
to support both cases. However, all public opinion was marginalised from the 
votes, with MPs following their own consciences in reaching their judgements. 
An analysis of MPs’ votes during the capital punishment debates demonstrates 
that they rarely changed their minds even after receiving new evidence, reports 
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and statistics. This analysis of the use of public opinion within the capital 
punishment debates and this division of the public into three groups are original 
contributions to the historiography of both the abolition debates and public 
opinion. 
 This thesis provides an original examination of the demography of the 
politicians involved in these debates within Chapter Two, titled “Who were the 
retentionists and abolitionists?”. This chapter is based upon the database of MPs’ 
votes. It identifies that the Conservative politicians who were born after 1920 
were more likely to support abolition than were their older Party colleagues, as 
were the vast majority of Labour MPs of any age. The characteristics of this 
younger generation are analysed in part through a study of Annan’s Our Age. This 
chapter is the first academic attempt to identify the retentionists and abolitionists 
beyond the recognition of the general party split, by which most Conservatives 
voted for retention and most Labour MPs for abolition, and beyond the 
highlighting of a few key actors. In doing so, this chapter creates a better 
understanding of the collective identities of the retentionists and abolitionists, 
thus providing invaluable evidence for the explanation of why politicians either 
supported or opposed the death penalty. 
 Chapters Three and Four, titled “The abolitionist case” and “The 
retentionist case”, are structured identically to allow a straightforward 
comparison between the two. The names for these chapters are inspired by The 
Conservative Case and The Labour Case, written by Quintin Hogg and Roy Jenkins 
respectively. Both were published by Penguin before the 1959 general election 
and have been useful for this thesis. Both chapters are based on four questions, 
the answers to which help to explain why capital punishment was abolished. The 
questions examine how the abolitionists and retentionists argued their cases, why 
their proponents either supported or opposed abolition, whether the abolitionists 
and retentionists could be seen as socially liberal or socially authoritarian 
respectively, and finally why the abolitionists succeeded and the retentionists 
failed. This examination draws upon the evidence from the database of MPs’ 
votes that was analysed in Chapter Two. Although the abolitionists’ and 
retentionists’ arguments have been examined previously within the 
historiography, they have not been appreciated within the context of 
secularisation. This thesis uses Christie Davies’ framework of moral arguments 
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diminishing in influence and being replaced by causalist arguments.43 This 
separation of the arguments allows them to be examined in more analytical 
depth than has been achieved previously within the historiography and enables 
the impact of secularisation to be appreciated fully. As a result, this thesis arrives 
at an original conclusion for the success of the abolitionists’ arguments over those 
of the retentionists based upon the dominance of the causalist issue of deterrence 
within the parliamentary debates at a time when moral arguments were 
becoming less persuasive.  
The conclusion to this thesis draws together the assertions and analysis 
within this thesis to explain why capital punishment was abolished for murder. 
Having achieved this, it looks beyond the period analysed within this thesis to 
examine briefly the implications of this research for the understanding of later 
British and foreign abolition debates. It outlines some broader historical issues to 
which this thesis has added and identifies areas for further research. 
This thesis engages with the principal themes from the context in which 
capital punishment was abolished, which were liberalisation, secularisation, 
increasing engagement with opinion polls and two periods of rising crime rates. 
The desire to liberalise British society after the Second World War encapsulated 
abolition. The increasing legal and political secularisation, which inspired the 
Hart/Devlin debate into the right of the state to legislate on matters of private 
morality, was influential within this liberalisation.44 There were two periods 
where incidents of violent crime increased. The first followed the end of the 
Second World War in late 1940s. The second began in the late 1950s and 
continued throughout the 1960s, when society was perceived to be more 
permissive and affluent. The rising crime rates were an important aspect of the 
context for the capital punishment debates and were referred to frequently by 
politicians. The increasing engagement with opinion polling required politicians 
to justify their neglect of public opinion, in part to ensure that capital punishment 
did not become an issue on which the electorate decided how to vote. This final 
theme is examined in the following chapter. 
 
                                                   
43 Davies, Permissive Britain, 4-8. 
44 Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (London: Oxford University Press, 1965); Hart, Law, 
Liberty and Morality. 
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Chapter One: Marginalising the mob: the influence of 
public opinion within the capital punishment debates 
 
On 22 July 1948, Sydney Silverman rose to address the House of Commons after 
the Lords had destroyed the last scraps of his attempt to abolish capital 
punishment.45 On numerous occasions the debate focused upon public opinion. 
Silverman was clear on this matter: 
Something has been said about public opinion. There is a 
difference between rule of the people and rule of the mob. It is 
democracy that we believe in; not "mobocracy." Here [the 
Commons] is the forum of public opinion; here is where decisions 
have to be made and taken, and the right way to take them is the 
way in which we took a decision on 14th April; each hon. Member 
relying on his own conscience in the end in making the choice he 
has to make, giving effect to the argument both ways.46 
Silverman used the imagery of the ‘mob’ to dismiss the influence of public opinion 
from politicians’ judgements. With one exception, every vote on abolition in the 
Commons was successful.47 This abolitionism was at odds with the opinion of the 
electorate. Though Silverman put his rejection of the electorate’s opinion in 
rather bolder terms than many of his colleagues, it struck at the heart of much of 
the criticism directed towards the use of popular will within parliamentary 
debates. For Silverman and many other politicians, the general public was too 
uninformed and sentimental to be permitted influence in legislative affairs.48 
Politicians would be neglecting their duty if they allowed the ‘mob’ such influence. 
In 1948, the opinion poll was in its infancy in Britain. The Conservative 
Party had begun to experiment with this new tool following its defeat in the 1945 
general election. However, many politicians were unconvinced of the efficacy of 
                                                   
45 The Lords rejected the government’s amendment to the Criminal Justice Bill retaining the 
death penalty for certain murders, having previously opposed Silverman’s own abolition 
amendment: HL Deb 2 Jun. 1948 vol. 156 cc. 102-78; HL Deb 20 Jul. 1948 vol. 157 cc. 1004-73. 
46 HC Deb 22 Jul. 1948 vol. 454 c. 744. 
47  An abolition amendment to the government’s resolution to take note of the Royal 
Commission’s report in February 1955 was defeated: HC Deb 10 Feb. 1955 vol. 536 cc. 2064-
183.  
48 Sentimentality was a common theme within the debates: Langhamer, “The Live Dynamic,” 
429-32; Manton, “Labour Governments and Capital Punishment,” 30. 
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seeking uninformed public opinion on matters of policy.49 In recent years, 
historians have examined the advent of polling and M-O in Britain, notably 
Laura Beers, Claire Langhamer, Joe Moran, Mark Roodhouse and Andrew 
Taylor.50 They have studied the roots of opinion polling in Britain and highlight 
the limited impact of these polls upon British politics from their inception through 
to the 1960s. M-O and the polling companies conducted their research in part to 
increase the public’s involvement in politics and improve the state of Britain’s 
democracy.51 These historians have established a rich historiography of the 
surveys of public opinion and the manner in which politicians used them. They 
provide an important context for this chapter. However, the surveys represented 
only Silverman’s ‘mob’. Politicians identified groups within the public, categorised 
as being either uninformed, which was the ‘mob’, or informed. This division of 
the public has not been recognised within the recent historiography, which has 
focused upon the surveys as the representation of public opinion. This chapter 
examines politicians’ uses and interpretations of the various public opinions. The 
conclusion drawn from this, however, is consistent with that of the existing 
historiography, which is best summarised by Beers, who explains that politicians 
adhered to the Burkean principle of representative democracy.52  Politicians 
quoted a form of public opinion where convenient for their arguments. Their 
judgements, though, were not influenced by any form of public opinion. 
The climate of opinion towards abolition was perceived to vary between 
the different groups within the public. The polls presented an unequivocal 
opposition to abolition from the majority of the electorate. This opposition never 
diminished throughout this period. Politicians could not deny that most British 
people wanted the death penalty to be retained as the punishment for murder. 
Many politicians did challenge the relevance of this mass opinion, though, over 
that of the apparently informed public. The abolitionists were largely successful in 
claiming that the majority of the informed public supported abolition. Both the 
abolitionists and retentionists were able to cite supporting opinions from experts 
                                                   
49 Beers, “Whose Opinion?,” 178-9. 
50 Moran, “Mass-Observation,” 827-51; Roodhouse, ‘“Fish and Chip Intelligence,” 224-48; 
Taylor, ‘“The Record of the 1950s is Irrelevant,” 81-110. 
51 Beers, “Whose Opinion,” 185; Roodhouse, “Fish and Chip Intelligence,” 225. 
52 Beers, “Whose Opinion,” 205. 
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in the field, which had the effect of nullifying both sides’ arguments on this 
particular point. The majority of politicians viewed informed opinion as superior 
to that of the uninformed. Therefore in per capita terms, the informed public’s 
support for abolition had a disproportionate impact upon politicians’ perception 
and presentation of the climate of opinion towards abolition within British society. 
The politicians’ hesitancy to engage with popular, uninformed opinion 
was in part the result of the infancy of psephology as a scientific discipline. 
Opinion polling had yet to become sufficiently sophisticated during this period to 
identify the issues on which the public based their votes during elections. For this 
reason, politicians were unsure whether capital punishment was an electoral issue. 
Many were concerned, though, that it should not be encouraged to become one. 
This can be seen as another reason for the negation of the electorate’s opinions 
within the parliamentary debates, as many politicians did not want to encourage 
the population to decide which party to vote for based upon an MP’s opinion on 
capital punishment. This would have introduced a party political element to the 
issue, which would have threatened the continuance of the MPs’ free vote during 
parliamentary debates on abolition, thus reducing the politicians’ ability to vote 
according to their consciences. 
There was no set definition of what, and more importantly who, 
constituted the public or its opinion. Those looking to gauge public opinion would 
read newspaper articles, letters pages and comment sections, pay attention to 
campaigns, count the signatures on petitions and, in the view of Silverman at 
least, listen to politicians’ speeches. Additionally, politicians used constituency 
correspondence to measure opinion. All of these, plus the poll, could claim to 
represent the opinion of the public without defining the public that they were 
representing. Politicians cited all of these expressions of public opinion, though 
some were used more frequently than others. Historians, therefore, need to 
consider all of these sources to fully appreciate what was interpreted to be public 
opinion and politicians’ reactions to it.53 
The differentiation between the uninformed and informed public was 
undefined. It often hinged on whether a person or group was deemed to be 
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‘responsible’, a concept that was mentioned frequently during the debates.54 
This, again, was an undefined term that was used liberally by politicians. Without 
a given definition, one is left to presume that politicians judged a person’s 
responsibility and status as part of the ‘informed’ public on traditional qualifiers 
for discrimination and division within British society, notably class, education, 
occupation and gender. James Thompson notes that the public was defined in a 
similar manner in the decades before the First World War. One’s inclusion 
within the public in that period was based upon enfranchisement and active 
engagement in debates.55 The division within the period studied for this thesis 
drew upon the concept of what could be termed a responsible class. George 
Rogers used this concept in the Commons debate on 16 February 1956 and 
Stuart Hall described the role of pressure groups as providing evidence to ‘sway 
“responsible opinion”.’56 These are not unique examples from the parliamentary 
debates and the historiography.  
The labels uninformed and informed were used primarily by the 
abolitionists to justify their arguments and criticise the retentionists’. They 
dismissed surveys of public opinion as representing only the uninformed public 
and perceived that those who were deemed to be responsible were therefore 
informed on the matter and, as a result, supported abolition. Many abolitionists 
claimed that the opinions of the informed were the most important. The NCACP 
compiled for the Home Secretary two memorials of persons favouring abolition, 
targeted only at people from this informed group, such as head teachers and 
Fellows of the Royal Society.57 
However, the uses of informed opinion indicate that politicians identified 
three groups within the public. The type of informed opinion targeted by the 
NCACP’s memorials can be categorised as non-expert. This opinion was 
practically immeasurable, despite the NCACP’s attempts to do so, as there was no 
definition of who qualified for the group. The opinions of experts in capital 
punishment, however, were more tangible. Politicians and campaigners often 
                                                   
54 HC Deb 16 Feb. 1956 vol. 548 cc. 2536-655; HC Deb 22 Jul. 1966 vol. 732 c. 1106. 
55 Thompson, British Political Culture, 28-83; 244. 
56 HC Deb 16 Feb. 1956 vol. 548 cc. 2596-7; Hall, “Reformism and the Legislation of Consent,” 
4. 
57 Lambeth Palace Library, London, Papers of Archbishop Ramsey (Ramsey Papers), Ramsey 16 
f. 156, Letter from Gardiner and Gollancz to Archbishop Ramsey, 5 Jul. 1962. 
 42 
sought the opinions of those who were either involved in a stage of the law 
enforcement process or had studied capital punishment academically. The most 
significant survey of such opinion was the Royal Commission on Capital 
Punishment. For centuries, Royal Commissions had been a standard method for 
the state to measure public opinion, receiving evidence from experts and interest 
groups.58 Politicians included experts within the informed public. Yet, although 
most groups of experts were found to favour abolition, a few tended to support 
retention, notably the police and prison officers. This differed from the 
abolitionism that was widely perceived to be prevalent amongst the informed 
public. Both abolitionists and retentionists cited support from experts during the 
capital punishment debates. Their opinions, therefore, require a separate category 
for examination. The first three sections of this chapter are structured around 
these uninformed, expert and informed categories of public opinion. The final 
section examines those who sought to inform public and political opinion. 
Through this division, it is possible to analyse how politicians used, and ultimately 
dismissed, the various guises of public opinion. 
Politicians did not rely solely upon external agencies, such as polling 
organisations, to provide an account of public opinion that supported their 
arguments. They manipulated the concept of the public and its opinions through 
the informed and uninformed categories to create a public opinion that suited 
their argument. James Chuter Ede used uninformed opinion to support the 
Labour government’s retentionist position in 1948 and informed opinion to justify 
his own abolitionism in 1956.59 Yet, none of these had a significant influence 
upon politicians’ judgements. Public opinion affected the presentation rather than 
the development of policy.60 This chapter demonstrates that politicians based 
their votes upon their own opinions. For this issue of conscience, politicians 
insisted that they be allowed to vote unfettered from the influences of public 
opinion or party pressure. They felt that they alone were sufficiently responsible 
and informed on the issue to make a judgement independently of others’ opinions. 
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Politicians positioned themselves as the most informed group within society. They 
demanded and received a free vote for debates on abolition.61  
The database of votes compiled for this thesis identifies that only 146 of 
the 1,304 politicians who voted in an abolition debate between 1947 and 1969 
changed their views on capital punishment, despite the increasingly publicised 
opinions of the various groups within society. This represented eleven per cent of 
the politicians who took part in a debate on abolition. A number of MPs praised 
the insights of experts into the matter, claiming that their views were more 
important than others’. Yet, such praise did not result in a change of voting 
patterns. MPs were reluctant to relinquish their independence or to be swayed by 
any other body of opinion, regardless of who made up that body. This was in 
keeping with the nature of the British political system. There was little difference 
in the use of public opinion between politicians within the House of Commons 
and the House of Lords. As Beers has explained, many MPs subscribed to the 
Burkean principle that they were elected to use their judgement on political issues 
rather than follow popular consensus.62 This chapter, therefore, focuses upon 
parliamentary discourse. Silverman may have been referring to the uninformed 
public when he spoke against a ‘mobocracy’, but this dismissal extended to all 
non-politicians. 
 
Uninformed Opinion 
In an interview with ITN news in April 1961, Victor Gollancz explained that:  
The, what I would call, informed opinion is, in my view, 
overwhelmingly in favour of abolition and people not so informed, 
people that don’t know the arguments one way or the other, people 
who respond to rather more primitive emotions are always behind 
informed opinion. You can’t expect anything else.63  
This attitude was not uncommon within the political debates on the death 
penalty. It was fortified when Gallup asked its respondents in February 1956 
whether they were well acquainted with the subject of capital punishment. Sixty-
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five per cent said no.64 Furthermore, every time Gallup asked a question on 
abolition, between five and seventeen per cent of respondents said that they did 
not know whether they supported or opposed the death penalty.65 As Langhamer 
has shown, M-O found that people did not understand the capital punishment 
debates, with some women suggesting that the questioner wait until their 
husbands returned home.66 The Times complained that ‘the opinion polls still have 
to go on confessing that there persists in Britain a not small number of men and 
women who refuse to know anything.’67  Opinion polls were recognised as 
representing those who were uninformed both on the issue of abolition and more 
generally. They were criticised widely by politicians and commentators, who used 
this to justify their negation of popular opinion. 
Discussion of capital punishment appeared frequently in newspapers at 
various stages throughout this period, usually coinciding with major 
parliamentary debates and notable executions. A few opinion polls were 
commissioned to complement this coverage. For instance, between 1947 and 
1969, the year that capital punishment was permanently abolished for murder, 
there were twenty-four Gallup polls on various issues concerning the death 
penalty (see Figure 1.1, which depicts only those polls that asked a question about 
abolition). The conclusion from the polling data was unequivocal. The majority of 
the British public supported the execution of murderers. Every time Gallup asked 
if capital punishment should be abolished or retained during this period, between 
sixty-one and seventy-three per cent of respondents favoured retention. When the 
question included retention for certain murders as well as for all, the total support 
for capital punishment rose to between sixty-nine and eighty-nine per cent.68  
Figure 1.1 indicates that the debates in Parliament had an effect on the 
shape of uninformed public opinion. The greatest support for abolition was in 
March 1956, when thirty-eight per cent of respondents favoured this reform. The 
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Commons had voted that month for Sydney Silverman’s abolition Bill, a few 
weeks after defeating the Conservative government’s motion to retain the death 
penalty but modify its application. These debates, along with the Royal 
Commission’s report and the unpopularity of the executions of Timothy Evans, 
Derek Bentley and Ruth Ellis, can be presumed to have had some influence on 
the outcome of the opinion polls in finding greater favour for degrees of murder in 
November 1956 than it did in August 1949.69 Furthermore, it is unsurprising that 
the composition of the questions asked by pollsters reflected contemporary 
political events. Respondents were only asked for their views on retaining the 
death penalty for certain murders at times when Parliament debated this reform. 
This did not result, though, in any significant shifts in public opinion. 
 
                                                   
69 For more information on Evans’, Bentley’s and Ellis’ cases, see: Twitchell, The Politics of the Rope, 
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Gallup, The Gallup International Public Opinion Polls. The May 1948 and March 1956 polls asked whether 
capital punishment should be suspended for five years or retained. The August 1949, February 1956 and 
November 1956 polls asked whether capital punishment should be retained for some or all murders or 
abolished completely. The rest of the polls asked only whether capital punishment should be retained or 
abolished. The polls in August 1962 and November 1964 have been excluded from this figure because the 
responses for retention and don’t know/no opinion were grouped together and cannot be separated. The 
polls from November 1938 and January 1970 have been included to indicate the state of public opinion 
outside the chronological limits of this chapter.   
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It is possible to get an impression of the impact of mass public opinion on 
MPs by comparing the outcomes of the divisions in the House of Commons that 
closely followed the publication of opinion polls on capital punishment. There 
were two opinion polls in the year before the April 1948 vote on the abolition 
amendment to the Criminal Justice Bill. These votes registered 69 and 65 per cent 
support for the retention of capital punishment. The outcome of the vote was that 
245, or 52.5 per cent, of MPs supported abolition, whereas 222, or 47.5 per cent, 
opposed it. The Conservative government’s motion to retain the death penalty 
but amend its application in February 1956 was in the same month as an opinion 
poll that asked respondents for their view on retaining capital punishment for 
some or all murderers. In total, 69 per cent wanted capital punishment for at least 
some murderers. Two months earlier, another poll returned 61 per cent support 
for retention. Yet again, though, the retentionists lost the debate in the Commons, 
gaining 262 votes, or 47 per cent, compared to the 293, or 53 per cent, who 
opposed the motion. They voted in the knowledge that, in the following month, 
the Death Penalty (Abolition) Bill would provide them with the chance to abolish 
capital punishment. In that month, another poll returned 53 per cent support for 
retention, but yet again the Commons voted differently. There were 286 
abolitionists, comprising 52 per cent of the MPs who took part in this division, 
compared to 262 retentionists, who made up the other 48 per cent.  
The debates in 1948 and 1956 were separated by three general elections. 
It is interesting that, despite the changes in both the personnel in the Commons 
and the party in government, the proportion of support for abolition during these 
three divisions was always between 52 and 53 per cent. This indicates that neither 
the opinion polls nor any other external factors had caused a significant shift in 
MPs’ opinions on capital punishment. There was a retentionist vote in February 
1955 that was caused by a more retentionist Conservative presence in the 
Commons than existed after the 1955 general election. Importantly for this point, 
this vote did not follow closely a published opinion poll. The third reading of the 
Homicide Bill in February 1957 did result in 217, or 62 per cent, of MPs voting 
for retention, albeit with capital punishment limited to certain murders. One 
hundred and thirty-one, or 38 per cent, voted against the Bill. Four months before 
this division, a poll returned 57 per cent support for retention for only certain 
murders. Although this appears to indicate that the poll might have had some 
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influence on the outcome of this debate, it is in fact the result of the Conservative 
government applying their whips during this Bill, thus manipulating its outcome 
by removing the MPs’ free vote on this matter. This vote, therefore, is not 
evidence for the influence of opinion polls on MPs’ decisions. 
When the Commons debated the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Bill 
in 1964 and 1965, the political environment was more conducive for the success 
of this Bill through both Houses of Parliament. There were a greater number of 
younger Conservative MPs who were more sympathetic to abolition, the Life 
Peerages Act 1958 had resulted in more reformist peers being appointed to the 
House of Lords and there was for the first time an abolitionist government. These 
factors all contributed to higher levels of support in Parliament for abolition. In 
December 1964, the second reading of the Bill was passed by 355 votes to 170, or 
68 per cent to 32. In July 1965, the third reading passed by 200 votes to 98, or 67 
per cent to 33. In between these votes, in February 1965, another opinion poll 
found 70 per cent support for retention. As with the votes in 1948 and 1956, the 
proportions in favour of abolition and retention were very similar across both 
debates.  
There were a number of factors that influenced the outcome of these 
debates, including demographic shifts within Parliament and government action, 
notably the Conservative government applying the whips during the Homicide 
Bill. The factors that affected politicians’ beliefs on the death penalty are 
examined in the following three chapters of this thesis. It is apparent, though, that 
the results of opinion polls did not greatly influence MPs’ decisions. 
The percentages in the polls offered no information about the strength of 
feeling or the cause of the respondents’ opinions, or indeed how well they 
understood the issue. When retentionists claimed support from the public based 
upon polling data, the abolitionists dismissed their evidence. For instance, after 
Forbes Hendry claimed, during the 5 March 1965 debate on the Murder 
(Abolition of Death Penalty) Bill, to have canvassed his constituents’ opinions on 
capital punishment through a private poll, Dr David Kerr retorted: ‘The whole 
idea of the hon. Member for Aberdeenshire, West knocking diligently at door 
after door and demanding of his constituents an answer to a question which I 
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cannot conceive will evoke an intelligent answer, is really almost derisory.’70 
Kerr’s stinging criticism was typical of many politicians who portrayed 
uninformed opinion as both unintelligent and insignificant. The proponents of 
such opinion had no response to refute these accusations. 
Callaghan’s and Ross’ 1969 cabinet memorandum on the permanent 
abolition of capital punishment for murder demonstrated that public opinion did 
not concern the abolitionists within Harold Wilson’s government. Their only 
mention of public opinion was to state briefly that the House of Commons was 
‘ahead’ of it. They provided a one-paragraph summary of the recent opinion polls 
in the appendix. This was considerably less than the two pages in the appendix 
afforded to the recent crime statistics, despite Callaghan and Ross writing that the 
abolitionists’ case should not ‘stand or fall on statistics’. It is clear, therefore, that 
public opinion did not concern the abolitionist Labour government during their 
preparations for the debate on the resolution to make abolition permanent. 
Callaghan’s and Ross’ memorandum outlined the government’s and abolitionists’ 
beliefs plus other factors that might be pertinent for a debate on the subject, 
notably crime statistics. That Callaghan and Ross wrote this in 1969, by which 
point opinion polling was more prominent than in 1947, emphasises that mass 
public opinion had little significance within the abolitionists’ arguments or 
beliefs.71 
One of the reasons for the lack of influence of opinion polls on politicians 
was that there were methodological problems with their sampling.72 Yet despite 
these issues, retentionist politicians and campaigners continually cited the support 
of uninformed public opinion within their arguments. 73  The abolitionists’ 
arguments were supported by evidence from foreign countries that had abolished 
the death penalty and, after 1953, by the Royal Commission’s conclusion that 
capital punishment offered no discernibly unique deterrent to murder. In 
particular, the abolitionists cited the examples of abolition from Scandinavia. 
Their uses of the Scandinavian countries as examples are examined in more detail 
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in this thesis’ chapter on the abolitionist case. The retentionists lacked this 
evidence and thus relied on the surveys. At a time when political parties were 
experimenting increasingly with polling, it is not surprising that some MPs 
attempted to use this data during these debates. The retentionists’ lack of evidence 
to support their arguments and assertions, though, was a major factor behind 
their defeat in Parliament. This issue is examined in greater detail within this 
thesis’ chapter on the retentionist case. 
The retentionists did not identify the public’s retentionism purely from 
these surveys. During the Lords debate on the Death Penalty (Abolition) Bill, the 
Marquess of Salisbury commented that, with just one exception, every letter in 
‘the largest postbag I have had on any subject in a great many years’ opposed 
abolition. Although Salisbury acknowledged that these letters were not conclusive, 
his use of them as evidence of public opinion was attacked by Lord Silkin: 
I have no doubt that he [Salisbury] has a very big postbag at all 
times. But when one takes the number of people who have taken 
the trouble to write to him, I do not think he would claim that that 
has any special significance. In judging of this matter, have we not 
to do the best we can on the assumption that public opinion is not 
very vociferous on this issue, and that Gallup Polls change so 
rapidly that they can hardly be relied upon at any particular 
moment?74 
Silkin dismissed the relevance of the public’s opinions by relating it to the 
perceived unreliability of polling data. For Silkin, there was no measure of 
uninformed public opinion that should influence politicians’ judgements. 
Although the Lords voted against the Bill, abolitionists such as Silkin were able to 
reject the value of uninformed public opinion for matters of policy and 
conscience.75 Although both the public’s and constituents’ letters were mentioned 
in a few debates on capital punishment, they did not provide a convincing reason 
for politicians to alter their position on abolition. They were treated in the same 
manner as the polls. 
The public opinion that was pronounced in newspaper comment sections 
received similar disdain from politicians. It was not unusual for politicians and 
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commentators to criticise newspapers for sensationalising murder cases and 
executions. However, published letters were rarely discussed in Parliament. One 
of the few occasions that such letters were cited was during the Lords debate on 
the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Bill. Lord Francis-Williams stated: 
All my life I have been a newspaperman, concerned inevitably, 
because of the interest that is aroused when publicised executions 
are afoot, with the emotions, and often the hysteria, which 
surround such affairs. The emotions as they are evidenced by the 
letters that flow into newspaper offices on such occasions are not 
pleasant emotions.76 
Francis-Williams attacked emotion to dismiss the opinions of the contributors. 
Although these letters were used infrequently during debates, the views expressed 
towards similar indicators of public opinion imply that Francis-Williams would 
not have been alone in criticising comment sections for representing uninformed 
opinion.  
Politicians’ rejection of uninformed public opinion also came from their 
uncertainty about whether the electorate considered a party’s or individual’s 
stance on capital punishment when deciding how to vote during general elections. 
Psephology was in its infancy, meaning that they had no accurate way to gauge 
the issues that influenced the direction of the electorates’ votes. Furthermore, 
criminal justice policy was not especially politicised until the 1970s.77  This 
position is supported by the fact that politicians were always afforded free votes 
when they entered the division lobbies on a question on abolition. There were no 
perceivable electoral gains, therefore, from appealing to or citing mass public 
opinion in support of an argument on capital punishment. In addition to this, 
politicians on both sides of the debate made little to no attempt to inform or 
influence the public about the death penalty. There was one notable exception to 
this, which was Duncan Sandys’ mass petition for retention in the latter half of the 
1960s. Politicians were not willing to engage with the public on this issue for fear 
of it becoming an electoral issue. This desire to avoid abolition becoming an 
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electoral issue was expressed by a number of politicians, including Herbert 
Morrison during a cabinet meeting in November 1948.78 Unsurprisingly, this was 
a greater fear for Labour MPs than for the retentionist Conservatives, as the latter 
would expect that they would receive extra support from the public were they to 
encourage abolition to become an electoral issue. The fact that these retentionists 
did not attempt to engage with public opinion in any meaningful way indicates, 
therefore, that politicians from all sides of the argument were unwilling both to 
take heed of uninformed opinion and to make this a party political issue. By 
deliberately sidelining the public from the debates, politicians were able to act and 
vote as they pleased on abolition, regardless of the public’s clear opposition to the 
reform, as they needed not fear any repercussions during general elections. 
Although the opinion of the uninformed public did not appear to 
influence the votes of MPs on capital punishment, they did influence other, more 
procedural aspects of the debate. For instance, the timing of the abolition debates 
in 1956, and indeed the formation of the NCACP in mid-1955, followed the 
widely unpopular execution of Ruth Ellis in July 1955. After Ellis’ death, the polls 
found diminishing support for the execution of women. Gallup polls returned 68 
per cent in favour of executing female murderers in August 1949. In December 
1955 this had reduced to 52 per cent.79 At this time, M-O conducted their second 
investigation into the death penalty for the Daily Telegraph.80 It was after this 
swelling of public comment and interest in the death penalty that the Commons 
once again debated capital punishment, with Ellis’ name mentioned eight times 
during the first parliamentary debate on the issue after her death.81 Furthermore, 
the polls aided the Conservative government in 1956 and 1957 when they 
introduced their compromise Homicide Bill, which created degrees of murder. 
The Royal Commission had recommended that a separation of murders was not 
practical.82 However, there was support for this reform from the polls. A Gallup 
poll in February 1956 returned 30 per cent support for retention for all murders 
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and 39 per cent for limiting capital punishment to certain murders.83 The 
government used this support to justify proceeding with the Bill, for which they 
used their whips to secure its passage through Parliament.84 
Public opinion provided an opportunity for the retentionists to remind 
abolitionist MPs that they were acting in defiance of the electorate on occasions 
when they complained that, having voted for abolition, the Lords dissented 
against their will.85 Such arguments, though, attracted criticism. An article in The 
Spectator, published a few days after the publication of the M-O survey in the Daily 
Telegraph, criticised politicians whose judgements on capital punishment were 
based upon public opinion. Titled “Burke or Gallup”, it focused its ire upon the 
Conservative retentionists who, it argued, quoted public opinion because their 
case for hanging had ‘no merits’. It concluded by stating that the ‘argument from 
public opinion has neither moral nor intellectual validity…Perhaps it is too much 
to hope that Conservatives should pay as much attention to Edmund Burke as 
they do to Dr. Gallup.’86 This criticism, however, only applied to the minority of 
MPs. The majority were unconcerned about voting against the will of the 
electorate. Politicians’ open criticism of mass public opinion within parliamentary 
debates indicates that they anticipated few if any negative repercussions as a result 
of these statements. The Spectator article demonstrates that there was support for 
such views. The public opinion that was expressed through the polls did not 
persuade the opponents of capital punishment to change the direction of their 
votes. MPs persisted in operating within the Burkean framework of representative 
democracy.87  
 
Expert Opinion 
The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, which was formed following the 
failure of the abolition amendment to the Criminal Justice Bill in 1948, was the 
most significant survey of expert opinion during the abolition debates. The 
commissioners heard evidence from 118 witnesses during their investigation. Of 
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these, a third were from the police and prison services, a quarter were from the 
medical profession and a fifth were from the legal profession.88 Through focusing 
their interest in this way, the commissioners were targeting evidence from those 
who were directly involved in the process of putting somebody to death. The 
entire procedure was covered, from the murderer’s capture, through their trial 
and into their incarceration and medical examination. The Commission did hear 
evidence from Albert Pierrepoint, Britain’s most famous executioner, though his 
evidence was criticised by Sir Leon Radzinowicz, one of the commissioners, as a 
‘callous, impertinent and bombastic testimony’.89 Clearly, Pierrepoint did not fit 
the profile of an expert or an informed person. 
The commissioners were representatives of groups that the government 
deemed to be informed on the subject. They came from the academic, medical, 
legal and political professions as well as the trade unions.90 The ten commissioners 
from these first four professions had an interest and expertise in capital 
punishment. The inclusion of two trade unionists amongst the twelve 
commissioners is slightly peculiar, as they were disconnected from the study and 
procedure of capital punishment. Indeed, trade unions did not take any real 
interest in capital punishment. There were no resolutions or debates on the death 
penalty at any Trades Union Congress (TUC) congress during the period from 
1947 to 1969.91 Furthermore, Radzinowicz felt that the two union representatives 
were not qualified to serve on the Commission. 92  Their inclusion can be 
attributed to the fact that it was a Labour government that formed the Royal 
Commission. It was not unusual for this government to include trade unionists in 
such investigations, as was the case with the appointment of Frank Wolstencroft, a 
former president of the TUC, to the Royal Commission on Betting, Lotteries and 
Gaming.93 
In forming the Royal Commission, the government aspired to achieve the 
ideal situation where the commissioners had no affiliation either to abolition or to 
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retention. They did, however, need to be recognised as informed, and hopefully 
expert, individuals. The government realised quickly that it was not possible to 
find a group of people who would be recognised by the public as being qualified 
to review the application of capital punishment yet who had no known abolitionist 
or retentionist beliefs. Instead, they created a balanced Commission comprised of 
moderate, open-minded abolitionists and retentionists who had not been too 
vocal about their views on capital punishment.94  
 There was a widely held acknowledgment that Royal Commissions were 
used to push issues from the political agenda. The capital punishment 
Commission was no different. Clement Attlee, who was Prime Minister when the 
Commission was formed in 1949, commented a year after the publication of its 
report that: 
It is, after all, an old tradition that Royal Commissions are set up to 
bury subjects. Capital punishment seems to be buried rather deep, 
and so does the subject of betting and gambling.95 
This sentiment was reinforced by two of the commissioners. Ernest 
Gowers, the chairman of the Commission, in a letter to Barbara Wootton 
expressed his disdain at the ‘astonishing force of vis inertia’ that permeated the 
investigation.96 Radzinowicz claimed in his autobiography that the Commission 
was formed in part to delay the debate on capital punishment.97 Ede, in forming 
the Commission, was able to utilise this delaying measure in part because the 
electorate was not demanding the end of hanging and so would be unlikely to 
criticise the government over this appointment. However, with a general election 
looming in 1950, the government was worried about any potential electoral 
ramifications of the capital punishment debate rumbling on, as most Labour 
Party MPs were voting against the wills of their constituents. Indeed, various 
members of the cabinet were concerned that the publication of the Commission’s 
report could be too close to the 1950 general election.98 Although very few 
politicians would have wanted abolition to become an electoral issue, making the 
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cabinet’s unease with the timing of the Commission understandable, the Labour 
MPs’ desire for reform had to be placated. This thorough investigation based on 
expert opinion could largely satisfy both requirements. 
Although the Commission was created partly as a device to postpone 
further political discussion on abolition, its report became essential reading for 
politicians in Britain and abroad who were engaged in capital punishment 
debates.99 Sir Frank Soskice, Home Secretary from 1964 to 1965, praised the 
Royal Commission for its thorough research, stating that ‘we could not have a 
higher or more persuasive authority’. 100  Such recognition allowed the 
Commission’s report to become an established expression of expert opinion on 
capital punishment.  
The Royal Commission’s terms of reference precluded the commissioners 
from considering abolition. However, at the end of their primary conclusions they 
stated that it was the main issue yet to be resolved within the capital punishment 
debates.101 Indeed, three years after the Commission’s report was complete, its 
chair, Ernest Gowers, published a book explaining how his involvement with the 
Commission had convinced him to support abolition.102 This placed an expert 
opinion explicitly behind the need for further debate on abolition. The report 
provided greater support for the abolitionists than the retentionists, as it 
concluded that the unique deterrent effect of the death penalty could not be 
proved and that there should be no gradation of murders into capital and non-
capital offences.103 The Conservative government’s Homicide Act flouted the 
latter recommendation and was widely criticised for this, including by the 
formerly retentionist Lord Chief Justice Hubert Parker, who claimed to have been 
persuaded to support abolition by the failings of the Act.104 This evidence from 
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experts was more useful as support for the abolitionists’ arguments than were the 
claims of public support for the retentionists’. 
However, expert opinion was not solely abolitionist. The Police 
Federation and Prison Officers Association supported retention. On 14 November 
1966, a year after capital punishment had been abolished for murder for an 
experimental five-year period, Duncan Sandys led a deputation to the Home 
Secretary of members of these organisations and retentionist politicians. They 
demanded the restoration of the death penalty for murderers of police and prison 
officers. This deputation was timed to support Sandys’ Early Day Motion for the 
same cause, which was to be debated the following week.105 The Commons, in 
which abolition had become entrenched by this time, rejected this Motion.106 
Furthermore, Sandys was meeting with a Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins, who was 
committed to abolition. Indeed, Sandys and Jenkins had clashed recently in the 
Commons over the police and prison services.107 Failure was no surprise, as was 
the case with other aspects of Sandys’ campaign that are examined later in this 
chapter. This failure demonstrated the unwillingness of the majority of MPs to 
adhere to a retentionist interpretation of expert opinion. Most MPs supported 
abolition and thus were more receptive to the opinions of experts who agreed with 
their position. 
Of all expressions of expert opinion, the most significant and frequently 
cited was the Royal Commission’s report. Even this, though, had little impact on 
politicians’ opinions on capital punishment. Of the 146 MPs who voted for both 
abolition and retention during this period, 13 voted only for retention before the 
publication of the Royal Commission’s report. Of these, only five voted 
exclusively for abolition after the report was published. Furthermore, three of 
these five MPs were Labour members who voted for retention on just one 
occasion, which was when Attlee’s government adopted a retentionist position 
against the abolition amendment to the Criminal Justice Bill. It is apparent, 
therefore, that this prominent expression of expert opinion did not exert much 
influence over MPs’ decisions, though it did have some impact upon their 
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arguments. The notable exception to this was the Royal Commission’s support for 
the argument and belief that capital punishment was not a unique deterrent 
against murder. Yet, it was this conclusion rather than the fact that this was the 
opinion of experts that appears to have influenced a minority of politicians, who 
were unsure whether capital punishment was an unpleasant but necessary 
sanction against murder, to support abolition. The impact of this evidence is 
explored further in the following chapters of this thesis. 
Although most MPs were more willing to interact with and receive expert 
opinion than general public opinion, expert opinion also had little discernible 
influence on the direction of their votes. Although some politicians claimed to 
have found the experts’ evidence useful, nonetheless most came to their own 
conclusions on the matter. Only a few MPs altered their votes between debates on 
capital punishment. Expert opinion provided more persuasive support for an 
argument than the opinion polls. Nevertheless, politicians retained their 
independence when arriving at their decisions on the matter. 
 
Informed Opinion 
Many politicians, particularly the abolitionists, cited informed opinion without 
quantification or qualification whilst lambasting the opinion polls as mere 
indicators of uninformed opinion. Sydney Silverman demanded that politicians 
seek out this undefined opinion rather than that of the uninformed public: 
We cannot test public opinion by a random reaction of 
buttonholing somebody in the street, in a pub, in a club, or in a 
railway station and getting his random casual answer to a question 
of this kind. We cannot test public opinion by a mere casual 
counting of the first heads we happen to come across. It is 
instructed and informed public opinion that counts.108 
The only attempts to create a more tangible representation of this informed 
opinion were two memorials organised by the NCACP in 1956 and in 1961 to 
1962 that were sent only to the members of certain professions, outlined below. 
For the most part, abolitionists simply claimed that they knew what this group 
thought, sometimes based on their own experiences, but without a measure to 
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prove this. John Paton claimed that ‘where one gets an audience which has a 
reasonable chance of being informed upon the subject…their decision is in favour 
of abolition’.109 The label represented no concrete insight into the thoughts of any 
identifiable section of British society. Instead it was the device around which was 
hinged the criticism of polling data that allowed the abolitionists to claim support 
from the public. It was necessary to have an informed group in order to have an 
uninformed group, and vice versa. It enabled the abolitionists to use public 
opinion to attack public opinion, despite having no statistics or measures to 
support their argument. The abolitionists labelled those people who supported 
their cause as being informed. Those who disagreed with them were simply 
uninformed. 
The NCACP’s memorials provide an insight into which individuals and 
groups were considered to be informed on the subject of capital punishment. The 
1962 memorial was signed by 6,825 people who, the NCACP argued in a letter to 
Archbishop Ramsey, occupied ‘positions of standing in different aspects of our 
national life’. This included bishops, artists, architects, writers, musicians, Fellows 
of the Royal Society and principal and senior probation officers. These had all 
been asked to sign the 1956 memorial as well. Other probation officers were 
asked to sign the 1962 memorial only. The NCACP outlined the purpose of the 
1962 memorial in the same letter and explained that it was different from a survey 
of uninformed opinion: 
The Memorial is not intended to be in any sense a mass petition, 
and no attempt has been made to obtain as many signatures as 
possible. This is exemplified by the fact that in the Schools, 
signatures have only been accepted from Head Teachers, and in 
the field of science only from Fellows of the Royal Society.110 
With the exception of the probation officers, these groups would not have had any 
specific expertise in crime and punishment. Rather, it was their status as 
respectable professionals that the NCACP hoped would make a greater 
impression on politicians than would polling data. It is notable for this point that 
junior probation officers were not invited to sign the 1956 memorial. Status rather 
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than occupational experience was key for whether one qualified as a member of 
the informed public. It is fair to presume that the NCACP believed that 
politicians would recognise the individuals listed as being informed on the subject 
because of the education and backgrounds that were required to pursue these 
careers. Harold Macmillan and R.A. Butler, in receiving the 1962 memorial on 
behalf of the government, appeared to be positive towards both it and the 
NCACP’s cause, but were not swayed from their retentionist position by this 
expression of informed opinion.111 
It is unsurprising that this informed opinion was not criticised vociferously 
in Parliament, as the majority of MPs were abolitionists throughout this period 
and so would have been keen to advance any argument that supported their 
cause. Informed opinion, though, was perceived widely to be of greater 
importance to the debate. Victor Gollancz demonstrated this in his interview with 
ITN in April 1961.112 Similarly, Terence Donovan claimed that his fellow MPs 
invoked ‘all too glibly the support of public opinion for the views in which we 
believe. How do we know what informed public opinion thinks? I do not 
know.’113 Neither man attempted to define the public to which they were 
referring. There was an assumption by both men that the existence and character 
of this public would be recognised by their peers, despite the lack of definition. 
Both Gollancz and Donovan used informed opinion to detract credibility from 
the retentionist uses of the opinion polls by stating that these did not represent the 
informed public. Although uninformed opinion was cited more frequently in 
parliamentary debates, informed opinion did not attract the level of criticism that 
politicians aimed towards the polls. 
It was not only pronounced abolitionists who subscribed to this weighting 
of the various public opinions. In 1961 Norman Brook, the Cabinet Secretary, 
explained to the retentionist Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, that public 
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opinion was ‘pretty evenly’ split between abolition and retention.114 There was no 
quantifiable evidence to support Brook’s claim that opinion was divided thus. 
Expert opinion appeared to be more in support of abolition than retention, but 
crucially there existed this unqualified assertion that the responsible public largely 
favoured abolition. For Brook’s interpretation of the state of public opinion to be 
so disconnected from all evidence from the polls, he had to have weighted 
informed opinion more greatly than uninformed opinion. This was symptomatic 
of politicians’ perceptions that there was an informed, responsible public whose 
opinions were more important than those of the general, uninformed public.115 
Yet, it is important to remember that, as with uninformed opinion, informed 
opinion failed to influence politicians’ judgements. The weight given to this 
informed public’s opinions demonstrates that their opinions were more 
convincing as a rhetorical device in debates than was the polling data of 
uninformed opinion. The voting patterns from these debates, though, 
demonstrate that politicians’ decisions remained personal and disconnected from 
the will of those outside Parliament. The percentages quoted earlier in this 
chapter, showing MPs’ consistent support for abolition of between 52 and 53 per 
cent during the Commons’ abolition debates in 1948 and 1956, also applies to 
informed opinion, as the 1956 votes were in the same year as the NCACP’s first 
memorial. Furthermore, the increase in the Commons’ abolitionism in the 1960s 
can be attributed to factors other than the NCACP’s second memorial, as is 
explained in the following chapters. This memorial, which was produced more 
than two years before the second reading of the Murder (Abolition of Death 
Penalty) Bill, can be afforded little responsibility for the increase in the proportion 
of MPs who were committed abolitionists. Politicians believed that they alone 
were sufficiently informed and responsible to judge the issue. They were the most 
informed group within society, according to their own weighting of public 
opinion. 
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Informing Opinion 
Although public opinion had no great influence over politicians’ judgements, 
nevertheless a number of organisations attempted to inform their opinions and 
those of the public. This section examines the opinion-informing role primarily of 
the campaigns for and against capital punishment and also of the Church and 
newspapers, and analyses politicians’ reactions to them. The NCACP was the 
largest abolitionist campaign. No retentionist campaign rivalled it in terms of 
publicity, influence or finance.116 The most significant retentionist campaign was 
the Society for the Restoration of Capital Punishment (SRCP). These 
organisations’ methods for disseminating and influencing public opinion were 
markedly different. The NCACP felt that they were ‘educating’ politicians and 
the public through their publications and public meetings. 117  The SRCP’s 
primary tactic was to compile a petition, physically representing public opinion 
through a list of hundreds of thousands of signatures. This was a more active 
representation of opinion than the poll, in the sense that MPs encountered the 
volume of signatures in support of the petition rather than a single sheet 
containing percentages. Unlike the poll, though, it took no account of those who 
refused to sign the petition because they did not support the restoration of capital 
punishment. 
The NCACP was formed after two key moments in the abolition process. 
First, despite being based upon expert opinion, the Royal Commission’s 
recommendations were largely rejected by the House of Commons in February 
1955. By the time that the Commission’s report was published in September 
1953, Attlee’s Labour government had been defeated by Churchill’s more 
staunchly retentionist Conservatives. Despite the influence that the report would 
have on the arguments in future debates, the Conservative government was 
unwilling to accept its major proposals.118 Secondly, the execution of Ruth Ellis in 
July 1955 caused outrage within sections of the media in Britain and other 
countries.119 With capital punishment becoming an increasingly important, or at 
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least sensational, subject, a group of prominent non-parliamentary abolitionists 
decided that this was an ideal moment to launch their campaign. In an open letter 
announcing the establishment of their campaign, the NCACP stated that they 
had formed because capital punishment had become increasingly prominent 
within the public consciousness.120 
The NCACP tailored its campaign to influence and inform both 
uninformed and political opinion. Its leaders felt that the informed public would 
support abolition without any intervention from the NCACP, as demonstrated in 
Gollancz’s interview with ITN in 1961.121 The portrayal of those who opposed 
abolition as being uninformed indicates that the NCACP viewed public opinion 
as something that was malleable that could be converted to support abolition with 
the appropriate education from the campaign. The NCACP’s work was split to 
appeal separately to uninformed and political opinion. Although the NCACP felt 
that it was important to educate the public, an alternative campaign was required 
to appeal to politicians. Had they felt that uninformed opinion could influence 
politicians’ judgements then a separate campaign would not have been necessary.  
The responsibilities for campaigning to both uninformed and political 
opinions were divided within the Executive Committee of the NCACP. From 
1960, the campaign had two chairs. One was Gollancz, who could use his 
publishing company to produce and distribute a large volume of material. The 
other was Gerald Gardiner, a QC who became Lord Chancellor during Harold 
Wilson’s premiership in the 1960s.122  Gollancz was the public face of the 
campaign and was an experienced social activist. In the campaign’s infancy 
another Executive Committee member and dedicated agitator, Arthur Koestler, 
joked in a letter to Gollancz that ‘the Gollancz-Koestler combination of names is 
already a red rag to God-fearing people’. 123  Gardiner focused upon the 
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parliamentary campaign. He liaised frequently with politicians and wrote the 
majority of the letters that were sent to them to persuade them to vote for 
abolition.124 The combination of the media-savvy publisher and the politically 
astute QC enabled the campaign to target both the general public and politicians. 
The interest in educating the general public on the issues surrounding abolition 
set the NCACP apart from politicians. Whereas politicians had little involvement 
with general public opinion during these debates beyond the retentionists’ quoting 
of polling data, the NCACP were keen to appeal to the public to convert them to 
their cause. The NCACP wanted to change attitudes as well as the law. 
The NCACP’s leadership was keen for the campaign to avoid any 
portrayal as an agitating group that utilised public emotions. During the first 
meeting of the NCACP’s Executive Committee, it was agreed that there were to 
be no vigils outside prisons on the eve of an execution in the manner of those 
organised by other campaigners, such as Violet Van Der Elst.125 Some politicians 
felt that these were sentimental.126 Gardiner labelled such activists as ‘the lunatic 
fringe’ who were ‘the curse of any cause.’127 At the same meeting of the Executive 
Committee it was agreed that there would be no mass national petition. Church 
services, the closure of shops on execution days and a newspaper campaign were 
to complement the drive to educate the public on the reasons for abolition.128 By 
maintaining a campaign that used informed opinion and quiet displays of dissent 
to impress their message upon politicians and the general public, the NCACP 
created a movement that was detached from what they considered to be the 
sensational and fluctuating sentiments that were driven by famous murder cases. 
As Koestler explained to the abolitionist and newspaper publisher David Astor: 
‘Wait for two or three particularly nasty murders in London…and there will be a 
great comeback of the retentionists, blaming it all on too many recent 
reprieves.’129  
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The execution of Ruth Ellis was a convenient incident for the formation of 
the NCACP. Such an incident, though, could never be the foundation of its 
campaign, as this would rely on and induce sentimental reactions of the sought 
from which the Executive Committee had distanced itself. However, as a 
perceived miscarriage of justice the Ellis case was for the NCACP the equivalent 
of the ‘nasty murders’ for the retentionists. There was no proven case of an 
innocent person being hanged for the abolitionists to use in their campaign, as 
Gwilym Lloyd George, Home Secretary from October 1954 to January 1957, 
noted in 1955.130 Nonetheless, the widespread perception of innocence or an 
inappropriate execution that surrounded the deaths of Ellis, Timothy Evans and 
Derek Bentley was useful for the abolitionist campaign. It provided the causes 
célèbres to support their argument despite no miscarriage of justice being 
acknowledged until after abolition, with Evans posthumously pardoned in 1966 
and Bentley’s conviction quashed in 1998. 131 Indeed, in 1955 the Howard 
League for Penal Reform prepared slogans and short poems about these cases for 
use in their campaign.132 These cases could alter the shape of general public 
opinion, but they did not have a significant impact upon politicians’ judgements, 
except potentially for those few MPs who changed their votes on abolition. These 
cases might have persuaded these few MPs that capital punishment was too 
problematic to be retained. Although the context provided by these cases 
undoubtedly was important for the debates, the parliamentary discourse was 
focused upon other issues, notably deterrence. The doubt surrounding these cases 
was based upon common perceptions rather than evidence. In this respect they 
were treated similarly to uninformed public opinion within these debates, as the 
majority of politicians perceived general public opinion to have no foundation in 
evidence and, therefore, to be unreliable. These cases were of limited use for the 
abolitionists. 
The NCACP was not the only organisation that campaigned for abolition. 
The Howard League for Penal Reform worked closely with the NCACP. When 
the NCADP disbanded in 1948, having achieved its aim whereby abolition was 
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debated in the Commons, its Executive Committee recommended that its 
members joined the Howard League to continue the pursuit of abolition. Many 
members of the NCADP were already members of the Howard League’s 
Executive Committee, including Gerald Gardiner. Indeed, the NCADP’s 
chairperson, Theodora Calvert, was the vice-chair of the Howard League.133 
When the NCACP was formed in 1955, a number of the NCADP supporters 
joined, having been affiliated with the Howard League, notably Gardiner. It is 
understandable, therefore, that there was coordination between the organisations. 
The NCACP, unlike the Howard League, focused its efforts exclusively on 
abolition. It was the NCACP rather than the Howard League, therefore, that led 
the campaigning activities 
In terms of their representation of public opinion, the SRCP’s methods 
were the polar opposite of the NCACP’s. Their campaign was centred upon a 
nationwide petition demanding the restoration of the death penalty for the 
murders of police and prison officers. Like the NCACP, Duncan Sandys’ 
formation of the campaign followed an important vote in Parliament and an 
infamous murder case. Capital punishment was suspended in July 1965 for a five-
year period following Labour’s victory in the 1964 general election. One year 
later, three police officers were murdered in Shepherd’s Bush.134 Unlike the 
NCACP, the SRCP used the public outrage against these murders as a key 
justification for their campaign. In September 1966, a National Opinion Poll 
(NOP) survey found that 82 per cent of the electorate favoured the retention of 
the death penalty. It cited the murder of the three police officers in Shepherd’s 
Bush that year as a reason for this level of support, but added that ‘NOP has 
always found a substantial majority in favour of capital punishment.’135 For 
‘tactical reasons’, Sandys limited the campaign’s efforts to the restoration of 
capital punishment for the murder of police and prison officers.136 These murders 
were always particularly shocking and received significant newspaper attention. 
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The Shepherd’s Bush murders were used to enhance the public’s appetite for the 
restoration of the death penalty.  
The SRCP’s campaign was not as sophisticated as that of the NCACP. It 
could not compete financially with the NCACP and it lacked the seasoned 
campaigners of the sort who dominated the abolitionist campaign, such as 
Gollancz, Gardiner and Koestler. Both campaigns were run on a tight budget and 
were often in debt. The NCACP, though, had many wealthy backers, such as 
Gollancz, and a membership of tens of thousands of people from whom they 
requested donations.137 Through Gollancz and Koestler the NCACP could cajole 
prominent authors for support, such as J.B. Priestley.138 Gardiner approached 
fellow solicitors and was on the committees of the Howard League and the 
Haldane Society of Labour Lawyers.139 This helped these groups to co-ordinate 
their efforts. In the margins of the letters sent by the NCACP was a list of the 
prominent individuals who were members of their Committee of Honour. By the 
1960s this list contained over 150 names and required both sides of the page.140 
The SRCP lacked this support. Though supported by the majority of the public, 
the SRCP did not attract any notable persons to publically endorse their 
campaign. Sandys alone was the SRCP’s figurehead. Although the Police 
Federation and Prison Officers Association provided expert support for the 
retentionists’ case, they were not involved in the campaign beyond their 
participation in the deputation to the Home Secretary.141 
When the SRCP began its activities in 1966, political parties were utilising 
public opinion and opinion polls for party and election strategy more frequently 
than they were in the 1940s.142 However, the increased use of polling did not 
extend to party policy or issues of conscience, including capital punishment. 
Sandys’ Early Day Motion in 1966 contained the signatures of 171 MPs, of whom 
                                                   
137 Gardiner Papers, Add MS 56455 B, Letter from Koestler to Gardiner, 18 Feb. 1956; Open 
Letter from the NCACP to its supporters, 27 Feb. 1956. 
138 Koestler Papers, MS 2400/1, 3 Dec. 1955. 
139 Gardiner Papers, Add MS 56460, Minutes of the Nation Council for the Abolition of the 
Death Penalty, 21 Jul. 1948; TNA:PRO, HO 45/21954, Letter from the Haldane Society to Sir 
Hartley Shawcross, undated. 
140 Warwick Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick, Papers of Victor Gollancz 
(Gollancz Papers), MSS.157/3/CAP/1/1-239, 1961-4. 
141 Sandys Papers, DSND 12/1, various files, Nov. 1966. 
142 Beers, “Whose Opinion?,” 199. 
 68 
162 were Conservatives, and was supported by the opinion polls. Nevertheless, 
the Commons refused Sandys leave to move his Bill by a majority of 122.143 
Sandys had fully expected this defeat.144 Even at a time when capital punishment 
was an especially emotive subject within the media as a result of the Shepherd’s 
Bush police murders, the majority of MPs were unwilling to debate any form of 
restoration. 
Unlike the NCACP, the SRCP relied upon uninformed opinion to 
persuade politicians to change their minds on capital punishment. They did not 
attempt to educate the public. As with most retentionists, the SRCP did not 
differentiate public opinion into informed and uninformed categories. Instead 
they represented the will of a homogenous public through a national petition. 
With this lack of financial and notable support, the SRCP was limited to running 
a campaign based upon quantitatively measuring public opinion. Their ability to 
inform opinion was stunted. They could afford to do little else.145 Whereas the 
NCACP produced numerous pamphlets and publications and held meetings 
across the country to educate both politicians and the public, including at the 
Royal Albert Hall and the Royal Festival Hall, the SRCP’s activities could not 
extend beyond their posters and petitioning on pavements and in pubs.146 
Sandys planned to collect as many signatures as possible by instructing the 
SRCP to focus its efforts upon areas where there had been a recent murder.147 As 
with the use of the Shepherd’s Bush police murders, the SRCP exploited the 
emotional responses to crime to boost their campaign. The SRCP’s petition was 
precisely the sort of campaign that the abolitionists labelled as being based upon 
uninformed and sentimental opinion. 148  As such opinion had always been 
marginalised from the abolition debates, the SRCP hoped that the physical 
representation of public opinion through the sheer volume of signatures would 
persuade the Commons to support capital punishment for the first time since 
1955. After three years of working with the SRCP, Sandys presented 858,647 
signatures in 21 boxes to Parliament on 15 December 1969, in preparation for the 
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debate on the resolution to make abolition permanent.149 The petition was 
unsuccessful. The government’s amendment by resolution to the Murder 
(Abolition of Death Penalty) Act comfortably passed through both Houses of 
Parliament. 150  Uninformed opinion had previously failed to encourage the 
Commons to retain capital punishment. The SRCP’s strategy of basing their 
campaign solely on this form of opinion was virtually doomed from the outset. 
The limited means of the campaign meant that it was able to attempt little else.  
The NCACP and SRCP were the principal campaigns for appealing to 
public and political opinion on capital punishment. However, newspapers and 
the Church also could shape public opinion. The Church, and to a lesser extent 
newspapers, were perceived to be part of the informed public. Indeed, when the 
Howard League formed its Campaign for the Prevention of Legal Cruelty in 
1955, newspapers and the Church were listed in an internal note as ‘levers or 
manipulators of public opinion’. The author of this list also included the House of 
Lords, although there is little evidence beyond this note to suggest that peers had 
any more influence than MPs on public opinion.151  
Newspapers held a variety of attitudes towards abolition. Some were 
firmly abolitionist throughout this period. In his ‘note on the press’, Arthur 
Koestler compiled a list of newspapers’ stances on capital punishment. He listed 
six dailies (Daily Herald, Daily Mirror, Manchester Guardian, Daily Worker, News 
Chronicle and Star), three Sunday nationals (News of the World, Observer and Reynolds 
News), 11 periodicals and 28 provincial newspapers that were known to support 
abolition. He also noted that five dailies, one Sunday national, one periodical and 
19 provincial newspapers were known to support retention, though he did not 
name them.152 Gradually, more newspapers converted to support abolition. John 
Grigg, formerly Lord Altrincham and the treasurer of the NCACP, claimed that 
‘to my mind, the “Daily Telegraph” is the most important citadel that has fallen 
yet – more important than any number of bishops and professors.’153 By 1969, 
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Gardiner claimed that no national newspaper supported capital punishment.154 
The Howard League was correct to identify that newspapers informed public 
opinion. However, they had no more influence over the decisions of politicians 
than did any other expression of popular will. Indeed, as with uninformed 
opinion, some politicians criticised certain newspapers for sensationalising 
murder.155 Politicians, therefore, treated newspapers in a similar manner to 
uninformed opinion. They were cited when they assisted an argument but 
otherwise were criticised for their emotional responses to murders. They had 
little influence over politicians’ judgements. Furthermore, although the principal 
debates in Parliament and the most notable executions were often reported on 
the front pages of the newspapers, no publication embarked on a determined 
campaign to either support or oppose abolition. There were no long-standing 
attempts by newspapers to influence the opinions of the public or politicians. 
By the early 1960s, there was explicit support for abolition from the 
Church of England. The convocations of Canterbury and York endorsed 
abolition in the early 1960s, coinciding with the abolitionist Michael Ramsey 
succeeding the retentionist Geoffrey Fisher as the Archbishop of Canterbury. 
This swing away from the death penalty by the established Church meant that an 
important organisation that was both informed and could inform public opinion 
was now largely behind the abolitionists’ case.156 Unlike the other expressions of 
and influences on public opinion, religious opinions can be expected to have 
influenced the decisions of some politicians on abolition. Furthermore, the lords 
spiritual would have had no less influence than any other peers during debates in 
the House of Lords. The Church of England was unique from other informing 
and informed organisations in that the most senior members of its leadership 
were part of the legislature. However, the support for abolition from some of the 
central organs of the Church of England from the 1960s onwards did not result 
in a significant number of politicians altering their votes. Underlying religious 
beliefs rather than the pronouncements of the leaders of the Church of England 
influenced the decisions of a number of politicians, although legal and political 
secularisation reduced the influence of traditional Anglican morality within an 
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increasing number of politicians’ arguments and beliefs. This is examined in 
greater detail in this thesis’ chapters on the abolitionist and retentionist cases. 
Politicians manipulated public opinion to find support for their 
arguments. They were less interested in what support could be found from the 
actions of opinion-forming bodies such as newspapers, the Church and campaign 
organisations.  
 
Conclusion 
In the Commons debate on the second reading of the Medical Termination of 
Pregnancy Bill, another issue of moral conscience, Norman St John Stevas 
explained his view of public opinion: 
It may be that the Bill commands the support of the majority of 
members of the public. That for me does not decide the issue. I 
would not submit my views or conscience on an issue of this kind to 
a public opinion poll any more than I would submit them to a 
Church or a political party. I view with dismay a society which 
combines a low level of thinking on matters of principle with a high 
degree of benevolence and good will. That can be a very lethal 
combination.157 
This epitomised the attitude of the majority of politicians towards public opinion. 
Although public opinion was sometimes presented as a single entity during the 
capital punishment debates, the dominant understanding of it within Parliament 
was as a collection of opinions from different groups, only some of whom were 
deemed to be informed. This division suited the abolitionists’ case, which was 
supported by the majority of MPs during this period. Informed opinion, both in 
its expert and non-expert guises, was a more effective rhetorical device than 
uninformed opinion within the parliamentary debates. Yet, the decision on 
abolition rested solely with politicians. They may have been influenced by outside 
forces if they chose to be, but the outcome of the matter was based upon their 
own consciences, which they felt were more informed and responsible than any of 
the electorate’s. 
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 The majority of MPs favoured abolition, yet they were unable to abolish 
capital punishment before 1965. This was the result of the retentionism of the 
House of Lords and the governments prior to Labour’s election victory in 1964. 
The Lords’ retentionism only diminished following the passage of the Life 
Peerages Act, after which a number of Labour members, predominantly 
abolitionists, entered the House.158 The Lords were under no pressure from the 
retentionist governments to vote in accordance with the will of the Commons. 
Public opinion could not justify action but it could justify inaction through not 
using the Parliament Act.159 Abolition, therefore, was only achieved once there 
were reformers within government and the Lords.  
 This chapter has departed from the recent historiography of public 
opinion within parliamentary debates by extending its analysis beyond the surveys 
of the general public and identifying the three groups that were present within 
politicians’ uses of public opinion. However, the conclusion remains the same as 
that reached elsewhere in the historiography. Politicians distanced themselves 
from the influence of all public opinion, especially when they were afforded a free 
vote. They had no appetite to be led by their parties in reaching a decision on 
capital punishment and neither did they want to be led by the electorate. They 
arrived at their own conclusions and used public opinion purely as a rhetorical 
device to support their arguments. The efforts of the campaigners, commissioners 
and pollsters had little influence on the outcome of the debates. Silverman’s fear 
of a ‘mobocracy’ was never realised.160  
The politicians’ refusal to allow public opinion to influence their 
judgement removed a significant obstacle to the abolitionists’ success. It is 
important to examine the place of public opinion within the abolition process, as 
this concept was cited frequently within the debates and has become an 
increasingly prominent feature of political discourse since the end of the Second 
World War. Furthermore, the opposition to abolition from the majority of the 
population was unequivocal. It is essential to account for politicians’ continued 
defiance of this opinion. Having achieved this through establishing the public’s 
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lack of influence, the explanation for why capital punishment was abolished 
requires the focus of examination to shift to the politicians. It is necessary to 
analyse the retentionists’ and abolitionists’ arguments and beliefs, which can be 
found in this thesis’ chapters on their cases. Before this, though, these two groups 
require identification in order to discover the common backgrounds of those 
politicians who either supported or opposed abolition. Having established that 
public opinion did not affect politicians’ beliefs on capital punishment, it is 
apparent that the majority of them voted according to their consciences. It is 
necessary, therefore, to examine their collective identities in order to identify the 
formative causes of their beliefs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 74 
Chapter Two: Who were the retentionists and abolitionists? 
 
Within the historiography of the capital punishment debates, historians have 
ascribed the label ‘retentionist’ to those who supported the continuance of the 
death penalty for murder and ‘abolitionist’ to those who opposed it. These are 
sensible labels as they describe the opinions of these two groups. Furthermore, 
the politicians and activists who took part in the debates used these labels. Yet, 
the existence of these labels has led to a degree of homogeneity being ascribed to 
those who were identified within each group.161 Understandably, the retentionists 
have been seen as almost synonymous with the Conservatives, the abolitionists 
with the Labour Party (see Figure 5.1, Appendix). This homogeneity is not 
necessarily something to avoid, as to examine the backgrounds and motivations 
of every individual involved in these debates would be impractical. However, 
there is a need for qualification. In order to understand why the retentionists 
failed and the abolitionists succeeded, a finer-grained approach is required to 
enable both an examination of why they adopted these positions and, to reach 
this conclusion, an examination of who these people were that took part in the 
debates. These questions have not been addressed in the historiography of capital 
punishment. The final question, who they were, is the focus of this chapter. The 
other question is addressed in the following chapters on the abolitionist and 
retentionist cases. In order to identify the retentionists and abolitionists this 
chapter examines the ages and occupations of those involved in the abolition 
debates, focusing in detail on the backgrounds of the prominent characters from 
the debates. It looks in particular at the identity of the Conservative MPs who 
were born from the 1920s onwards, as a significant minority of these MPs broke 
the traditional party divide on this issue by supporting abolition. These 
Conservative MPs were key for the abolition of capital punishment, as their entry 
into Parliament led to abolitionism becoming entrenched within the Commons, 
regardless of which Party was in government. This chapter uses the database of 
MPs’ votes to examine the correlation between how politicians voted on abolition 
and how they voted on other issues of conscience, particularly the permissive 
reforms. It compares the divisions during the second readings of the Sexual 
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Offences Bill and Medical Termination of Pregnancy Bill with those from the 
principal abolition debates. The support for the permissive reforms was a 
significant factor within the identity of the abolitionists, as was the opposition to it 
for a number of the retentionists. This association was manifest within the capital 
punishment discourse. The correlation between the supporters and opponents of 
both abolition and the permissive reforms is outlined within this chapter. Its 
conceptual background is examined further within the chapters on the 
abolitionist and retentionist cases, as this was an important characteristic of the 
politicians’ beliefs on capital punishment. 
 The most important factor in identifying abolitionists and retentionists, 
aside from party allegiance, was their age. This information is displayed in Figure 
2.1. This charts the number of MPs who took part in the abolition debates by 
their decade of birth and orders them into committed abolitionists, committed 
retentionists and those who voted for both abolition and retention. The trend line 
indicates the percentage of the MPs born each decade who were committed 
abolitionists. The trend line demonstrates that there was a far greater proportion 
of abolitionists amongst the politicians who were born from the 1920s onwards. 
When the politicians are divided by year of birth rather than by decade, the 
dramatic increase in the proportion of abolitionists began after 1922. Forty-two 
per cent of the politicians born in 1922 who took part in the abolition debates 
were committed abolitionists. For 1923, the proportion was 67 per cent. 1922’s 
percentage was indicative for the years before it, as was 1923’s for the years after. 
To ease analysis, though, this chapter divides the births into decades rather than 
individual years. It uses the decade after 1920 as the turning point rather than 
1922. As the vast majority of Labour MPs were committed abolitionists, the 
proportional increase in abolitionists amongst those MPs born after 1920 can be 
attributed to a change in Conservative attitudes towards the death penalty 
amongst a significant minority of their younger MPs. Figure 2.1 is referred to at 
various points throughout this chapter, though its closest examination can be 
found in the final section.  
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The mixed votes at the top of the columns on Figure 2.1 require 
explanation. This accounts for every MP who voted for both retention and 
abolition during these debates, including those who voted frequently in one 
direction in these debates, choosing the other direction only once. These MPs, 
who voted predominantly but not exclusively for either abolition or retention, 
have been grouped together with those few MPs whose votes were more evenly 
distributed in favour of and against the death penalty in order to focus attention 
on those who voted consistently in one direction. This enables greater clarity in 
the examination of these consistent MPs. In total, 146 MPs voted both for and 
against abolition during these debates. This was just 11 per cent of the 1,304 MPs 
who participated in the debates.  
The biggest incident that caused MPs to vote against their normal 
opinion was the Labour government’s retentionist position in 1948. This led to a 
number of Labour MPs voting in line with their government before voting for 
abolition in all of the other debates in which they took part. Seventy-four Labour 
MPs voted for retention during the successful second reading of the abolition 
amendment to the Criminal Justice Bill in April 1948. Of these, 55 voted 
exclusively for abolition after this debate. Ten voted for retention again, although 
five of these did vote for abolition at least once, and nine did not vote again after 
April 1948. This vote alone accounted for 55 of the 146 mixed voters. They are 
only categorised as such because they voted with their government in 1948. The 
same is true for a number of the Conservatives who voted in favour of the 
Homicide Bill in February 1957 under the pressure of the party whips. The 
passage of this Bill ended the chances of the Death Penalty (Abolition) Bill 
reaching the statute book.162 Twenty-one of the Conservative MPs to vote for the 
Homicide Bill voted for abolition on every other occasion. A further seven voted 
for abolition in many of the other debates. Government pressure was a major 
factor in 76 of the 146 mixed voters choosing to back retention on just one 
occasion. There were numerous other factors that caused the other MPs to 
change their votes between debates, many of which were personal to the 
members. However, a party line accounts for much of this and thus hides the 
votes of 76 MPs on Figure 2.1 who were otherwise committed abolitionists. 
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 The data used in this chapter for the numbers of MPs who came from 
various occupational and membership group backgrounds should be read as 
indicative rather than exhaustive. This is because there is more evidence readily 
available for some members than for others. The main sources for these 
backgrounds are Who Was Who and Roth’s catalogues of MPs. These figures, 
though, are useful as they give a decent indication of the levels of support for 
abolition and retention from MPs from various backgrounds. This chapter first 
attempts to identify the retentionists and the abolitionists before examining the 
nature of what the author has termed the class of the 1920s. This term refers to 
the politicians, in particular the Conservatives, who took part in the abolition 
debates and were born after 1920. It does not refer to anybody outside 
Parliament because, as the previous chapter has shown, politicians’ opinions on 
abolition in this period were detached from the predominantly retentionist 
electorate’s. 
 
Who were the retentionists? 
Within the historiography of the death penalty, the retentionists have been 
associated with the Conservative Party.163 This association is sensible, as almost 
all of the Conservative MPs who voted in the capital punishment debates before 
1956 supported retention. Only 14 of the 157 Conservative MPs who took part 
in the debates on the Criminal Justice Bill in 1948 voted for abolition. During the 
Conservative government’s motion to acknowledge the Royal Commission’s 
report in 1955, just 15 of the 245 Conservative MPs voted for the abolitionist 
amendment.164 They comprised only nine per cent of the Conservative MPs 
present in the 1948 vote and six per cent in the 1955 vote. The association 
between retention and the Conservative Party is strengthened by the fact that few 
Labour MPs voted for the death penalty, with the exception of the 1948 vote on 
the Criminal Justice Bill. The 74 Labour MPs who voted for retention in April 
1948 were only 26 per cent of the 288 Labour MPs who voted in that debate, 
with 214 voting for abolition against the advice of their government.165 Kevin 
Manton is correct to assert that Labour was not a party of uniform abolitionists. 
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He examines an important retentionist strand within the party that was visible in 
the late 1940s.166 However, this was an exception, as the overwhelming majority 
of Labour MPs after the Second World War were abolitionists. The retentionists, 
therefore, can be strongly associated with the Conservative Party. The reasons 
for the Labour government adopting a retentionist position are examined in the 
chapter on the retentionist case. 
Older age was one of the major characteristics of the retentionist MPs. 
Regardless of their year of birth the vast majority of Labour MPs were 
abolitionists. Therefore, this analysis will focus on the Conservatives. Of those 
Conservative MPs to take part in the abolition debates, 130 were born before 
1900. Of these MPs, only two were committed abolitionists. A further six voted 
both for and against abolition in various debates, but the other 122 were 
committed retentionists. The proportion of Conservative MPs born after 1900 
who were abolitionists increased, although the most marked rise came in the 
1920s (see Figure 3.1, Appendix). It is the older Conservative MPs, therefore, 
who provided a dependable spine of support for the retentionists.  
The division between older and younger Conservatives, sometimes 
portrayed as the traditional and Right Progressive Tories, has been the 
framework for much of the historiography of the Party after the Second World 
War. Andrew Gamble identifies the younger Conservatives with the desire for 
economic and social reforms that developed towards the end of the war. He 
argues that this liberalisation was behind the rekindling of One Nation 
Conservatism. 167  Stuart Hall and Mark Jarvis ascertain that the Right 
Progressives were at the heart of the Conservative liberalisation of the 1950s and 
early 1960s that is viewed by Hall as the beginning of the liberalising ‘legislative 
moment’.168 Although not all Right Progressive MPs were abolitionists, as is 
examined in this thesis’ chapter on the abolitionist case, the correlation between 
the younger Conservative MPs, liberalisation and abolition cannot be ignored. 
Indeed, Brigadier Terence Clarke made this connection when unsuccessfully 
attempting to defend the death penalty in December 1964:  
                                                   
166 Manton, “Labour Governments and Capital Punishment,” 16-33. 
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If we [the Conservatives] had [tabled a Bill to abolish the death 
penalty], half the Conservative Party would have voted against it, 
anyhow. Unfortunately, we have a few young people on this side of 
the House who came in in about 1956 and who are of a rather 
different calibre. They are about as wet as the last three Home 
Secretaries…169 
This ‘wetness’ of the young abolitionist Conservatives, to whom Clarke is 
referring, is an example of the accusations of emotionalism that both abolitionists 
and retentionists targeted at their opponents, as is examined by Claire 
Langhamer.170 Quintin Hogg epitomised this change in Conservative thinking in 
his book The Case for Conservatism in 1947 and its second edition The Conservative 
Case in 1959. In 1947, Hogg wrote: ‘Our ancestors learned and taught that a 
disregard of these rules [passed down by what he termed a ‘Celestial Cabinet’] 
brought calamity upon our heads, as apple-stealing might bring the birch for a 
small boy, or burglary penal servitude for a criminal’. In 1959, Hogg repeated 
this sentiment verbatim, except he replaced the birch with a slipper.171 Hogg was 
a retentionist but demonstrated here that a liberalising strand was developing 
within the Conservative Party in the years after the Second World War. These 
Conservatives largely became distinct from the older, traditional Party members 
who, on the whole, supported retention. This different identity can be found in 
Noel Annan’s book Our Age, which extols the generation born between the First 
and Second World Wars who Annan felt modernised Britain. This identity will 
be examined in more detail later in this chapter. Although most Conservatives 
born after 1920 were retentionists, the older Conservative MPs were almost 
unanimous in their retentionism, particularly those born before 1900.  
 As one would expect, the retentionist MPs came from a variety of 
occupational backgrounds. However, some occupations tended to produce a high 
proportion of retentionists (see Figure 6.1, Appendix). The vast majority of MPs 
who came from business and military backgrounds were retentionists. 148 of the 
MPs that took part in the abolition debates are listed in the bibliographical 
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catalogues as having had a military career, although these catalogues do not 
expose the nature of the politicians’ military service. Of these, 104 were 
committed retentionists, comprising 70 per cent of the military professionals in 
the Commons. A further 15 voted for both abolition and retention during the 
debates and 29 of the 148 were committed abolitionists. There was a strong base 
of support for retention from those with military careers. The reasons for this 
support could be linked to an appreciation of both the sanctity of life and the 
necessity to take life in certain circumstances that was different to other MPs’ 
appreciations of these issues. However, it is difficult to ascertain the direct impact 
that a career in the military might have had on MPs’ beliefs on capital 
punishment, as it is perceivable that such experience could make a person either 
more or less inclined to support the death penalty. This is explored in greater 
detail in this thesis’ chapter on the retentionist case. Furthermore, there was a 
strong Conservative identity amongst those who had a career in the military. Of 
the 148, 125 were Conservatives, comprising 84 per cent of the military MPs. 
Therefore, the overwhelming retentionism of those with military careers supports 
the well-established party divide, whereby the retentionists were associated with 
the Conservatives. Indeed, between 8 and 14 per cent of Conservative MPs 
during these years had previously held careers in the armed services. By 
comparison, only one per cent of Labour MPs came from this background.172  
The other occupational background that was common for a significant 
number of retentionists was business management and directorships. The 
following does not include those MPs who were listed in Roth’s catalogues as 
non-executive directors. Two hundred and twenty-six of the MPs who took part 
in the abolition debates had a business background. Of these, 146 voted for 
retention in every debate that they attended. This constituted 55 per cent of the 
business MPs. This is a significantly lower figure than the 70 per cent of military 
MPs who were committed retentionists. However, in a House of Commons that 
voted for abolition in every vote bar one after 1947, a large group of MPs that 
has over half of its members exclusively supporting retention merits recognition. 
There were considerably fewer abolitionists from this occupation, with 75 voting 
exclusively against the death penalty. This equated to 28 per cent of the group. 
                                                   
172 Great Britain. House of Commons Library, UK Election Statistics: 1945-2003, Research Paper 
03/59 (London: HMSO, 2003). 
 82 
Forty-five of the MPs with business backgrounds voted for both abolition and 
retention over this period, comprising 17 per cent of the total MPs.  As with the 
armed services, those MPs who had forged a career in business tended to be 
members of the Conservative Party. During the various governments of this 
period, between 18 and 24 per cent of Conservative MPs were company 
executives or directors. Only between one and four per cent of Labour MPs 
came from these careers.173 The particular dominance of retentionists amongst 
the ranks of MPs from the armed services and business leaders supports the 
theory, therefore, that those who favoured retaining the death penalty were 
predominantly members of the Conservative Party. There were no career 
backgrounds common to a number of MPs from parties other than the 
Conservatives that produced a high proportion of retentionists. 
A number of retentionist MPs had been involved in colonial service prior 
to the post-war capital punishment debates. Thirty-six of the MPs who took part 
in the abolition debates are listed in Who Was Who as having served in some 
capacity in the colonies.174 Of these 36, 24 voted exclusively for retention. 
Another two voted once for abolition but were retentionists in all other debates. 
Only ten of the 36 MPs with colonial experience voted exclusively for abolition. 
Seventeen of the 36 MPs had occupations in either business management or the 
military. Twelve of these 17 were committed retentionists.  
A further 26 of the MPs who took part in the abolition debates 
represented constituencies in Northern Ireland. Of these MPs, 22 were 
committed retentionists. This is perhaps unsurprising given the political unrest 
that plagued Northern Ireland and Éire. Those with experiences from the 
colonies and of British rule in Northern Ireland, many of which were locations 
that featured sporadic violence, tended to support retention. 
There was a link between the retentionists and the opponents of 
permissive legislation. One hundred and six MPs who took part in at least one 
abolition debate voted against the second reading of the Sexual Offences Bill (see 
Figure 7.1, Appendix). 175  Of these, 86 were committed retentionists, eight 
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registered mixed votes and 12 were committed abolitionists. Of these 86 
retentionists, 80 were Conservatives. There was a more even split between the 
abolitionist and retentionist opponents of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy 
Bill at its second reading (see Figure 8.1, Appendix).176 There were 11 committed 
retentionists and 13 committed abolitionists who voted against this Bill. However, 
this split opposition is less surprising, as both abortion and capital punishment 
concerned the sanctity of life. A small minority of abolitionists, therefore, 
opposed this liberalising measure because they disagreed with the taking of life in 
any form, including abortions. Similarly, some retentionists might have opposed 
the legalisation of abortions because of either a belief in the sanctity of life or an 
opposition to liberalisation. This is examined in greater detail in the following 
two chapters.177 
 There was a general perception during this period that those in the legal 
profession favoured retention. Lord Elton, speaking during the Lords debate on 
the Death Penalty (Abolition) Bill, felt that ‘the odds are that the Bishops will vote 
one way [abolition] and the lawyers the other [retention].’178 Although this may 
have been the case with the judges in the Lords, as is explained later, this pattern 
was not borne out in the Commons. Of the 244 MPs with legal backgrounds to 
take part in these debates, 108 voted for retention exclusively and 106 for 
abolition. As with other occupations, the split between abolition and retention 
within the legal profession was orientated around party lines. All retentionist MPs 
with legal careers came from the Conservative Party, except for seven Ulster 
Unionists, one Labour, one independent and one National MP. The legal journal 
Justices of the Peace and Local Government Review showed some favour for capital 
punishment in the 1940s. In April 1948 it included an article titled “Capital 
Punishment”, which argued that the death penalty was a deterrent to some 
criminals. It did not stress, though, that it believed it to be unique in its 
effectiveness.179 Yet, between then and the 1960s the attitude of those involved in 
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the journal softened towards abolition. In 1969 it published a strong indictment 
of capital punishment: 
There was no capital punishment from the northern tip of Norway 
to the southern tip of Italy. In an age of gas chambers and mass 
executions, those countries had found, as we had, a new safeguard 
and a new dignity in refusing the state the right to take life.180 
Through this use of language that was closely associated with the abolitionist 
discourse on civilisation, this article placed one expression of legal opinion firmly 
against the death penalty. The Law Society Gazette was less opinionated in its 
interpretation of the abolition debates, critiquing both sides’ arguments. The 
greatest criticism was aimed at the Homicide Act, describing it as ‘one of the 
most irrational and anomalous pieces of legislation of modern times.’181 There 
was, though, no statement of affiliation to either a retentionist or abolitionist 
position. The evidence from MPs’ voting records and the opinions published in 
legal journals does not support Lord Elton’s comment that lawyers were firmly in 
favour of retention.  
 Although lawyers in general showed no strong inclination towards 
retention, there was greater support for the death penalty from judges. William 
Jowitt, the Lord Chancellor during Attlee’s premiership, stated during a cabinet 
meeting in July 1947 that ‘His Majesty’s judges were unanimously opposed to the 
abolition of the death penalty on the ground that it constituted the only effective 
deterrent in certain cases.’182 In 1956, the Conservative government sought the 
opinions of judges on their draft of the Homicide Bill. All of the judges who 
submitted reports found anomalies within the Bill, with many stating explicitly 
that they did not like the reform. Justice Donovan was the only judge to express a 
clear desire for the full retention of capital punishment, arguing that the only 
reform should have been to constructive malice and suicide pacts. Although no 
other judges argued explicitly for retention or abolition, there was a strong 
inference from all of the reports that the judges favoured the continued use of 
capital punishment. They questioned why certain murders were not included in 
the list of capital offences rather than why those murders on this list had been 
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exempted from abolition. Certainly there were no abolitionist sentiments from 
these judges.183 The judges were largely supportive of the retention of the death 
penalty. Due to the presence of the judges within the Lords, it is unsurprising that 
Lord Elton felt that lawyers were mostly retentionists. This label, though, only 
applies to the judges rather than all lawyers. 
 One of the principal issues with identifying the retentionists is that they 
lacked a figurehead before 1965 to rival the abolitionists Sydney Silverman, 
Victor Gollancz and Gerald Gardiner. After 1965, Duncan Sandys became the 
retentionist figurehead. His campaign was examined in the previous chapter and 
is developed later in this chapter. The retentionists, though, were more visible 
within the House of Lords. The Lords only voted for abolition after Harold 
Wilson’s Labour government came to power in 1964. With their electoral success 
in that year, the Lords also received its first abolitionist Lord Chancellor in this 
period, Gerald Gardiner. Prior to this success, the Lords were firmly entrenched 
within the retentionist camp. The fact that the Lords’ rejection of the abolition 
Bills from the Commons went unopposed during this period is an indication of 
the retentionist natures of the governments prior to 1964 rather than any control 
over the issue from the Lords. Nevertheless, the character of the Lords as 
retentionists merits some examination, as there were numerous committed 
supporters of the death penalty within this chamber.  
 The retentionist nature of the Lords can be ascribed to a large extent to 
the political orientation and age of the peers. Their occupational backgrounds 
can also be presumed to have had some effect. Indeed, the Lords contained a 
number of judges, lawyers and bishops who were senior within their professions. 
However, as was the case with the Conservative MPs, the younger bishops and 
members of the legal profession who entered the House of Lords during this 
period, with perhaps the exception of the judges, seemed more willing to 
embrace abolition than their older colleagues. Occupation, therefore, was of 
secondary importance compared to age and political orientation as a cause of the 
Lords’ retentionism.  
Of those Lords whose political affiliation was known, the vast majority 
were Conservatives throughout this period, despite Harold Wilson’s efforts in 
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opposition and in government to add Labour peers under the Life Peerages Act 
1958.184 The life peers, law lords and lords spiritual were predominantly older 
members of their respective professions.185 The first life peers appointed in 1958 
were all born before 1920, with only two of the 14 new peers born after 1910 and 
seven born before 1900.186 This demographic within the chamber means that it is 
unsurprising that the Lords remained firmly retentionist until the arrival of an 
abolitionist government and Lord Chancellor in 1964, by which time there were 
more Labour peers. 
 There were many vocal retentionists within the Lords during these years, 
in particular the Lord Chancellors and Lord Chief Justices. The four Lord 
Chancellors prior to Gerald Gardiner were all retentionists, although William 
Jowitt voted for abolition in 1948 against his conscience, as he felt obliged to 
follow the government’s line. 187  Robert Stevens’ legal caricatures of Lord 
Chancellors Jowitt, Simonds, Kilmuir and Dilhorne provides useful insights into 
their political characters.188 The analysis for this thesis, though, excludes Simonds 
and Dilhorne as their tenures as Lord Chancellor, between 1951 and 1954 and 
between 1962 and 1964 respectively, did not coincide with any major abolition 
debates.  
Stevens describes Jowitt as being ‘more conservative than many 
Conservative M.P.s’. Jowitt, although a Labour Party member, ‘had little in 
common with the leading Labour supporters’ and was again separated from the 
rank-and-file of the Party by supporting retention in the Lords. His role as Lord 
Chancellor, however, meant that he felt obliged to vote for abolition, as the 
retentionist Labour government had recommended that the Lords vote for 
abolition in line with the Commons’ will rather than the government’s own 
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retentionist position.189 Jowitt’s retentionism was in line with the opinions of 
many of his colleagues in government, but he was more vocal than many of those 
in speaking against this Bill and, unlike most members of Attlee’s cabinet in the 
Commons, maintained his retentionist stance after 1948. 
 Lord Kilmuir had a different career leading to his appointment as Lord 
Chancellor as, unlike his predecessors Jowitt and Simonds, he was previously a 
member of the government in the Commons. Kilmuir, as David Maxwell Fyfe, 
was Home Secretary before entering the Lords. He voted for retention during 
every abolition debate that he attended in the Commons and was an outspoken 
proponent of the punishment in both houses.190 Stevens, in his rather flattering 
portrayal of Maxwell Fyfe, acknowledges that ‘liberals found themselves out of 
sympathy with Kilmuir’. Stevens used his refusal of mercy for Derek Bentley as 
an example of his support for capital punishment and his authoritarian approach 
to issues regarded as socially liberal.191 
 Both Kilmuir and Jowitt were involved with the Nuremberg Trials. 
Kilmuir was the deputy British prosecutor, serving under the staunchly 
abolitionist Sir Hartley Shawcross. Jowitt had been involved in drafting the 
procedures for the war crimes trials.192 Kilmuir’s and Jowitt’s involvement in the 
Nuremberg trials added an expert element to their position as retentionist 
figureheads within the Lords through their recent involvement, as representatives 
of the British state, in the executions of Nazi war criminals. It is interesting that, 
although Shawcross was one of the most vocal abolitionists at the beginning of 
the period investigated within this thesis, he was not one of the abolitionists’ 
figureheads. This is perhaps a result of his close involvement with the executions 
at Nuremberg, which did not correlate with the image of a committed 
abolitionist. 
 Stevens also sheds some light onto to the character of Rayner Goddard, 
the Lord Chief Justice from 1946 to 1958. Goddard’s retentionist nature was the 
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first characteristic drawn out in his caricature: ‘Goddard was an ardent supporter 
of capital and corporal punishment and of more severe sentences for criminals. 
He attacked J.P.s for being too lenient and insisted that homosexuality be met 
with the full force of the law.’ Stevens continued: ‘for many, Goddard embodied 
the anti-intellectual, somewhat sadistic, tone of the English judiciary in the 1940s 
and 1950s.’193 During the Lords’ second reading of the Death Penalty (Abolition) 
Bill in 1956, Goddard defended the importance of capital punishment as a 
deterrent and lamented the stereotype of judges as enemies of reform and, in 
particular, his depiction in one newspaper as a ‘bewigged obscurantist’.194 
Nevertheless, his continued opposition to abolition fitted in with the traditional 
Conservative retentionism in both Houses.  
Goddard’s successor, Lord Parker, spoke only once during a capital 
punishment debate in the Lords. During the second reading of the Murder 
(Abolition of Death Penalty) Bill, he pledged himself to be a ‘full-blooded 
abolitionist’ but stated that this was due to the ‘complete absurdities’ of the 
Homicide Bill rather than any moral repugnance towards capital punishment.195 
Parker’s abolitionism was based on legal practicalities rather than a strong belief 
in reform. His lack of involvement in the capital punishment debates, compared 
to that of Jowitt, Kilmuir and Goddard, means that his opinion should be read 
more as a judicial repudiation of the Homicide Act in favour of abolition rather 
than as an expression of a senior member of the House of Lords on the 
repugnance felt towards the death penalty. It is interesting, though, that his 
declaration of support for abolition coincided with the Lords voting for abolition 
for the first time. It is Jowitt, Kilmuir and Goddard who led the Lords in their 
retentionist stance before Wilson’s Labour Party won the 1964 general election. 
There were other peers who were not from legal backgrounds that spoke against 
abolition, including a number of bishops. These three, though, were the 
figureheads for the retentionist campaign in the Lords. Unlike the abolitionist 
figureheads, though, their role as figureheads did not extend into the public 
realm. 
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Outside the Lords, the retentionists lacked a figurehead before 1965 who 
could champion their case in the Commons and in public. Quintin Hogg was 
one of the more vocal retentionists during these debates and led the unsuccessful 
Conservative demands to delay the resolution to make abolition permanent from 
its scheduled time of December 1969 until at least the following year.196 He did 
this, though, because of his role as the shadow Home Secretary rather than 
because he was an especially committed retentionist. He was the representative 
rather than the figurehead of the retentionist Conservative Party. Indeed, he had 
previously explained, in a letter to the abolitionist Arthur Koestler about a 
television debate on capital punishment to which they were both invited, that ‘I 
find it [capital punishment] less interesting than perhaps I should’.197 Hogg, 
therefore, was no figurehead. 
Duncan Sandys was the retentionist figurehead for the campaign after 
capital punishment was abolished for a five-year period in 1965. Sandys was 
Winston Churchill’s son-in-law and had served in the Foreign Office before 
being elected to Parliament.198 His campaign was examined in the previous 
chapter.199 The petition followed two previous, unsuccessful Early Day Motions 
in November 1966 and June 1969.200 Sandys, however, stood alone in his 
crusade to restore the death penalty. He had few notable supporters and did not 
enjoy the full backing of the Conservative Leader’s Consultative Committee. 
They agreed with him in 1969 that the five-year experiment should be completed 
before the vote was taken to make abolition permanent, but they were not keen 
on his reasons for this, which were not specified.201 The isolated nature of his 
failure highlighted the fact that the retentionists were not able, and potentially 
not willing, to mount a serious campaign both to retain the death penalty and to 
compete with the abolitionists. 
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The retentionists were predominantly a traditional Conservative group 
whose members were born before the 1920s. There were a number of 
retentionists from the Labour Party in the late 1940s, although this can be 
attributed in part to the feeling that capital punishment was a necessary deterrent 
during the years of post-war dislocation. The lack of genuine desire from these 
Labour retentionists to keep the death penalty was demonstrated by the fact that 
only a small proportion of them voted for retention again after the 1940s. Some 
of the smaller parties, notably the Ulster Unionists, supported the death penalty, 
as did those MPs with colonial experience. The retentionists were more 
prominent in the Lords than they were in the more progressive Commons, 
although this diminished after Harold Wilson’s Labour Party won the 1964 
general election, as is discussed in the next section of this chapter. Ultimately, the 
retentionists were dominated by older members of the Conservative Party, whose 
ideas on capital punishment and liberalisation did not match those of the 
burgeoning socially liberalising culture in the Commons. This conclusion revises 
the established association of the retentionists with the Conservative Party, as the 
abolitionism of a significant minority of the younger Conservatives does not 
conform to a uniform identity of the Conservatives as the Party of retention. This 
identity applies only to the older Conservatives. 
 
Who were the abolitionists? 
Unlike the retentionists, the abolitionists had a number of vocal and identifiable 
figureheads in the Commons and in the wider campaign against the death 
penalty. These figureheads are examined later in this section. As with the 
retentionists being generally linked with the Conservative Party, the abolitionists 
have been widely associated with the Labour Party by both academics and 
contemporary commentators, although as mentioned earlier Kevin Manton 
challenges the strength of this association.202 There is no doubt that the majority 
of Labour MPs favoured abolition (see Figure 5.1, Appendix). After the 1948 vote 
that was analysed earlier in this chapter, almost every Labour MP voted for 
abolition when the issue was debated in the Commons. Only six of the 200 
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Labour MPs present voted for retention when an abolition amendment was 
added to the motion acknowledging the Royal Commission’s report.203 Eight 
Labour MPs voted for retention in the 1956 divisions on the government’s 
motion to retain capital punishment and on the Death Penalty (Abolition) Bill.204 
By the 1960s, the number of Labour retentionists in the Commons had reduced 
to two per vote.205 The predominance of abolitionist thought amongst Labour 
MPs after the Second World War is clear. 
 The two decades after the Second World War saw the number of 
Conservative abolitionists increase dramatically. In April 1948, 14 out of 157 
Conservative MPs voted for the abolition amendment to the Criminal Justice 
Bill. In February 1955 there were 15 abolitionists out of the 245 Conservatives 
who voted on the abolition amendment to the motion acknowledging the Royal 
Commission’s report. However, in 1956 this number increased dramatically. 
Forty-five out of 289 Conservatives voted against their government’s motion for 
the retention of the death penalty in February 1956. In the vote on the Death 
Penalty (Abolition) Bill in the following month there were 44 Conservative 
abolitionists supporting the successful Bill. The rise in the number of 
Conservative abolitionists between the votes in February 1955 and February 
1956 can be attributed largely to the general election in May 1955. The number 
increased yet again in the second reading of the Murder (Abolition of Death 
Penalty) Bill in December 1964, with 77 of the 237 Conservative MPs voting for 
abolition. This was the highest proportion of Conservatives to vote for abolition 
during these debates, with 32 per cent supporting this reform. The number of 
abolitionists decreased to 52 out of the 228 Conservative MPs who took part in 
the December 1969 vote to make abolition permanent, although this decrease 
can be ascribed to the more party political nature of the vote. Many 
Conservatives were unhappy that the Labour government was attempting to 
force through this resolution before the five year experiment was completed.206 
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This increase in the number of Conservative opponents of the death penalty 
necessitates a more nuanced understanding of the identities of the abolitionists 
beyond their associations with the Labour Party. 
 The first dramatic increase in the number of Conservative abolitionists 
occurred after a general election in 1955, the second after two further elections in 
1959 and 1964. These elections introduced a number of younger Conservatives 
into the Commons. One hundred and eight of the Conservative MPs who voted 
in at least one abolition debate in this period were born after 1920 (see Figure 
3.1, Appendix). Of these, only two took part in debates before the 1955 general 
election. Furthermore, only 21 of these 108 younger Conservatives took part in 
debates before Labour’s 1964 general election victory, although there were no 
major debates between the elections in 1959 and 1964. These younger 
Conservatives had a greater tendency to support abolition than their 
predecessors, though this support never rivalled the almost unanimous 
abolitionism of the Labour MPs. Thirty-seven of these younger Conservatives 
voted solely for abolition during these debates, and a further 16 voted both for 
and against abolition, a marked increase in the proportion of abolitionists when 
compared to their older Party colleagues. Opposition to the death penalty 
became increasingly common amongst the younger Conservatives who were 
born later, with more committed abolitionists born in the late 1920s and beyond 
than at the start of the decade. In 1969, the final year of study for this thesis, the 
Young Conservatives’ national committee voted against the reintroduction of the 
death penalty by 23 votes to 14. It is important to remember, though, that it was 
a minority of younger Conservatives who were abolitionists. Indeed, the Young 
Conservatives’ national committee acknowledged that they were not 
representative of all younger Conservatives. A survey of 4,000 young party 
members returned only 23 per cent support for abolition.207 This was not too 
dissimilar to the percentage of committed abolitionists amongst the Conservative 
MPs born after 1920, which was 34 per cent. Interestingly, the difference of 
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opinion between the Young Conservatives’ national committee and the young 
party members replicated the divergence of opinion on capital punishment that 
existed between the political class and the general public. The public, as 
represented by these 4,000 party members, wanted capital punishment whereas 
the majority at the centre did not. 
 The Labour MPs born after 1920 displayed a more united desire for 
abolition than their young Conservative counterparts. One hundred and thirty-
three Labour MPs born after 1920 voted in abolition debates. One hundred and 
thirty-two of these MPs voted for abolition on every occasion, with the other MP 
voting once against this reform in 1969 when abolition was made permanent. 
However, this did not represent any real deviation away from the trend of 
Labour MPs voting for abolition, regardless of the year that they were born (see 
Figure 4.1, Appendix). The rise in the proportion of abolitionists born after 1920 
in Figure 2.1 can be attributed largely to the younger Conservatives rather than 
Labour MPs, as it was these Conservatives that bucked the retentionist trend 
within their party and thus overcame the traditional party divide on capital 
punishment. Overall, of the 257 MPs born after 1920 that took part in at least 
one capital punishment debate, 178 voted for abolition on every occasion, 
comprising 69 per cent of this group. A further 17 voted both for and against 
abolition and 62 were committed retentionists. The voting records on capital 
punishment indicate that the abolitionists were predominantly Labour MPs who 
were supported by a number of younger Conservatives born after 1920. 
 The occupations that were well represented in these debates and that had 
the largest proportions of abolitionist MPs were the unions, mining, engineering, 
railways, lecturing and teaching (see Figure 6.1, Appendix). Unsurprisingly, these 
were occupations that had a strong association with the Labour Party. For 
example, between 14 and 20 per cent of all Labour MPs were teachers during 
these years, compared to between one and two per cent of Conservative MPs.208 
One hundred and twenty of the MPs that voted in these debates were either 
teachers or lecturers. Of these, 106 voted for abolition in every debate that they 
attended, comprising 88 per cent of the representatives of this profession. Six 
MPs voted both for and against abolition and a further eight were committed 
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retentionists. Ninety-nine of the 106 abolitionist teachers were Labour MPs, with 
five of the other seven representing the Conservative Party. Similar figures exist 
for these other professions. Ninety-one of the 108 union workers were committed 
abolitionists, although interestingly the TUC conference never debated or took a 
line on capital punishment during this period.209 Fifty-six of the 63 miners were 
committed abolitionists, as were 20 of the 30 engineers and 26 of the 35 railway 
workers. There were only six committed retentionist engineers, five committed 
retentionist union workers, one committed retentionist miner and no committed 
retentionists amongst the railway workers. The vast majority of MPs from these 
professions represented the Labour Party. There was one Conservative who had 
worked for a union, two Conservative miners, both of whom became company 
directors, six Conservative engineers, two of whom were company directors, and 
two Conservative railway workers, of whom one was a company director. The 
predominance of abolitionism amongst these occupations supports the identity of 
the majority of abolitionists as being members of the Labour Party. 
 The previous section of this chapter established a link between the 
retentionists and the opponents of other liberalising reforms. There was also a 
link between the abolitionists and the supporters of these liberalising reforms. 
One hundred and sixty three MPs who voted in at least one abolition debate 
voted in favour of the second reading of the Sexual Offences Bill. Of these, 132 
were committed abolitionists whereas only 18 were committed retentionists. Only 
25 of the 132 committed abolitionists were not Labour MPs (see Figure 9.1, 
Appendix). Similarly, 214 of the MPs who took part in an abolition debate voted 
in favour of the second reading of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Bill. Of 
these, 169 were committed abolitionists and 31 were committed retentionists. 
One hundred and fifty of these committed abolitionists were Labour MPs (see 
Figure 10.1, Appendix). There is a clear link between the abolitionists and the 
supporters of the other liberalising reforms, which is examined further in this 
thesis’ chapter on the abolitionist case. 
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 There was a peculiarly strong correlation between the abolitionists and 
the supporters of the CND. The CND archive contains lists of MPs who were 
members of or sympathetic to their campaign. 147 MPs who took part in the 
abolition debates were included in these lists, including Sydney Silverman. All 
147 were committed abolitionists. 136 were members of the Labour Party, 
alongside one member of the Éire Labour Party, seven Liberals and one 
Conservative.210 Other key members of the CND were involved in the abolition 
campaign outside the Commons. Peggy Duff was one of the secretaries of the 
NCACP and was the first Organising Secretary of the CND. Gerald Gardiner 
and Victor Gollancz, the chairmen of the NCACP, were also involved in the 
CND, as was Canon L. John Collins, another member of the NCACP’s 
Executive Committee. 211  This connection with the CND was one of the 
associations that linked the abolition campaign with other liberalising, agitating 
and pacifist movements.  
 It is difficult to measure how many politicians were conscientious 
objectors, as there are not any sufficiently comprehensive lists or records of these 
politicians to enable an investigation into their voting patterns on abolition. It is 
possible, though, to create an impression of the relationship between politicians’ 
pacifism and their opinions on abolition by looking at their biographies and 
memoirs. An inference can be drawn from this about whether the conscientious 
objectors in Parliament were abolitionists, although no percentage can be derived 
from this to indicate the level of support. For this purpose, the backgrounds of 
some of the most prominent abolitionists and retentionists have been examined. 
These politicians are the abolitionists Sydney Silverman, Roy Jenkins, Anthony 
Crosland, Hartley Shawcross, John Paton and Jim Callaghan and the 
retentionists David Maxwell Fyfe, Duncan Sandys, R.A. Butler, Terence Clarke, 
Reginald Manningham-Buller and Quintin Hogg. Of these politicians, only 
Silverman and Paton were not involved in war service. Silverman was 
imprisoned during the First World War for being a conscientious objector and 
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Paton was a prominent anti-war propagandist during the same conflict. 212 This 
sample of politicians is too small to permit a precise conclusion to be drawn. It 
indicates, though, that although most politicians did not actively oppose the 
World Wars, those that did oppose them tended to support abolition. This 
pacifism correlated with a belief in the sanctity of life, which included a rejection 
of the right of the state to take life in any circumstance. 
 There were notable abolitionist figureheads both inside and outside 
Parliament. The principal parliamentary abolitionist was Sydney Silverman, who 
introduced the abolition Bills in 1956 and 1964 and the abolition amendment to 
the Criminal Justice Bill in 1948. Roy Jenkins was another prominent abolitionist 
within the Commons, as was Iain MacLeod for the Conservatives. In the Lords, 
the two abolitionist leaders were Michael Ramsey, the Archbishop of York and 
later Archbishop of Canterbury, and, after 1964, Gerald Gardiner. Outside the 
Commons the campaign was led by Victor Gollancz, L. John Collins and Arthur 
Koestler. These figures from the abolition campaign warrant examination in 
order to understand who were the abolitionists. 
 Sydney Silverman was the architect of the abolition of capital 
punishment. In his obituary in the Daily Express, Wilfred Sendall, quoted in 
Emrys Hughes’ biography on Silverman, described Silverman’s name as 
‘synonymous with Left-wing opposition.’213 Abolition was Silverman’s greatest 
pursuit in Parliament, but he was a committed agitator and supporter of liberal 
reforms. He voted in favour of the legalisation of homosexuality and abortion. 
He was a pacifist and conscientious objector, although these views were tempered 
slightly during the Second World War due to the genocide of the Jews on 
                                                   
212 R.A. Butler, The Art of the Possible: the Memoirs of Lord Butler (London: Hamish Hamilton Limited, 
1971), 61-82; Susan Crosland, Tony Crosland (London: Jonathon Cape Limited, 1982), 13-8; Quintin 
Hogg, A Sparrow’s Flight: the Memoirs of Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone (London: William Collins Sons 
and Co. Limited, 1990), 128-94; Roy Jenkins, A Life at the Centre (London: Macmillan London 
Limited, 1991), 45-58; David Maxwell Fyfe, Political Adventure: the Memoirs of the Earl of Kilmuir 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), 53-64; Kenneth O. Morgan, Callaghan: a Life (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997), 41-56; “Buller, Reginald Edward Manningham-”; “Paton, John”; 
“Sandys, (Edwin) Duncan”; “Shawcross, Hartley William”; “Silverman, (Samuel) Sydney”; 
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, http://www.oxforddnb.com, [accessed 3 Dec. 2013]; 
“Clarke, Brig. Terence Hugh,” Who Was Who, 
http://www.ukwhoswho.com/view/article/oupww/whowaswho/U171703/CLARKE_Brig._Te
rence_Hugh?index=1&results=QuicksearchResults&query=0, [accessed. 3 Dec. 2013]. 
213 Daily Express, 10 February 1968, quoted in Emrys Hughes, Sydney Silverman: Rebel in Parliament 
(London: Charles Skilton Ltd., 1969), 208. 
 97 
mainland Europe. 214  Silverman’s committed and passionate opposition to 
abolition was grounded in a wider rejection of a state’s right to take life and a 
desire for a liberalised society. 
 Roy Jenkins’ opposition to capital punishment was expressed clearly in his 
book The Labour Case. In this, Jenkins listed abolition as the first of the reforms 
required to civilise Britain. In doing so, he linked this to the other liberalising 
reforms under the banner of civilisation.215 This was a theme that was common 
in many abolitionist arguments in Parliament. Jenkins best described the place of 
abolition alongside the other liberalising legislation. It was his use of civilisation 
that was the most prominent example of this concept within the political 
discourse on capital punishment. The importance of the concept of civilisation is 
examined in greater depth in the following two chapters of this thesis.  
Jenkins, of course, later became the leader of the Social Democratic 
Party. Another key abolitionist, Sir Hartley Shawcross, was from a famous liberal 
family. It is possible that part of the explanation for the dominance of Labour 
within both the abolition process and the other liberalising reforms was that there 
did not exist at this time a viable liberal party where liberals such as Jenkins and 
Shawcross could achieve their ambitions. 
 Although Archbishop Ramsey was firm in his opposition to capital 
punishment, he was aware that he was the head of an organisation that 
represented a variety of views on abolition.216 He was not comfortable with 
introducing the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Bill in the Lords due to 
fears that he would be perceived to be both alienating a portion of his 
congregation and suggesting that he was representing the view of the Church of 
England in opposing capital punishment, although both convocations of 
Canterbury and York had expressed their support for abolition in the early 
1960s. Furthermore, there were fears from some of Ramsey’s abolitionist 
confidents that he would not be able to defend himself properly in a debate 
against seasoned retentionist politicians who would attack his argument if he 
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were to introduce the Bill.217 Nonetheless, he was active within the campaign. He 
had opted to make his maiden speech to the House of Lords during the second 
reading of the Death Penalty (Abolition) Bill in 1956, whilst he was Archbishop of 
York. 218  As Archbishop of Canterbury, he communicated regularly with 
prominent abolitionist politicians and campaigners to assist with the preparations 
for the debates on the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Bill.219 Ramsey 
represented a respectable and intelligent moral opposition to capital punishment 
through his roles as Archbishop of York and later Canterbury. 
 Like Ramsey, Gerald Gardiner represented another respectable 
profession, law, in his support for abolition, particularly once he was Lord 
Chancellor. Gardiner’s appointment as Lord Chancellor marked a departure 
from the retentionism of his post-war predecessors. Gardiner was one of the most 
active abolitionist campaigners in Britain before he was appointed as Lord 
Chancellor. By making this appointment, Harold Wilson emphasised that Britain 
had for the first time a government that supported abolition. As a prominent 
lawyer and head of the judiciary, Gardiner’s appointment also served to dispel 
somewhat Lord Elton’s assertion that the lawyers in the Lords were 
predominantly retentionists. 220  Gardiner added credibility from the legal 
profession to the abolition campaign.  
 A minority of Conservative MPs supported abolition. One of the Party’s 
most senior abolitionists was Iain Macleod, a minister in the 1950s and 1960s.221 
Macleod voted for abolition in the 1960s, although he supported the 
government’s Homicide Bill in the mid-1950s. However, his more retentionist 
position in the 1950s did not represent his opinion. He stated his desire to abstain 
from voting on the government’s motion to retain but amend the use of capital 
punishment in February 1956 and on various aspects of the Homicide Bill. He 
was afforded the freedom to abstain in the division on the government’s motion 
but not on the Homicide Bill. As a member of the government, Macleod was 
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expected to support the government Bill, despite his stated strong feelings against 
it.222 Macleod was a vocal abolitionist within cabinet meetings and was free to 
express his support for abolition in the Commons’ divisions after the 
Conservatives lost the 1964 general election. Interestingly, Macleod, like the 
previous abolitionist MPs examined in this chapter, also supported the 
legalisation of homosexuality and abortion. This demonstrates again that a 
liberalising ethos was an important factor behind many politicians’ abolitionism. 
 Thus far this section has examined briefly some notable abolitionists 
within Parliament. However, unlike the retentionists the abolitionists were 
supported by a large national campaign, the NCACP, which sought to educate 
the public and politicians against the death penalty. Some of the other key figures 
from this campaign, aside from Gardiner, warrant attention. These figures are 
Victor Gollancz, the other chair of the campaign, and Canon L. John Collins 
and Arthur Koestler, two of its most prominent members. All of these men were 
committed agitators. Gollancz and Collins were early members of the CND.223 
Indeed, Collins was the campaign’s first chair. He had also helped to create 
Christian Action, a movement dedicated to involving religion in matters 
propagating social and political reforms, and had set up a legal defence fund for 
political activists in South Africa who were imprisoned under the apartheid 
regime.224 Koestler referred to his and Gollancz’s agitating reputations when 
writing to Gollancz in 1955, stating that their names together on the NCACP’s 
Executive Committee would be ‘a red rag to God-fearing people’.225 Another 
with strong agitating and liberalising campaign credentials was Peggy Duff, the 
NCACP’s first secretary and the first Organising Secretary of the CND.226 The 
presence of a number of seasoned activists, however, led to clashes and threats of 
resignation within the Executive Committee. Most notably, Gollancz, Koestler 
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and John Grigg fell out with one another at various times.227 However, despite 
the sometimes tempestuous relationships between these strong-minded agitators, 
the campaign was able to enjoy some success because it was headed by well-
known figures who were recognised as being committed to liberalisation and the 
preservation of the sanctity of life. 
 The abolitionists were by no means a homogenous group. However, there 
were a number of characteristics that were common to many of them. The vast 
majority of Labour MPs were abolitionists, as were a significant number of the 
Conservatives who were born after 1920. A high proportion of the abolitionist 
MPs were supporters of other liberalising reforms, particularly those taking part 
in debates in the 1960s. Unlike the retentionists, the abolitionists had a number 
of figureheads inside and outside Parliament to promote their case. There were a 
large number of pacifists and social agitators amongst the ranks of the abolitionist 
MPs. Support for abolition was most visible, though, amongst the vast majority of 
Labour members. It was only once the class of the 1920s entered Parliament in 
the mid-1950s and 1960s that the numbers of Conservatives supporting abolition 
increased, thus entrenching abolitionism within the Commons regardless of the 
party in government. This, coupled with the Labour election victory in 1964 and 
the arrival of a number of abolitionists in the Lords, including the Lord 
Chancellor, created the environment necessary for abolition to be approved by 
both Houses of Parliament. 
 
Who were the class of the 1920s?  
The marked increase in the percentage of Conservative MPs born during or after 
the 1920s who voted for abolition was a deciding factor in the outcome of the 
capital punishment debates. Unlike those born earlier, these years produced a 
significantly higher proportion of abolitionist MPs. Two hundred and fifty-seven 
MPs who voted in the abolition debates were born during or after the 1920s. Of 
these, 178 were committed abolitionists, 62 committed retentionists and 17 
registered mixed votes. Just over 69 per cent of these MPs were committed 
abolitionists. These politicians have been termed the class of the 1920s for this 
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thesis. Of those MPs born before the 1920s, just under 47 per cent were 
committed abolitionists. The dramatic change that occurred amongst those MPs 
born after 1920 can be recognised when comparing it to those born in the decade 
before. Forty-four per cent of the MPs born between 1911 and 1920 were 
committed abolitionists whereas, for those born between 1921 and 1930, 67.5 
per cent consistently favoured this reform. Of the 178 committed abolitionists 
born after 1920, 132 were Labour MPs and 37 were Conservatives. All of the 
committed retentionists were Conservatives, except for 7 Ulster Unionist MPs. 
The increased prominence of abolition amongst younger politicians was 
recognised contemporaneously. Callaghan and Ross, in their 1969 cabinet 
memorandum, noted that the House of Commons was becoming stronger in its 
support for abolition as a result of the ‘shift in political balance’ whereby the 
older MPs were replaced by younger politicians. They were referring to all MPs, 
but this process was limited primarily to the Conservatives. Where a younger 
Labour MP replaced an older Party colleague for the same seat, the transition 
was almost always from one abolitionist to another.228 As quoted earlier in this 
chapter, Terence Clarke, one of the most vocal retentionist MPs, criticised his 
younger Conservative colleagues for supporting abolition. 229  For Clarke, 
Callaghan and Ross, amongst others, there was no doubt that the younger 
Conservatives were more likely to join with Labour MPs in believing that capital 
punishment should be abolished. This section attempts to explain what common 
backgrounds influenced and formed these younger politicians’ abhorrence 
towards the death penalty. 
There was an earlier increase in the proportion of Conservative 
abolitionists amongst those Conservative MPs who were born after the turn of 
the century. One hundred and thirty-three of the 144 Conservative MPs born 
before or during 1900 who took part in the capital punishment debates were 
committed retentionists, equating to over 92 per cent of this group. Only two of 
these Conservatives were committed abolitionists. Two hundred and fifty-nine of 
the 328 Conservatives born between 1901 and 1920 were committed 
                                                   
228 TNA:PRO, Confidential memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Home Department 
and the Secretary of State for Scotland on the Permanent Abolition of Capital Punishment for 
Murder, CAB/129/141, C(69) 48, 6 May 1969. 
229 HC Deb 21 Dec. 1964 vol. 704 c. 949. 
 102 
retentionists, which represented 79 per cent of the group. Seventeen of the 328 
were committed abolitionists, equivalent to five per cent, and 52 registered mixed 
voted. However, as was noted earlier, the sharpest increase in Conservative 
abolitionism occurred amongst those born after 1920. Thirty-seven of the 108 
Conservatives born in this period, or 34 per cent, were committed abolitionists. 
Fifty-five of these Conservatives, or 51 per cent, were committed retentionists 
whilst 16 voted for both abolition and retention (see Figure 3.1, Appendix).230 
Although there were still more retentionists than abolitionists amongst these 
younger Conservatives, there was a far greater proportion of abolitionists 
amongst their number than was the case with their older Party colleagues. 
In order to understand the characteristics of this younger group, though, 
it is necessary to examine the liberalising generation as a whole. The increasing 
desire for liberalisation after the Second World War was felt primarily amongst 
Labour MPs, especially their younger members. However, there were many 
younger Conservative MPs who shared this liberalising ethos. Fifty-four of the 
108 Conservative MPs born after 1920 who took part in an abolition debate also 
voted in either or both of the second readings of the Sexual Offences Bill and the 
Medical Termination of Pregnancy Bill. Of these 54, 33 voted in favour of 
liberalisation only, 18 voted consistently against reform and three voted for one 
of the Bills and against the other. The liberalising attitudes of the young 
Conservative abolitionists are investigated in the following chapter of this thesis. 
The fact that, on capital punishment, most Labour MPs of all ages already 
supported this reform did not mean that the younger Conservatives’ shift towards 
abolition, away from their Party’s traditional retentionism, was isolated from the 
wider liberalisation that engulfed Parliament and the liberal elite in the 1950s 
and 1960s. The best way, therefore, to understand why more Conservatives who 
were born after 1920 supported abolition than those born earlier is to examine 
the nature of the liberalising generation. 
 The liberalising generation was the group whose modernising virtues 
were extolled by Noel Annan in Our Age. The widespread recognition, at least 
from those within this group, of Annan’s interpretation of their achievements and 
the role of the author within them was demonstrated by the praise for the book 
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on its front cover from another member of this generation, Roy Jenkins: ‘A tour de 
force; a major intellectual achievement by a man who has been a fine exemplar of 
the civilisation he portrays’.231 Again using the civilisation discourse, Jenkins 
placed this generation at the heart of the liberalising and modernising movement 
that encapsulated the abolition of the death penalty. Having the review from 
Jenkins, the Home Secretary most closely associated with these liberalising 
reforms, alone on the front cover of the book placed Annan and his 
interpretation of the generation within a recognisable context of liberalisation 
and abolition. Indeed, Annan described Jenkins as ‘the politician of Our Age who 
did more than any other to increase personal liberty.’232 
 Annan’s generation was not all encompassing. It was temporally limited 
to those ‘who came of age and went to university in the thirty years between 
1919, the end of the Great War, and 1949’. 233  The broadly abolitionist 
generation born from the 1920s onwards, therefore, only correlates with those 
born in the latter half of Annan’s generation. Annan’s examination of his 
generation, though, is important for his portrayal of its context and identity.  
There were further requirements for somebody to be considered part of 
this group: 
How did one get accepted as a member of Our Age? In the same 
way that most people have always got accepted – by ability, by 
family connections and knowing somebody…far more came from 
another aristocracy – the intellectual families that intermarried in 
the nineteenth century and were in full flower between the wars. 
These families produced a disproportionately large number of 
eminent men and women and a fair share of those of not 
outstanding ability but who occupied top posts in academic and 
cultural life. 
Annan continued to say that, while the members of ‘Our Age’ shunned the 
metaphorical wearing of the ‘old school tie’, with the exception, he claims, of the 
Etonians, a large number of this group went to the same public schools. He claims 
that their experiences were ‘shared at school and reinforced by their experiences 
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at university’, predominantly Oxford and Cambridge but also the London School 
of Economics. Annan claimed, though, that the old ‘grammar school boys’ 
reached a more equal footing in society with those educated at public schools, 
particularly in the 1950s and 1960s.234 Annan saw his generation as an intellectual 
elite that set about to modernise the country. This certainly did not include 
everybody who had this education, but was rather a characteristic of this group. 
This equates to the liberal paternalism of the political elite, which abolished 
capital punishment against the will of the electorate out of the elite’s belief that 
only it was sufficiently informed to decide what was best for society on this matter. 
 Annan identified the First World War as the moment that caused his 
generation to be ‘preternaturally critical’ of their fathers’ generation, titled by one 
of his peers as ‘the Establishment’.235 Annan portrayed the rejection of both the 
war and the perceived need for military action as a major factor that helped to 
create and galvanise his generation. Although this does not translate precisely to 
the pacifism of some of the abolitionist MPs, it helps to explain why such 
sentiments were not uncommon during the abolition debates, particularly in the 
wake of the Second World War. This challenging of the establishment included 
the established morality of Britain. Annan identified some of the cultural 
developments that came out of the sexual liberalisation and pleasure seeking of 
this period.236 Such reforms were supported and enabled by the legal and political 
secularisation that the class of the 1920s encouraged and worked within. 
 Annan celebrated the liberalising nature of his generation and criticised 
those senior government figures that opposed it. He argued that David Maxwell 
Fyfe, the Conservative Home Secretary and later Lord Chancellor, was 
‘convinced that Britain should take the lead in uniting Europe. On other matters 
he was less enlightened.’237 His portrayal of Maxwell Fyfe as being unenlightened 
correlated with both the abolitionists’ civilisation narrative and Annan’s own 
assertion that the members of his generation were an intellectual elite. Much like 
the abolitionists who argued that those who disagreed with their view on capital 
punishment were uninformed, Annan viewed those who disagreed with the 
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liberalism of his generation as being uneducated. Annan did suggest that Maxwell 
Fyfe was more intelligent than Sir William Joynson-Hicks, ‘the puritanical Home 
Secretary of the 1920s’, but continued to argue that despite this he was 
‘determined to loose the police on to these deviants [homosexuals].’238 For 
Annan, Maxwell Fyfe’s comparatively higher intelligence did not match that of 
this enlightened generation. The victories of this generation against the 
established morality were credited to the desire for sexual liberalisation and more 
specifically to the obscenity case regarding the publication of Lady Chatterley’s Lover. 
Amongst his analysis of the desire for increased liberalisation, there was virtually 
no mention of capital punishment. Annan made only one passing reference to the 
death penalty in his book as again he criticised the unenlightened nature of 
Maxwell Fyfe as Home Secretary. Annan did not afford abolition a place within 
the great achievements of his generation.239 However, it was this liberalising ethos 
that encapsulated abolition under the banner of civilisation, as demonstrated by 
Jenkins and others.240 Annan outlined the identity and nature of the generation 
that removed the death penalty. It was others, though, who recognised the place 
of abolition within such a movement. It is possible that Annan made only a 
passing reference to capital punishment in Our Age because the issue did not fit 
with the ideals of his entire generation. Nevertheless, this generation provided an 
important context for abolition. 
 This class of the 1920s is represented in Figure 2.1 by the sharply rising 
trend line, which indicates the percentage of all MPs born in each decade who 
were committed abolitionists and rises dramatically from the 1920s. The rise in 
abolitionist support from the class of the 1920s was caused by the more 
liberalising attitudes of the Conservative MPs born in these years, who were part 
of Annan’s age. As mentioned earlier, though, Annan’s generation did not match 
precisely the expansion in abolitionism in this period. The trend line in Figure 
2.1 is relatively steady from 1871-1920. This does not mirror the shift in morals 
and practices that Annan recognised within his broader generation. 
 The generational shift identified by Annan does not explain fully why 
there was an increased prominence of abolitionism amongst the younger 
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Conservatives. As well as conforming to this liberalising ethos, there would have 
been other reasons for why these younger Conservatives disagreed with their 
older colleagues by finding capital punishment repugnant. It is not possible to 
explain definitively why there was a sharp rise in abolitionism amongst 
Conservative MPs born after 1920. However, it is appropriate to outline some 
hypotheses on factors that can be presumed to have had some influence on these 
politicians’ beliefs on capital punishment.  
Mark Jarvis has argued that the Conservatives needed to embrace 
modernisation after their electoral defeat in 1945 in order to remain in touch 
with their electorate.241 This accounts for the Party elite’s willingness to adopt 
some liberalising measures in the latter half of the 1950s and early 1960s, but 
does not explain why younger Conservative MPs voted against this elite when 
supporting abolition. The youngest of the MPs from the class of the 1920s would 
not have fought in the Second World War, although the experience of war could 
have influenced MPs to either support or oppose capital punishment. It is not 
possible to quantify or qualify the extent to which not fighting in war affected 
MPs’ beliefs on the death penalty without accessing many politicians’ private 
archives. Many of these are not accessible to the public and there has been 
insufficient time during the research for this thesis to visit all of the archives that 
are accessible. The following, therefore, are the most probable hypotheses for the 
younger MPs’ beliefs on abolition, particularly those of the younger 
Conservatives, which can be reached without having a lot more time to visit 
more archives. 
What is evident is that for Labour MPs and for many younger 
Conservatives there was a greater propensity to feel that the country required 
liberalisation. The younger Conservatives, though, split from their Party’s 
orthodox approach on capital punishment to support abolition. The younger 
Conservative MPs were politically maturing and then elected at a time when 
Britain’s political culture was secularising. This legal and political secularisation 
diminished the influence of religious doctrine and morality within the 
parliamentary process, particularly that of traditional Anglican morality which 
was most influential within the Conservative Party. Anglican morality and the 
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leaders of the Church of England had previously provided a level of support for 
retention, although by the early 1960s the Church’s older retentionist leaders had 
largely been replaced by abolitionists.242 Secularisation can be presumed to have 
had some formative influence on at least some of the younger Conservatives’ 
beliefs and moral frameworks, as they were maturing within a political 
environment in which Anglican morality was becoming less influential. 
These younger Conservatives entered the House of Commons at a time 
when the liberalising ethos was gripping much of the Labour Party and senior 
elements of the Conservative Party, notably R.A. Butler. The widespread 
recognition for the relaxation of both state control over society and state 
interference in individuals’ lives was linked with the post-war discourse of 
civilisation, based on a progressive programme to humanise and liberalise British 
society. As Overy explains with reference to the inter-war period, those who 
wrote about civilisation defined the concept. Those writing about it, notably 
Jenkins and Crosland, defined it as improving both the sanctity of life and the 
individual’s freedom of behaviour in order to create a society based upon gaiety 
and full enjoyment.243 The younger Conservatives entered a House of Commons 
that was embracing these notions of liberalisation and civilisation. For most 
politicians who adhered to these notions, this included abolishing the death 
penalty. It is unsurprising, therefore, that an increasing number of the 
Conservatives who matured politically and entered Parliament within this 
environment supported abolition. It is also unsurprising that this shift did not 
affect the majority of the younger Conservatives, as this new political culture 
cannot be expected to have caused a sudden, seismic shift away from traditional 
Conservative values amongst all younger Conservatives. Such changes happen 
more gradually. The lack of a central doctrine behind Conservatism, of the sort 
that existed for the Labour Party, meant that it was not especially problematic for 
groups within the Party to shift away from traditional Party orthodoxies on 
certain issues, as was happening contemporaneously with R.A. Butler and the 
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Right Progressives supporting an element of economic and social liberalisation.244 
The shift towards abolitionism within the Conservative Party accelerated with 
the arrival in Parliament of the younger MPs born after 1920. It developed in the 
following decades to such an extent that when Margaret Thatcher, as Prime 
Minister, spoke publically of her desire for capital punishment to be retained, she 
did so in the knowledge that the majority of her front bench disagreed with 
her.245 
It is likely that the politically secularising, liberalising and civilising ethos 
within the British political culture of the 1950s and 1960s helped to form some of 
the abolitionist beliefs of the younger Conservatives. This mentality was common 
amongst members of all parties who favoured the separation of crime and sin, 
which was particularly prominent within the permissive legislation. However, a 
number of the senior members of both major parties were uncomfortable with 
the developing permissive society. This is examined in the following two chapters 
of this thesis. There were other factors, though, that could have influenced the 
class of the 1920s, and in particular the younger Conservatives, to support 
abolition.  
The widespread perception that Evans, Bentley and Ellis should not have 
been executed might have persuaded a few politicians that the death penalty 
should be abolished. It may have also reinforced the abolitionism of others, 
particularly those younger politicians who were more likely to be formulating 
their opinions when these executions were carried out. Similarly, the emerging 
evidence during this period from the Royal Commission’s report and from 
foreign countries that had abolished the death penalty indicated that capital 
punishment was not a uniquely effective deterrent to murder. This would have 
removed the sense for some politicians that it was a necessary penalty to maintain 
law and order within society and could have thus persuaded some to support 
abolition. The committed abolitionism of most of the abolitionists, though, 
indicates that their opposition to capital punishment would not have required 
such evidence or cases to convince them that the death penalty should be 
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removed. Their opposition was a more innate, emotional rejection of executions, 
based on a view that capital punishment was barbaric, to quote Callaghan and 
Ross.246 
This abolitionism was not the result of a ‘youthquake’, as demonstrated 
by the retentionism of the general membership of the Young Conservatives. This 
and the abolitionism of their national committee, mentioned earlier, was a 
microcosm of the difference of opinion on abolition between the political elite 
and the electorate. There were no youth protests or vocal demands for abolition. 
The young in society did not differentiate themselves from the opinions of the 
rest of the broadly retentionist population. These younger abolitionist 
Conservative MPs, as part of the political elite, enabled abolitionism to become 
entrenched within the Commons. The majority of the abolitionists in Parliament, 
though, were members of the Labour Party of all ages. Politicians did not act 
with the support of, or under pressure from, the electorate. There was no clear 
demand for abolition from the younger members of society. It was, therefore, a 
reform that was imposed upon them by a liberal elite.  
Party characteristics and conceptual backgrounds are examined in the 
following chapter as formative aspects of the abolitionists’ beliefs. Abolitionism 
was stronger amongst the younger Conservatives than it was amongst their older 
Party colleagues. In the absence of further evidence for the formative causes of 
their beliefs, one must presume that the secularised, liberalising, civilising political 
culture of the 1950s and 1960s influenced a minority of young Conservatives to 
believe that capital punishment was an unpleasant and unnecessary element of 
Britain’s criminal justice system. This was in line with the established Labour 
orthodoxy on the issue.  
It is likely that there would have been other factors that pushed the 
parliamentary class of the 1920s towards abolition, regardless of their affiliations 
to political parties. Without accessing the private papers of a significant number 
of politicians, though, one can only speculate as to what these factors might have 
been. 
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Conclusion 
The retentionists and abolitionists were broadly divided along party lines, with 
the former predominantly aligned with the Conservatives and the latter with the 
Labour Party. The notable exception was the abolitionist minority of younger 
Conservative MPs. Although a number of historians have highlighted the party 
divide over abolition, no study has investigated this or examined the 
characteristics of those involved in either group. This chapter has explained that 
the retentionists were generally more traditional Conservatives, many of whom 
had careers in the military and business management. The abolitionism of the 
younger Conservatives, though, enabled abolition to become entrenched within 
the Commons, regardless of which party was in government. 
 The previous chapter on public opinion explained that politicians 
disregarded the popular will and were liberated from party pressure when they 
voted on capital punishment. The directions of their votes were based upon their 
own consciences. It is impossible to identify the specific reasons for the votes cast 
by each individual politician during these debates. Yet, this detachment from 
public opinion and party pressure means that it is essential to understand the 
backgrounds that shaped politicians’ decisions when examining why capital 
punishment was abolished. It is necessary, therefore, that their collective 
identities as retentionists and abolitionists are established in order to understand 
why the abolitionists were successful. This chapter has qualified these labels, 
which have been used in much of the historiography without qualification 
beyond a basic division by party allegiance. The politicians’ occupational 
backgrounds that have been extrapolated from the database of MPs’ votes 
support the broad party split of the Conservatives as retentionists and Labour 
members as abolitionists. The abolitionism of the younger Conservatives is 
significant, though, for explaining why capital punishment was consistently 
opposed within the House of Commons after the 1955 general election. 
 This identification of these collective identities exposes some of the causes 
of politicians’ beliefs on capital punishment. It goes some way, therefore, to 
explaining why the death penalty was abolished. In order to address this question 
fully, though, the arguments and beliefs of the retentionists and abolitionists have 
to be examined in detail, drawing upon the backgrounds uncovered within this 
chapter. This is conducted in the following two chapters of this thesis. 
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Chapter Three: The abolitionist case 
 
When Sydney Silverman moved that his Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Bill 
be read for a second time, he did so in confidence that, finally, his attempt to 
abolish capital punishment would be successful. He took the inclusion of his Bill 
in the Queen’s Speech, the only Private Members’ Bill to make the programme, 
to be a ‘good omen’. He stated in Parliament that this debate would not look at 
the ‘pros and cons of the preservation or abolition of the death penalty for 
murder’, as that ‘battle—a long, grim, sometimes dreary, sometimes exciting 
battle—was won in 1957 in the Homicide Act.’247 Although many retentionists 
would have disputed this assertion, Silverman’s speech reflected the wider feeling 
amongst the prominent abolitionists that the matter would be resolved 
imminently and successfully. Six months before the 1964 general election, 
Gardiner and Gollancz had written to the members of the NCACP: ‘Whatever 
Government is returned will be younger and we believe that there is a probability 
that success will at last crown our efforts during the lifetime of the next 
Parliament.’248 By 1964, the abolition process had become long and grim, as the 
abolition Bills of 1948 and 1956, which had received the support of the 
Commons, were defeated because of the retentionist attitudes of both the 
presiding governments and the House of Lords. 
This chapter examines how the abolitionists argued their case within 
Parliament, the reasons why they believed that abolition was necessary, the place 
of abolition alongside the other socially liberal reforms and, finally, why the 
abolitionists succeeded. These four areas of investigation form the structure of 
this chapter and explain how the abolitionists achieved their aim. Civilisation was 
an important aspect of the abolitionists’ arguments and beliefs and is examined in 
this chapter, along with the other principal components of their case, namely a 
moral repugnance towards the state taking life and their challenge to the 
argument that capital punishment was a unique deterrent to murder. 
An analysis of the abolitionists’ arguments and an appraisal of their 
movement have been absent thus far from the historiography of capital 
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punishment. In particular, there has been no challenge to the assumption that 
there was a genuine link between abolition and the permissive society. This 
chapter provides an original analysis of the abolitionists’ case in order to 
understand why capital punishment was abolished in Britain. As the vast 
majority of abolitionist MPs were members of the Labour Party, this chapter 
examines the conceptual backgrounds of this party in explaining the nature of 
and reasons for the abolitionists’ arguments and beliefs. However, this thesis’ 
previous chapter has explained that there was a group of younger Conservative 
MPs who also favoured abolition. These have been loosely associated with the 
Right Progressive movement within the Conservative Party. It is essential, 
therefore, that the analysis of the abolitionists’ case extends beyond the Labour 
Party. This extension is underdeveloped within the historiography. 
 
How did the abolitionists argue their case? 
This section splits the abolitionist argument into three primary groups: 
civilisation, moralism and causalism. These three aspects of their arguments are 
examined in this order. A significant number of abolitionists used language 
associated with civilisation to criticise the retention of the death penalty, 
including Silverman during the same speech mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter. His use of civilisation is quoted a little later in this section. These were 
emotional expressions within the discourse of high politics that were used to 
invoke repugnance and disgust amongst fellow politicians. Such expressions did 
not tend to be scorned by politicians, despite their dismissal of dissenting public 
opinion on the grounds of perceived emotionalism.249 Arguments based upon 
civilisation were not the sole preserve of the abolitionists. The retentionists 
argued that Britain’s level of civilisation would be diminished were capital 
punishment abolished. This argument is examined in this thesis’ chapter on the 
retentionist case. However, civilisation was utilised more successfully by the 
abolitionists in Parliament and formed a central part of many of their arguments. 
Many abolitionists used moral arguments, some of which were based on 
Christian teachings and non-conformist ideals. The influence of these declined 
during this period, though, as Britain’s law and political discourse became 
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increasingly secularised. The major aspect of their case was the causalist 
argument that capital punishment did not provide a uniquely effective deterrent 
to murder. This became the crucial point of contention during the capital 
punishment debates, ahead of arguments based on morality. Both the 
abolitionists and retentionists attempted to persuade their audiences in the 
Commons and Lords that their interpretation of the deterrent effect of capital 
punishment was correct. This examination of the abolitionists’ arguments uses 
Christie Davies’ framework of causalist issues becoming more important than 
moralism within the political discourse on issues of conscience in this period.250  
Civilisation, although predominantly a moral, emotional argument, 
somewhat transcends the division of arguments into moralist and causalist. There 
were aspects of causalism within the abolitionists’ uses of civilisation, such as the 
perception that a more civilised society would be safer and less violent. Most uses 
of civilisation, though, were moral reactions to capital punishment. For this 
reason, civilisation is analysed separately in this section, before moralism and 
causalism. This thesis’ chapter on public opinion explained that politicians did 
not allow their views on capital punishment to be influenced greatly by the 
opinions of those outside Parliament. Politicians did not engage in any significant 
attempts to present their arguments to the electorate. For this reason the majority 
of the evidence for the abolitionists’ arguments is taken from politicians’ speeches, 
as recorded in Hansard. 
 Silverman’s first sentence after moving that the Bill be read was one of 
gratitude to the government for providing time for the debate to bring about the 
‘final end of the last remnant of a grotesque barbarity’. 251 This language 
immediately placed Silverman’s argument within the well-established discourse 
on civilisation. Callaghan and Ross echoed the use of this concept in their cabinet 
memorandum of 1969.252 This concept was a common feature of both the 
abolitionist and retentionist arguments, although the abolitionists had a better-
developed conceptual framework and used the concept more frequently in their 
arguments. Roy Jenkins’ use of civilisation is perhaps the most noteworthy within 
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the capital punishment debates. He used the concept to link abolition to other 
liberalising reforms within the final chapter of The Labour Case, which he titled “Is 
Britain Civilised?”.253 
Raymond Williams has broadly defined civilisation as ‘an achieved state 
or condition of organised social life.’254 None of the politicians who took part in 
the capital punishment debates would dispute Williams’ description. 
Retentionists and abolitionists disagreed with one another about whether capital 
punishment positively or negatively impacted on the condition of organised 
society and about whether Britain had achieved this state of social life. There was 
a widespread acceptance, though, that capital punishment did have an effect on 
the level of civilisation within a society. Although there was no uniformity in 
either the abolitionist or retentionist interpretations of civilisation, it was widely 
understood to be a concept by which Britain could be compared to other 
countries. 
Jenkins’ chapter “Is Britain Civilised?” demonstrated both the 
relationship between capital punishment and civilisation and the belief that this 
relationship would be recognised by the book’s audience. There was a well-
founded conceptual framework that linked society’s treatment of its prisoners to 
its level of civilisation. The Gospel according to Matthew stated that it was right 
to care for the weakest members of society, including prisoners.255 Winston 
Churchill, a committed retentionist, developed this concept in a speech to the 
House of Commons in 1910:  
The mood and temper of the public in regard to the treatment of 
crime and criminals is one of the most unfailing tests of the 
civilisation of any country.  A calm and dispassionate recognition 
of the rights of the accused against the State, and even of convicted 
criminals against the State… are the symbols which in the 
treatment of crime and criminals mark and measure the stored-up 
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strength of a nation, and are the sign and proof of the living virtue 
in it.256 
It is understandable, therefore, that retaining or abolishing capital punishment 
was perceived by politicians to have some effect on Britain’s civilisation. As a 
result, the concept was used frequently within the death penalty discourse. 
Civilisation was both a conceptual framework for abolition and an 
emotional device within the discourse. Roy Jenkins provided the most detailed 
example of the former use of civilisation. He opened the final chapter of The 
Labour Case, in which he set out his programme to abolish the death penalty and 
enact other liberalising legislation, by explaining that: ‘this chapter is about the 
need to make this country a more civilised place in which to live.’257 The chapter 
framed Jenkins’ proposed legislative programme around this concept. He used 
civilisation to connect capital punishment to other liberalising reforms, such as 
the legalisation of homosexuality and abortion. Abolition was mentioned first in 
this list of reforms. Jenkins emphasised the importance of removing the death 
penalty for achieving civilisation through his language on capital punishment, 
describing it as ‘a barbaric and useless penalty’ and the gallows as the ‘ghastly 
apparatus’. This emotive language highlighted that abolition was a key reform for 
Jenkins. He concluded his paragraph on capital punishment by claiming that 
Britain ‘stands out as one of the few advanced countries which retains this 
presumptuously final penalty’.258 Jenkins was one of many abolitionists to base his 
argument for abolition on the concept of civilisation. As a senior Labour 
politician using this framework to support and unite abolition with other 
liberalising legislation, his chapter is of particular interest and importance as it 
represented an argument that it is fair to presume was supported by at least some 
of the other senior members of the Labour Party.  
The same was true for Tony Crosland, another senior Labour politician, 
who outlined a programme for modernising Britain that was broader than 
Jenkins’. This contained many of the same reforms, including the ‘libertarian 
reform of existing laws on capital punishment, police powers, homosexuality, 
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aliens and immigration, and so on.’259 Although he did not frame this around the 
concept of civilisation, he used similar ideas that were often linked to this, notably 
progressiveness. Civilisation was present, though, in his earlier vision of a society 
based upon increased enjoyment and leisure activities pursued outdoors and in 
cafés, restaurants, pubs and theatres. This was published in the conclusion of The 
Future of Socialism. Crosland defined the society that he was picturing as being ‘a 
more colourful and civilised country to live in.’260 Although this vision is well-
known, this chapter of this thesis uses his programme within The Conservative 
Enemy more closely, as it contained a more detailed list of proposed legislation to 
realise his ambition. The absence of the term civilisation from Crosland’s later 
programme is a reminder that the concept was not used universally and 
consistently by all abolitionists. Other concepts were used in a similar manner, 
notably progressiveness, liberalisation and modernisation, though they were not 
synonyms for civilisation. These other concepts were used somewhat 
interchangeably, but it was civilisation that appeared the most frequently within 
abolitionists’ arguments. 
 The abolitionists’ appeals to civilisation within parliamentary discourse 
were emotional. Their decrying of executions as a barbaric practice was intended 
both to incite disgust towards capital punishment and to inspire support for 
abolition based upon their audience’s now-heightened moral and aesthetic 
repudiation of the death penalty. Civilisation was used primarily in two ways by 
the abolitionists. The majority viewed Britain as a civilised country whose use of 
the death penalty did not match this status. Some, though, portrayed it as a 
country that could only become civilised by abolishing capital punishment. For 
most abolitionists, therefore, the portrayal of capital punishment as an uncivilised 
practice placed the death penalty at odds with their impression of the state that 
they represented. This was a crucial aspect of the emotional nature of the 
civilisation arguments, as it challenged the presentation of Britain as a superior 
society at a time that it was losing its empire. According to this portrayal, 
sympathetic politicians could only satisfy themselves that their state was ‘Great’ 
Britain by abolishing the death penalty.  
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Speaking in 1956, the Earl of Listowel’s argument was founded upon this 
former idea that the death penalty was harmful to Britain’s status as a civilised 
country: 
There are only three countries left in Western Europe—which, 
after all, is still the main repository of Christian civilisation—the 
United Kingdom, France and Spain, that still retain the death 
penalty for murder. I have always taken the view, which I think 
may be shared by many other noble Lords, that the British 
character is more Scandinavian than Latin; and I think this holds 
good in spite of our predominantly urban way of life. I cannot 
believe that we are, on the whole, less self-disciplined or more 
prone to violence than our Scandinavian neighbours, and I venture 
to think that this may be just as forcible an explanation of the low 
murder rate, to which frequent reference has been made, in the 
United Kingdom as the explanation that it is accounted for by the 
existence of the death penalty.261 
Listowel supported his abolitionist position through a comparative, international 
understanding of civilisation. His view of civilisation was Euro-centric, which is 
perhaps unsurprising. His interpretation of Scandinavian and Latin countries 
could be presented as a comparison between the cold-climate states, where 
emotionalism was limited, and the hot-climate states in which tempers boiled. 
The latter encouraged greater incidences of murder whereas the former kept 
homicide rates low. He argued that capital punishment was unnecessary in 
Britain because the country had a similar level of civilisation and climate as the 
Scandinavian states that had abolished the death penalty. He saw no reason why 
capital punishment would be a unique deterrent in Britain if it were not in those 
other countries. By referring to the comparative levels of civilisation between 
Britain and the Scandinavian and Latin countries, Listowel was challenging his 
fellow peers to find a reason to portray Britain as a more dangerous and 
barbarous state. Although some peers were willing to do this in other debates, 
citing gangsterism in cities and the increasing incidents of violent crime, a 
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significant number of politicians adhered to Listowel’s use of civilisation within 
the abolition debates.262 
 It is noteworthy that Listowel compared Britain to the Scandinavian 
countries. The experiences and opinions from these countries, in particular 
Sweden and Norway, were of particular interest to various politicians and 
governments across this period. The Royal Commission’s members visited 
Scandinavian countries, along with the Benelux countries, France, Italy, 
Switzerland and some of the states of the United States, in order to inform their 
report. 263  The Howard League for Penal Reform invited foreign experts, 
primarily from Scandinavia, to speak to MPs in 1956.264 Finally, the British 
ambassadors to Sweden and Norway sent a number of letters to the British 
government outlining the opinions of people and politicians in these countries 
towards Britain’s use of capital punishment. There is no record in The National 
Archives of opinions from other countries being recorded in the same manner.265 
It is apparent, therefore, that both Listowel’s admiration for Scandinavia and his 
perception of Britain as having a similar level of civilisation to the Scandinavian 
countries would have resonated amongst a number of politicians and others 
involved in studying capital punishment. 
 The Earl of Listowel’s view of Britain as a civilised country was the most 
common use of civilsation by abolitionists. There were some politicians, though, 
who argued that Britain was not civilised because of its use of the death penalty. 
One such politician was Lord Merthyr, who argued in 1948: 
I share the views of a good many foreigners who point to this 
country and say: "Your country cannot be wholly civilised so long 
as you have the death penalty," and who say that in any so-called 
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civilised country which retains the death penalty there is an element 
of barbarism.266 
Merthyr’s use of civilisation compared Britain to foreign countries that, it can be 
inferred, had abolished capital punishment. His denunciation of Britain as an 
uncivilised country, or at least one whose status as being civilised was dubious, 
portrayed capital punishment as having a greater barbaric effect upon society 
than did Listowel in his speech. However, the use of foreign examples indicates 
that, although Merthyr viewed capital punishment as having a more uncivilising 
influence on society than did Listowel, both men used and justified the concept as 
a comparative tool. This is common throughout the debates, both for abolitionists 
who viewed Britain as civilised and for those who did not. The differences in the 
gravity afforded to the uncivilising influence of capital punishment, therefore, 
should not overshadow the broad commonality in the abolitionists’ uses of this 
concept. The concept, therefore, can be examined as a broadly uniform idea. 
Abolitionist MPs attacked the retentionists’ uses of civilisation. Sydney 
Silverman, in criticising the Conservative government’s Homicide Bill, stated: 
The whole of these discussions [about the compromise Homicide 
Bill] are exempt from argument, reason and logic. We are to have 
this, because it must stand between our civilisation and its 
irretrievable collapse—the execution of 2.35 murderers every 
years. That is the reductio ad absurdum of the whole argument, 
and the Government appeal to us to help them along with the Bill; 
not to waste time. They are determined to have it on the Statute 
Book, when they are saying that there is nothing satisfactory to 
anyone; that there is nothing intelligible or rational to be said in 
support of it.267 
There was nothing unusual in Silverman lambasting a retentionist argument. His 
criticism of the retentionist argument on Britain’s civilisation, though, is 
interesting. Although Silverman did not utilise civilisation in his own argument, 
he found fault with this alternative interpretation, accusing the retentionists of 
using the concept for political expediency. This was a charge that was also leveled 
against the abolitionists, as was demonstrated by Stanley Evans when, during the 
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debate on the government’s retentionist motion in February 1956, he attacked the 
abolitionists for labeling those who disagreed with them as being uncivilised.268 
This argument is examined in greater detail in the following chapter. Both 
abolitionists and retentionists used arguments based on civilisation to enhance 
their case. It was the abolitionists, though, who published programmes to civilise 
the country. The retentionists did not develop the concept to a similar extent. 
The civilisation discourse extended beyond Westminster. William 
Temple, the Archbishop of York between 1929 and 1942 and Archbishop of 
Canterbury from 1942 to 1944, delivered a sermon against the continuance of 
the death penalty that was published by The Spectator and reprinted by the 
NCADP in 1935. Temple’s final sentence of his sermon presented the crux of his 
opposition to capital punishment: 
To me, at least, it seems clear that few public actions would at the 
present time so much demonstrate and secure an advance in the 
ethics of civilisation as the abolition of the death penalty.269 
Temple’s rejection of capital punishment pre-dates the scope of this thesis, but it 
demonstrates that the civilisation discourse within the capital punishment debates 
was well established. He added a prominent and respectable voice to those of the 
politicians who decried the uncivilised nature of capital punishment. Throughout 
the capital punishment debates both abolitionists and retentionists praised the 
contributions made to the debates from senior bishops, particularly in the House 
of Lords.270 Temple’s argument was cited in the capital punishment debates in 
both Houses of Parliament after his death. This demonstrates Matthew Grimley’s 
argument that secularisation was not total during this period. It influenced the 
arguments and, occasionally, the beliefs of politicians. It did not mean, though, 
that senior clerics lost all influence within politics or society. 271  Temple’s 
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contribution and interpretation of civilisation, therefore, had an impact upon 
these debates.272 
The widespread appeal of the civilisation discourse within the abolitionist 
arguments was not limited to Britain. The Norwegian newspaper Aftonbladet 
criticised Britain’s civilisation in relation to the execution of Ruth Ellis but 
praised it when the House of Commons passed the Death Penalty (Abolition) Bill 
in 1956. It was another example of the emotionalism that rested at the heart of 
the arguments based on civilisation: 
Cases like that of Ruth Ellis stay in our memories and from them 
we judge the English people. The continuance of the death 
sentence in England is a burden for England’s good name in the 
world. 
This quote, published in the Daily Mirror, was accompanied by a similar quote 
from the Melbourne Argus in Australia, which claimed that: 
The hanging has shamed Britain in the eyes of most of the civilised 
world – not because Ellis was a woman, but in the application of 
the death penalty itself. It amounts to state murder.273 
Aftonbladet later portrayed British civilisation in a more positive light after the 
Commons debate on the Death Penalty (Abolition) Bill: 
In these cruel times when we have to cling to everything which 
speaks for humanity, we must welcome the agreement of the House 
of Commons with this view (that the death penalty should be 
abandoned). Our faith in Great Britain, whether under a Labour or 
Tory Government, as the surest guardian of civilisation has been 
confirmed afresh.274 
These examples demonstrate that abolitionists in foreign countries believed that 
capital punishment was connected to civilisation and that Britain’s reputation as 
a civilised country was affected by its use of the death penalty. Aftonbladet 
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apportioned particular importance to capital punishment as a device that 
determined a society’s civilisation, arguing that Britain’s civilisation had been 
burdened by the execution of Ruth Ellis, yet less than a year later claiming that it 
was a ‘surest guardian of civilisation’ after it appeared that the death penalty 
would be abolished. Civilisation was both an emotional device for politicians and 
others to defend their arguments whilst attacking their opponents’ and a 
conceptual framework that epitomised the nature of society that was to be 
protected or desired.  
Morality, and in particular religion, were fairly common themes within the 
abolitionists’ arguments, although they were not used as frequently as arguments 
based on civilisation or deterrence, thus demonstrating secularisation within law 
and politics. Although Davies is correct to assert that moralism declined in 
prominence within the debates on abolition and other issues of conscience, being 
overtaken by causalist arguments, moralism remained a feature of the abolitionist 
arguments throughout this period.275 Furthermore, as the next section of this 
chapter explains, it was still the most important reason for the abolitionism of 
most MPs. Davies’ framework of secularisation applies to the arguments within 
the abolition debates to a large, but not total, extent. 
Nonconformist Christian practices had a distinct influence over many of 
those who were involved in the formation of the Labour Party, though this 
influence declined after ‘the Party’s formative years’.276 The religious backgrounds 
within the Labour Party are examined in the next section of this chapter. The 
reduction in the presence of nonconformists within the Party, though, did not 
equate to a decline in moral justifications for abolition. 
 Religion was a fairly fundamental aspect of a number of abolitionist 
arguments. Lord Rochester, speaking during the Lords debate on the abolition 
amendment to the Criminal Justice Bill in June 1948, based much of his 
argument on Biblical doctrine. He criticised the Archbishop of Canterbury, 
Geoffrey Fisher, who had spoken in favour of capital punishment in the debate on 
the previous day and whose speech is examined in this thesis’ chapter on the 
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retentionist case. Rochester argued that Canterbury focused too heavily on the 
Old Testament and yet omitted ‘all reference to the words of Jesus Christ 
himself.’277 He did not employ Christianity, though, merely to criticise the 
religious arguments of his opponents. His abolitionist argument was centred 
largely on Christian teachings: 
While the death sentence remains, it colours the whole of our penal 
system, whereas to abolish it would be a civilising step and a gleam 
of light on a dark horizon when so many steps backward are being 
taken all over the world… This is an issue that far transcends all 
Parties. My appeal is to Christian principles, of which the first and 
most important is the sacredness of human personality and the 
value of every individual life in the sight of God.278 
Rochester found the support necessary for his argument from the Bible. He 
sought to convince the other Lords of the need to abolish the death penalty 
because of the unchristian and uncivilised nature of the punishment.  
 Reginald Paget, one of the more prominent abolitionist MPs, and the 
Bishop of Chichester also used religion in their arguments. During the November 
1956 debate on the Homicide Bill, Paget stated: 
Young men like these, however violent, ill-guided and wicked, 
should not be denied the chance of becoming fit to meet their 
Maker. That seems to be the all-important consideration… There 
are just three phrases from St. Matthew which I should like to read 
with regard to this. They are: “Pilate saith unto them, What shall I 
do with Jesus who is called Christ? They all say unto him. Let him 
be crucified.” “And the Governor said, Why, what evil hath he 
done? But they cried out the more, saying. Let him be crucified.” 
“When Pilate saw he could prevail nothing, but that rather a 
tumult was made, he took water, and washed his hands before the 
multitude, saying, I am innocent of the blood of this just person.” 
Was he innocent? Do we judge him innocent? Can we judge 
ourselves innocent if we consent to the killing, the unnecessary 
killing, wrongful killing, because we think that the crowd likes it? 
                                                   
277 HL Deb 02 Jun. 1948 vol. 156 c. 153. 
278 HL Deb 02 Jun. 1948 vol. 156 c. 155. 
 124 
Can we justify this, for it is our action? The hangman is our 
servant—is there one of us here who would do his job? Very few, I 
hope, because in our hearts and souls we know that what he is 
doing is indecent and wrong.279 
Paget’s reference to Christian doctrine was at the end of a speech that lasted a 
little over thirty-five minutes. Religion was not the primary justification for his 
entire argument. By citing a religious reason to abolish the death penalty at the 
end of a long speech, Paget would have hoped or expected that this would have a 
greater impact upon his audience. He was not, however, using religion simply to 
state that hanging was wrong. The main purpose of his use of religious doctrine 
was to draw upon an example that would be both familiar to and respected by his 
audience in the Commons. His strategy appears to have been to remind his fellow 
politicians of their culpability in an execution in order to persuade them to oppose 
capital punishment. His use of religious doctrine, therefore, was as an emotional 
and persuasive device rather than as the central justification for an argument. In 
this way, it differed from the position espoused by Lord Rochester in 1948 that 
was based on Biblical teachings. 
 The Bishop of Chichester, Roger Wilson, in speaking in favour of the 
Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Bill in the Lords in July 1965, referred 
infrequently to Christianity. His argument instead was based upon a morality that 
was not specific to the Church. He did, though, make some reference to the 
Church, notably the opinions of the clergy towards the death penalty: 
The Churches have made their own pronouncements through 
their assemblies on this. They would not dream of saying they 
represent all Christian opinion or that there has been any Gallup 
Poll among the Churches on this. In the Convocations they have 
said as representatives what they thought right; and I take it that 
this is the business of this House also; and in the end I believe we 
shall be seen in a far more creditable light and far more Christian 
light if, instead of waiting for positive evidence, which will never 
occur, on grounds of principle and of utility we grasp the nettle at 
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this time and make our decision, as indeed I hope we shall do to-
morrow afternoon.280 
As with Paget, Chichester’s inclusion of religion was at the end of his speech to the 
House. Chichester used religious opinion to influence other peers. He placed 
specific importance on Christian opinion on the death penalty, following the 
recent pronouncements in favour of abolition from the Convocations of 
Canterbury and York.281 Prior to the quoted passage from his speech, Chichester 
had stated that it was ‘certainly not our business to wait for public opinion in such 
an important issue.’282 Christian, and more specifically Anglican, opinion was 
placed here above the opinion of the general public. In order to support his 
abolitionist argument, Chichester argued that the opinions of religious leaders 
were more informed than those of the public. He did not utilise Biblical doctrine. 
The examples quoted in this section demonstrate that religion and 
religious morality were important for the abolitionists’ arguments. There were 
individuals, such as Lord Rochester early in this period, for whom religion was an 
important justification for an abolitionist argument. Furthermore, others such as 
Paget and the Bishop of Chichester used Christianity to conclude their speeches. 
They would not have done so had they believed that religion would not have had 
a particular influence upon the decisions and consciences of their audiences. 
Christian leaders were also present within the abolition movement. One of the 
founding members of the NCACP was Canon L. John Collins. Another 
important abolitionist was Michael Ramsey, the Archbishop of York who 
succeeded Geoffrey Fisher at Canterbury in 1961. Ramsey had agreed to 
Silverman’s request that he introduce the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) 
Bill in the House of Lords, an invitation that demonstrated the continuing 
importance of religious figures within the political process towards the end of this 
period. However, it was decided later that it was unwise for Ramsey to do this, as 
it risked alienating part of the congregation, could cause resentment amongst 
opposition peers that an Archbishop was introducing a controversial subject and 
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would force Ramsey to face more skilled politicians than himself in debate.283 
This demonstrated, though, the enduring importance of religious figures during a 
period of secularisation. 
 Christie Davies is correct to identify that religious arguments were less 
prominent in the capital punishment debates than were other issues, notably the 
causalist issue of deterrence. 284  However, they remained present within 
abolitionist arguments across this period. Although their influence diminished in 
relation to deterrence within the presentation of the abolitionists’ arguments, they 
remained a valuable aspect of the case for abolition. Furthermore, they were 
always a significant factor in shaping the beliefs of this cohort.  
 The abolitionist uses of morality were not limited to religion. During the 
Lords debate on the abolition amendment to the Criminal Justice Bill in June 
1948, the Bishop of Chichester, George Bell, proposed a moral argument against 
the death penalty on the grounds that it was unpleasant for those involved in the 
process: 
There is another consideration, from the moral point of view. The 
Lord Chief Justice reminded us that he and other Judges are face 
to face with the murderer, and he has described the effect on the 
Judge, the jury and the people in court of the sight of the 
murderer—a human monster he may be—and of the grim 
unfolding of the details of a horrible crime. That is caused by the 
murder itself. But consider the effect of the whole circumstances of 
the verdict and the execution on the prison officers, the prison 
population, the relatives, and others whose duty brings them near 
the sentenced criminal.285 
Chichester’s argument that capital punishment had a damaging effect on those 
involved in the process was not uncommon. He alluded to a causalist issue by 
arguing that the negative effect on those involved with or close to an execution 
was a detrimental outcome of the application of the punishment. Chichester, 
though, felt that this was a moral issue based on the sense of repugnance and 
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unease that was generated by executions. He continued his speech by recounting 
stories and reports of those who suffered after witnessing or enabling an 
execution. His recognition that there was a moral issue to be resolved within the 
capital punishment debates that was not connected directly to religion was a 
common point raised by abolitionists.286  
A number of abolitionist arguments were based upon the principle of the 
sanctity of life. During the second reading of the Murder (Abolition of Death 
Penalty) Bill, John Hynd based part of his argument upon this principle: 
…we have not any concrete evidence to suggest that it is right to 
continue this barbaric method of punishment, which I think by 
general agreement reduces the conceptions of the sanctity of 
human life and society and therefore to some extent undermines 
the basis of our civilisation.287 
The retentionists had a counter-argument that the sanctity of life was preserved 
through the deterrent effect of the death penalty. Sir S. Knox Cunningham raised 
this point during the debate in February 1956 on the Conservative government’s 
motion to retain the death penalty but modify its application:  
I am in favour of its retention, and I have come to this conclusion 
because I believe in the sanctity of human life…I believe we must 
see that the Queen's peace is kept and that right and law are the 
rule in this land.288 
As was often the situation, both the abolitionists and retentionists cited moral 
justifications for their cases that could be countered by their opponents but not 
easily disproved. They were based upon individual opinions and morality rather 
than evidence. This was one reason why the causalist issue of deterrence became 
the most important argument within the abolitionist case once evidence had 
become available from the Royal Commission’s report and from foreign 
abolitionist countries that the retentionists were unable to refute. However, the 
sanctity of life was a significant reason why many abolitionists opposed the death 
penalty. This is examined further in the next section of this chapter. 
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Moralism declined somewhat in importance whilst causalism became a 
more prominent factor in the capital punishment debates as this period 
developed. The decline in the prominence of moralist abolitionist arguments in 
this period was part of the legal and political secularisation of the post-war 
decades. Furthermore, the connection between law and morality was being 
challenged and reduced through developments in the application of legal 
morality, notably the Wolfenden Report and H.L.A. Hart’s lectures at Stanford 
University, published in 1963.289 Davies explains that these links were borne out 
in the political discourse, demonstrating that arguments and justifications for 
issues of conscience became less moralist and more causalist.290 For the death 
penalty, the Royal Commission’s report was a turning point in both the nature of 
the debate and the abolitionists’ arguments. Some MPs had called for an 
investigation such as this in the wake of the failure of the abolition amendment to 
the Criminal Justice Bill in 1948, including the abolitionist Christopher Hollis: 
‘the best chance of having a settlement lies in our scientifically investigating the 
question whether the death penalty is or is not a deterrent.291 The Royal 
Commission’s report provided a scientific, dispassionate investigation into capital 
punishment that informed and educated the debates, which resulted in the 
politicians focusing on the causalist issue of deterrence above other, moralist 
factors.  
Causalism dominated the Royal Commission’s report. The commissioners 
reached a conclusion concerning the principal causalist issue of deterrence: 
Prima facie the death sentence is likely to have a stronger effect as a 
deterrent to normal human beings than any other form of 
punishment. There is some evidence (though no convincingly 
statistical evidence) that this is in fact so; and also that abolition 
may be followed for a short time by an increase in homicides and 
crimes of violence. But there is no clear evidence of any lasting 
increase, and there are many offenders on whom the deterrent 
effect is limited and may often be negligible. It is therefore 
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important to view the question in a just perspective and not to base 
a penal policy in relation to murder on exaggerated estimates of the 
uniquely deterrent force of the death penalty.292 
Although the report stated that it was impossible to properly assess the deterrent 
effect of the death penalty, it found no evidence that capital punishment was a 
unique deterrent to murder.293 This lack of evidence provided significant support 
for the abolitionists’ case. They could argue both that the report was evidence that 
capital punishment was not a discernibly unique deterrent to murder and that the 
retentionists were required to prove otherwise.294 The retentionists did not have 
competing evidence to support their argument that capital punishment was a 
unique deterrent. This pushed the causalist issue of deterrence to the forefront of 
the abolitionists’ case. 
Deterrence became the principle subject of the arguments within both the 
abolitionists’ case and the capital punishment debates. A number of MPs said that 
they were morally opposed to the death penalty but would support capital 
punishment if it could be proved to reduce the number of murders.295 The 
retentionists’ failure to prove the unique deterrent effect of capital punishment 
weakened their case. The abolitionists’ persuasive causalist argument, that the 
death penalty offered no uniquely effective deterrent to murder, enabled those 
MPs who were morally opposed to the death penalty to support abolition without 
being burdened by the concern that they would encourage the murder rate to 
rise. These politicians, who were a minority amongst the abolitionists, are 
examined in the next section of this chapter. 
The abolitionists used arguments on deterrence prior to the publication of 
the Royal Commission’s report. However, they lacked the evidence to support 
their assertions. During the Commons’ second reading of the abolition 
amendment to the Criminal Justice Bill in April 1948, Silverman stated: 
                                                   
292 Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 274. 
293 Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 274. 
294 William Reid, Labour MP for Glasgow Provan, outlined this argument during the Commons’ 
debate on the Conservative government’s motion to retain capital punishment but modify its 
application: HC Deb 16 Feb. 1956 vol. 548 cc. 2585-6. 
295 One example of this was Mark Carlisle’s maiden speech to the House of Commons during the 
second reading of the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Bill: HC Deb 21 Dec. 1964 vol. 704 
cc. 918-22. 
 130 
I understand the Government's case to be, not that they were in 
favour of the death penalty in principle but that, in the 
circumstances that now obtain, this is the wrong moment in which 
to live up to those principles. I cannot understand that argument. 
Either the death penalty is a deterrent in the case of crimes of 
violence or it is not. If one thinks it is a deterrent, one ought to 
retain it for ever. If one thinks it is not a deterrent, one ought to 
abolish it. But it is a complete non sequitur to say, "We think the 
death penalty ought to be abolished because it is not a deterrent, 
but we will not abolish it now because if we do murders will 
increase.296 
Silverman disputed the government’s assertion that capital punishment provided 
a necessary deterrent to murder at that moment, but did not have conclusive 
evidence to support his claim. This lack of evidence meant that Silverman could 
not yet disprove the retentionists’ argument on deterrence in favour of his own. It 
is important to note, though, that although the abolitionists could not prove their 
position concerning deterrence at this stage, they still won the vote in the 
Commons despite the opposition to this reform from the Labour government. 
This is a reminder that the moral arguments, and more pertinently the moral 
beliefs, remained significant, though these arguments were delivered to a House 
that had a Labour majority and, thus, a large number of abolitionists. This alone 
was insufficient to remove the death penalty at this time, though, as the House of 
Lords, a minority of Labour MPs and the vast majority of the Conservative Party 
opposed this reform. 
Kenneth Younger, Labour MP for Grimsby, used the Royal Commission’s 
report to support his argument when responding to a point raised by Gwilym 
Lloyd George during the capital punishment debate of 16 February 1956: 
I think I made it clear that I accept the fact that there is no 
conclusive evidence either way. That is what the Royal 
Commission said, but anyone who reads the evidence must, I think, 
feel that there is a great body of evidence tending in the one 
direction— but not amounting to proof—and, on the other hand, 
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an extraordinary absence of evidence. It is surprising how many 
people who come to the problem with open minds become 
convinced. I can quote my own case. I had no particular views on 
this matter when I went to the Home Office, but in the Home 
Office, I became convinced that the death penalty was unnecessary. 
We have a much more important example in Sir Ernest Gowers 
himself. We also have had two ex-Home Secretaries today and, as 
everyone knows, there is a third in another place, all of whom, after 
long experience, and reading the recent evidence, have reached the 
same conclusion.297 
Younger acknowledged that the Royal Commission did not find that capital 
punishment was either a unique deterrent to murder or was categorically not 
unique in its effectiveness. However, he used this irreconcilable doubt over its 
deterrent effect to explain that many people became abolitionists because of it. 
This is just one example where the lack of evidence for the retentionists’ argument 
on deterrence greatly aided the abolitionists’ case because they were able to cast 
doubt over this key aspect of the retentionists’ case, as a result of the Royal 
Commission’s report. 
A number of abolitionists used the experiences from foreign countries that 
had removed the death penalty within their arguments, notably from Scandinavia 
and the Low Countries. The Royal Commission also visited these countries when 
researching for their report. The abolitionist John Paton claimed that there were 
‘more than 30 states and countries in the world today which have had experience 
of the abolition of capital punishment.’ He raised the question of whether these 
countries experienced a rise in the incidences of murder or numbers of armed 
criminals: ‘In every one of the abolitionist countries, the experience was the same, 
the answer was, No.’298 Although Scandinavia, specifically named by Paton, was 
of particular interest to politicians involved in the abolition debates throughout 
this period, the examples from these and other countries were not especially 
convincing to the retentionists, who could respond by saying that the situation in 
Britain was different to that in other countries. David Maxwell-Fyfe, the future 
Conservative Home Secretary and Lord Chancellor, was such a retentionist. He 
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stated that there was ‘a difficulty in taking Scandinavia and the Low Countries as 
examples.’ However despite the retentionists’ efforts to dismiss their relevance, 
these countries did provide further evidence to support the abolitionists’ case, as 
none experienced a rise in their murder rate after abolishing the death penalty.299 
The retentionists had no equivalent examples to support their case. 
In February 1956 Herbert Morrison, by this time an abolitionist convert, 
used foreign examples from abolitionist countries to attack the retentionist position 
and advance the abolitionists’ case: 
The awkward fact for the Home Secretary to overcome, the 
awkward fact that impressed the Royal Commission, and one of the 
important facts which must have impressed Sir Ernest Gowers, who 
is himself a convert after being Chairman of the Royal 
Commission, is that it is shown that in countries or States where the 
death penalty has been abolished, the number of murders has, in 
general, not increased. Indeed, in some of them it has diminished, 
although I would not argue that that was the result of the abolition 
of the death penalty.300 
William Reid, Labour MP for Provan, Glasgow, supported this position in the 
same debate by arguing that, as the Commission found no evidence of higher 
murder rates in abolitionist countries, capital punishment should not be retained 
in Britain because of the fear of increased incidents of murder.301 These foreign 
examples added credence to the abolitionists’ argument that capital punishment 
was not a unique deterrent to murder. They provided, therefore, useful evidence 
that enabled the abolitionists’ arguments to succeed. 
 The evidence from the Royal Commission’s report and foreign countries 
provided much of the support for the abolitionists’ arguments on deterrence. 
There was further support for their case in the mid 1950s from the popular doubt 
regarding whether Timothy Evans, Derek Bentley and Ruth Ellis should have 
been executed. These cases, in particular Evans’, were mentioned during 
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parliamentary debates and within the abolitionists’ campaign material.302 These 
cases were prominent within the public discourse on capital punishment, as was 
evident in the numerous newspaper articles, books and, in later years, television 
programmes about their executions. However, unlike the Royal Commission’s 
report and evidence from foreign countries, these cases did not provide any 
irrefutable evidence in support of the abolitionists’ arguments. The abolitionists 
could not prove that Evans and Bentley were not guilty, and indeed neither man 
was pardoned before the death penalty was abolished for murder in 1965. The 
retentionists could respond to claims that they were executed in error by saying 
that they trusted the decisions of the courts and the presiding Home 
Secretaries.303 The outcry against Ellis’ execution was based on the perceived 
inhumanity of executing a young, single mother who was guilty of a crime passionel. 
The influence of these cases within Parliament, therefore, was based upon the 
abolitionists’ and retentionists’ interpretations of them. This placed these cases 
closer to the arguments based on morality, in that they could not be proved to be 
miscarriages of justice during the debates. They did aid a causalist argument for 
abolition, though, as the perception that these were wrongful executions added 
further weight to the argument that the negative outcomes of capital punishment 
outweighed the positives. 
Within the abolitionists’ arguments was a wider fear that an irreconcilable 
mistake could be made. This fear was demonstrated by the executions of Evans 
and Bentley. During the debate on the Conservative government’s motion to 
retain capital punishment but modify its application, Kenneth Younger addressed 
the dismissal of this fear by the Home Secretary at the time, Gwilym Lloyd 
George:  
                                                   
302 Numerous abolitionist politicians raised doubts over Evans’ guilt during the Commons debate 
on the Conservative government’s motion to retain capital punishment but modify its application: 
HC Deb 16 Feb. 1956 vol. 548 cc. 2536-655. Amongst the many references to these cases from 
the abolitionist campaigns, the Howard League for Penal Reform produced a short poem about 
Evans to aid the dissemination of their argument: ‘‘Timothy Evans was arraigned by a 
cop,/Timothy Evans took the fatal drop/And all the Queen’s Counsel and Home Office 
men/Could not put Evans together again’: Koestler Papers, MS 2400/2, List of suggestions for 
the direction of the Howard League’s campaign on capital punishment, July/August 1955. 
303 An example of this was Sir Lionel Heald’s response to James Chuter Ede’s argument that 
Evans might have been innocent in February 1956: HC Deb 16 Feb. 1956 vol. 548 cc. 2583-4. 
 134 
My third point on these reforms is that one of the things about 
which public opinion is most exercised is the possibility of mistake 
by the courts and by the Home Secretary. That is a major anxiety. 
I was surprised that the Home Secretary made so light of it. These 
reforms, so far as I can see, cannot affect the likelihood of a 
mistake, and would leave the consequences of a mistake as shocking 
as ever.304 
Younger viewed the possibility of a mistake as a causalist justification for abolition 
relating to the inability to rectify a miscarriage of justice. Younger was not alone 
in using the fear of executing an innocent person within an argument for 
abolition. However, the issue was not raised as frequently as the other issues 
concerning morality and deterrence that have been examined thus far within this 
section. The abolitionists used the perceived but unproven miscarriages of justice 
relating to these cases. For this reason, retentionists such as Lloyd George were 
able to claim that sufficient mechanisms were in place to avoid a miscarriage from 
occurring.305 There was no sufficiently convincing argument or counter-argument 
on this issue to make it particularly persuasive within the debates. 
Davies’ narrative that moralism was replaced by causalism within the 
debates on issues of conscience was borne out largely in the arguments for the 
abolition of capital punishment, particularly after the publication of the Royal 
Commission’s report. Causalism was the most persuasive aspect of the 
abolitionists’ arguments, based upon the evidence from the Royal Commission’s 
report and from foreign countries that had abolished capital punishment. The 
retentionists were unable to produce evidence to counter that that supported the 
abolitionists’ case. Morality remained a feature of these arguments, though, 
demonstrating that legal and political secularisation was not a complete process. 
What this section has shown, though, is that moralist and causalist arguments 
were often inter-linked. Civilisation provided an important and well-established 
conceptual framework for these arguments, which were rooted in the abolitionists’ 
repugnance towards capital punishment. This repugnance, though, requires 
investigation in order to explain why capital punishment was abolished. 
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Why did the abolitionists want to remove the death penalty? 
There were two broad opinions on the death penalty that led to politicians 
supporting abolition. The majority of abolitionists found the death penalty 
abhorrent. They were determined to achieve this reform and only unequivocal 
evidence of the unique deterrent effect of the death penalty would have stood any 
chance of shaking them from this opinion. A smaller proportion of the 
abolitionists were not overwhelmed by a repulsion against the death penalty. 
Their number would have accepted the continuation of the death penalty had it 
been proven to have a unique deterrent effect. The emerging evidence to the 
contrary, the unease concerning the executions of Evans, Bentley and Ellis, and 
the perceived failure of the Homicide Act convinced them that there was no 
discernibly unique deterrent from this irreversible punishment. Under this 
circumstance, their latent disgust towards capital punishment was able to direct 
them towards the abolition lobby. These beliefs are two broadly drawn paths 
towards support for abolition. They do not represent the many nuances within 
and surrounding them that would have influenced many politicians to support 
abolition. The impracticality of studying all of these nuances has precluded them 
from being examined within this thesis. These two schools of thought, therefore, 
provide the framework through which the abolitionists’ beliefs can be examined. 
 This section will examine first the committed abolitionists, whose 
abhorrence towards the death penalty overwhelmed the other factors within the 
abolition question to lead them to support abolition on every occasion. It will 
develop the previous chapter’s hypotheses for the formative causes of these beliefs 
to examine the various aspects of their beliefs, primarily based upon both the 
concept of the sanctity of life and the perceived need to liberalise society, both of 
which can be seen as part of a civilising process, which itself was an aspect of the 
abolitionists’ beliefs. These are especially important aspects of the abolitionists’ 
disgust towards capital punishment, as they encompassed the sense of its barbarity 
and its negative moral impact upon society. Of particular interest are the 
abolitionists’ opinions on abortion, as they voted both for and against this reform 
dependent on whether their opposition to the death penalty was based on either a 
belief in the need to civilise Britain or in their interpretations of the sanctity of life. 
This is examined within this section in order to understand the abolitionists’ 
beliefs. This section also examines their party identity and religious backgrounds. 
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Due to the limited time available to conduct research for this thesis, the MPs’ 
religious backgrounds have been taken only from Peter Richard’s account of the 
1964 Commons vote.306 It has not been possible to investigate religious beliefs in 
detail, for instance whether the younger Conservative abolitionists adhered to 
different religious practices to their older retentionist colleagues. For this reason, 
the religious differences examined follow a more straightforward party divide. 
This section will finish by looking at the beliefs of those who needed to be 
convinced that capital punishment was not necessary to maintain law and order. 
This will focus on the impact of both the deterrence argument and the notable 
executions on their abolitionism. Of course, they would have shared the disgust 
towards the death penalty of the other abolitionists, as if they approved of the 
retributive impact of capital punishment then one would expect them to have 
voted for retention.  
The voting records of MPs indicate that the majority of abolitionists were 
committed to their cause and, thus, can be presumed to have opposed capital 
punishment predominantly because of a moral disgust towards executions. Of the 
1,304 MPs to take part in at least one abolition debate, 146 voted for both 
abolition and retention during different debates. Of these 146, 55 were Labour 
MPs who voted with their government to oppose the abolition amendment to the 
Criminal Justice Bill but then supported abolition in every debate in which they 
participated thereafter. Twenty-one of the Conservatives who supported retention 
when the three-line whip was applied to the third reading of the Homicide Bill 
voted for abolition during every other debate in which they took part. In total, of 
the 146 MPs who registered mixed votes on abolition, 104 only voted for 
retention once. Thirty-nine of these 104 only voted twice on abolition in total, 
although again 25 of these were Labour MPs who voted with their government 
against the abolition amendment to the Criminal Justice Bill. Of the 42 to vote for 
retention at least twice, 36 were Conservatives. There were 666 committed 
abolitionists and a further 104 MPs who predominantly supported abolition but 
voted once for retention.  
Of the 666 committed abolitionists, 316 voted for abolition for the first 
time before the publication of the Royal Commission’s report. One hundred and 
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seventy-eight of the 666 were born after 1920, of whom only one took part in an 
abolition debate before the publication of the Royal Commission’s report. It is 
apparent, therefore, that the majority of the committed abolitionists had either 
supported the reform before the Royal Commission’s report concluded that the 
unique deterrent effect of capital punishment could not be proved or were part of 
the younger generation of politicians that was increasingly unwilling to accept the 
continuation of the death penalty. Some of this younger generation may have 
been influenced by the Royal Commission’s report before entering Parliament, 
but their generation’s liberalising ethos was a significant factor behind many of 
their beliefs. It is with as much confidence as is possible in this pursuit that a 
conclusion can be reached that the majority of abolitionists wanted to remove the 
death penalty because they found it abhorrent. Their opposition, which was based 
on their innate disgust towards capital punishment, did not require authoritative 
evidence that the death penalty was not a necessary sanction to maintain law and 
order.  
Of course, such a conclusion from the voting figures does not account for 
the many variations in the abolitionists’ beliefs. Certainly, the balance between 
moral and causalist factors in reaching an opinion that the death penalty should 
be abolished would have been different for each MP. The impossibility of 
measuring these nuances, though, instead requires a broad commonality to be 
identified. These figures identify that morality and emotion appear to have been 
more influential in shaping the abolitionists’ beliefs than were causalist issues of 
deterrence and the irreversibility of mistaken convictions. If this were not the case 
then one would expect to have found that a greater number of abolitionists voted 
for retention in the late 1940s, before both the publication of the Royal 
Commission’s report and the notable, dubious executions provided causalist 
evidence that supported the case for abolition. The figures quoted earlier for 
mixed votes on abolition indicate that this was not the case. 
James Callaghan’s and William Ross’ cabinet memorandum, quoted in 
the title of this thesis, is an excellent summary of the principal reason for why the 
majority of abolitionists were determined to remove the death penalty: 
The essential case for abolition is in our view a moral one. Capital 
punishment is a barbarous penalty which the community has no 
right to exact, however heinous the crime. There are however 
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other subsidiary arguments in favour of abolition. The death 
penalty is a denial of the principle underlying the rest of our penal 
thinking, that no criminal is beyond the hope of redemption. In the 
event of doubt arising about the verdict after the sentence has been 
carried out, there is no opportunity to right the wrong. We think 
that those who advocate capital punishment are under the onus of 
establishing that this barbarous penalty is a unique deterrent; but 
there is no conclusive evidence, either here or elsewhere, to support 
such a contention.307 
This passage puts simply and eloquently the emotion that lay at the heart of most 
abolitionists’ opposition to capital punishment. The belief that capital punishment 
should be abolished was caused primarily by the abolitionists’ feelings of disgust 
and repugnance towards the death penalty. It was linked to the liberalising 
mentality that was common amongst the abolitionists, as Callaghan and Ross 
expressed when outlining the principle whereby no criminal was beyond 
redemption. It placed all other causes of a belief in abolition, and indeed a belief 
in retention, behind this disgust towards a barbarous penalty. The memorandum 
also reinforces the point that abolitionism had become entrenched in the 
Commons as a result of younger MPs replacing older ones, which was particularly 
important within the Conservative Party. A moral opposition to capital 
punishment can be recognised broadly as resulting from two desires: to preserve 
or improve the sanctity of life in society and to liberalise and civilise British 
society. 
A significant aspect of the moral opposition to the death penalty was a 
belief in the sanctity of life. This was common to abolitionists from all parties. 
Mark Carlisle, the Conservative MP for Runcorn, expressed clearly the belief of 
many of his fellow abolitionists during the second reading of the Murder 
(Abolition of Death Penalty) Bill in 1964: 
I support the Bill because of my belief in the sanctity of human life. 
It is because I believe that it is wrong to take human life that I 
                                                   
307 TNA:PRO, Confidential memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Home Department 
and the Secretary of State for Scotland on the Permanent Abolition of Capital Punishment for 
Murder, CAB/129/141, C(69) 48, 6 May 1969. 
 139 
believe that it is equally wrong whether that life is taken by the 
individual or by the State.308 
Born in 1929, Carlisle was one of the young Conservative MPs who supported 
abolition.309 He stated later in his speech that he would support retention if the 
death penalty had a proven deterrent effect.310 The lack of such proof, however, 
meant that he felt able to vote in accordance with his conscience. The sanctity of 
life was a moral belief at the heart of many abolitionists’ opposition to the death 
penalty. It encapsulated the general attitude that no person had the right to take 
away another person’s life, alongside a variety of other beliefs concerning the 
detrimental effect of executions upon society. 
 The idea that capital punishment normalised the taking of life was of 
central importance to Sydney Silverman’s abolitionist amendment to the 
Criminal Justice Bill in 1948. The quote below outlines his belief that removing 
the death penalty would increase the sanctity of life following the devastation of 
the First and Second World Wars: 
Finally, it was said that crimes of violence are increasing because 
the sense of the sanctity of human life is lower than it used to be, 
and that for that reason we should ourselves destroy life. I think 
that the argument is really all the other way…after we have had 
two world wars with infinite loss of human life…I suppose it may 
seem a very small matter whether half a dozen worthless human 
beings, who have themselves taken human life, should die or live. 
But, surely, it is the duty of all of us who value our civilisation not to 
depress still further those moral and spiritual values, but to seek to 
raise them, and to seek to raise them at precisely this moment when 
they are most in danger. If they are most in danger now, now is the 
time to restore the sense of the ultimate value of every human 
being, rather than to seek further to undermine that value.311 
Silverman’s belief in the preservation of the sanctity of life through the abolition 
of the death penalty was grounded in the wider concept of civilisation. By 
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embracing the context provided by the world wars, Silverman produced possibly 
the finest example of an abolitionist interpretation of the sanctity of life, arguing 
that human existence and society within Britain would only improve and civilise if 
capital punishment were abolished. This was one of the most important reasons 
behind many politicians’ beliefs that the death penalty must be abolished. 
A belief in the sanctity of life linked many of the abolitionists to other 
causes through their shared personnel. In particular, there were a number of 
members of the CND within the ranks of the abolitionists, who demonstrated 
their belief in the sanctity of life through opposing both the death penalty and 
indiscriminately destructive warfare. The correlation between the abolitionists 
and members of the CND was remarkably strong. One hundred and forty-seven 
of the MPs listed by the CND as being members of or sympathetic to their cause 
took part in the abolition debates. This was the vast majority of the MPs listed. All 
147 of these MPs voted for abolition on every occasion that they were present for 
a debate on capital punishment.312 The chapter of this thesis identifying the 
retentionists and abolitionists noted that a number of the prominent abolitionists, 
both from within and outside Parliament, were prominent members of the CND, 
including Sydney Silverman, Victor Gollancz and Canon L. John Collins. The 
association between these causes through those who were active within both 
indicates that one of the reasons why many abolitionists opposed the death 
penalty was because they did not believe that the state had the right to take life in 
almost any circumstance, including through executing murderers or using 
weapons of mass destruction.  
 Abortion, however, was an issue that divided the abolitionists who based 
their belief on the sanctity of life. It was a dilemma for some abolitionists who 
opposed capital punishment because of both their belief in the sanctity of life and 
their desire to liberalise Britain along the lines of the programmes set out by 
Jenkins and Crosland. Kevin McNamara, Labour MP for Hull North, expressed 
his view on what he believed to be a misnomer: 
This is what the Bill seeks to change [the United Nations 
Declaration of Human Rights, protecting children with physical 
and mental immaturity before and after birth], for if it does nothing 
                                                   
312 CND Papers, CND/2/13, Lists of MPs who are members of or sympathetic to CND, 
undated. 
 141 
else it legalises the taking of human life. I find it tragic that so many 
hon. and right hon. Members who in the last Parliament walked 
through the Lobby in support of the Murder (Abolition of Death 
Penalty) Act outlawing capital punishment could at the same time 
support the Bill before us today. Had I been a Member of the 
House then, the same motives which would have taken me into the 
Lobby in support of my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and 
Colne (Mr. Sydney Silverman) would make me reject this Bill.313 
McNamara, who saw no dilemma in this matter, felt that a belief in the sanctity of 
life should lead an MP to support abolition and oppose abortion. He was shocked 
that other members who cherished this sanctity could vote otherwise. Such 
abolitionists, though, were in the minority. The majority of abolitionists who 
voted in the second reading of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Bill 
supported the legalisation of abortion. One hundred and sixty-nine committed 
abolitionists voted to legalise abortion, whereas only 13 voted against the Bill (see 
Figures 8.1 and 10.1, Appendix). The overwhelming support for the legalisation 
of abortion from the abolitionists is significant as it demonstrates that, for many 
politicians, the repugnance felt towards the death penalty stemmed primarily 
from their liberalising ethos, incorporating the view that liberalisation was 
creating a more civilised society. The view that life in all forms was sacred 
certainly was an important issue, but it was of less importance than the general 
ethos that British society required liberalisation, which included abolishing capital 
punishment, to encourage greater enjoyment and gaiety. 
 The liberalising zeal to civilise Britain was common to many abolitionists, 
but it was most apparent amongst Labour politicians, in part because they were 
the most vocal abolitionists. The desire to civilise and to liberalise Britain was a 
broad theme of Jenkins’ and Crosland’s visions. These concepts were not merely 
discursive tools. They described many abolitionists’ genuine desires for reform. 
They believed that the British state needed to treat its population with more 
humanity, in terms of both the social freedoms which they were permitted and the 
manner in which convicts were treated. Removing the death penalty was a 
natural aspect of the second of these humane, civilising principles. Historians, 
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such as Arthur Marwick, have concurred with this view, particularly in terms of 
civilisation:  
Perhaps the increase in crime [from the mid-1950s onwards] 
should be seen more as a return to Victorianism rather than a 
move away from it, but there can be no doubts about the most 
significant of all the pieces of civilising legislation, the abolition of 
capital punishment.314 
Marwick’s praise for abolition is not uncommon amongst academics, though few 
are as explicit as Marwick in conferring their opinions upon their audience. This 
is indicative of the widespread appeal of the civilising ethos amongst the liberal 
elite and within academia.  
This ethos became an unofficial Labour policy in the 1950s and 1960s, 
placing the belief that the death penalty was uncivilised at the heart of the liberal 
reforms desired by the majority of the party. In the words of Peter Thompson, the 
aim of senior Labour politicians, such as Crosland, was to evolve the party to 
strive not only for full employment but also full enjoyment.315 This desire can be 
found within Jenkins’ vision in The Labour Case and Crosland’s within The 
Conservative Enemy and The Future of Socialism. Jenkins’ and Crosland’s visions were 
of a society with greater individual freedom and leisure. Jenkins wrote of the need 
to ‘create a climate of opinion which is favourable to gaiety, tolerance, and 
beauty, and unfavourable to puritanical restriction, to petty-minded disapproval, 
to hypocrisy, and to a dreary, ugly pattern of life’. This involved encouraging the 
arts, creating ‘towns which are worth living in’ and preserving ‘a countryside 
which is worth looking at’.316 This ideal was manifest within Crosland’s well-
known acclamation of the virtues of a society that inspires outdoor pursuits and 
relaxation in cafés.317 It was through this vision that the permissive reforms 
outlined by Crosland and Jenkins were linked to capital punishment. The 
inhibitions on personal liberty and the existence of state-sanctioned killing were 
part of the puritanical restrictions that were at odds with their drive to make 
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Britain a more pleasant country in which to live. In their view, one could not 
enjoy life and enjoy living within British society if the state was judicially 
executing its citizens. For them, the death penalty had to be abolished to achieve 
this utopia. 
 Jenkins’ and Crosland’s visions for a civilised, progressive society were 
important because they were prominent expressions of the liberalising utopia to 
which the supporters of the relevant legislation appeared to adhere. They can be 
presumed to be indicative of the views of many abolitionists due to both the 
strong correlation between the abolitionists and the supporters of the permissive 
legislation and the successful realisation of most of Jenkins’ and Crosland’s desired 
reforms. Indeed, 92 per cent of the abolitionist MPs to take part in one or both of 
the second readings of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Bill and Sexual 
Offences Bill voted in favour of reform if they were present for the debate. As was 
the case with all abolitionist MPs in the 1960s, the majority of these liberalising 
abolitionists were members of the Labour Party, although 11 per cent were 
Conservatives.  
There were no published Conservative works to rival those of Jenkins and 
Crosland outlining a liberalising, civilising programme of reform or a treatise on 
the need to abolish or retain capital punishment. There was a little discussion of 
these issues within Crossbow, the journal of the Bow Group of young 
Conservatives. Criminal justice policy was the focus of the July to September 1965 
issue and was discussed in articles in the New Year 1959 and October to 
December 1968 issues of the publication. Capital punishment was barely 
mentioned in any of these issues. These issues highlighted problems within 
criminal justice policy and suggested a few specific changes, but did not produce 
any overarching programmes for reform based upon concepts such as civilisation. 
The October to December 1969 issue included two contributors outlining their 
cases for and against abolition, but this was published after the passage of the 
Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965, by which time abolitionism was 
firmly entrenched within the Commons. The death penalty was discussed in the 
New Year 1960 issue, but only insofar as the Homicide Act being an example of 
ill-judged compromise within Parliament.318 Abolition generated little discussion 
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within Crossbow, especially when compared to the more opinionated stances taken 
on other aspects of penal policy within the same issues, such as prison reform. 
This suggests that there was recognition amongst the younger Conservatives that 
their opinions were divided on the matter and that their members were unlikely to 
be criticised by their peers for holding either an abolitionist or retentionist 
opinion. It suggests also that perhaps abolition was not as significant an issue for 
these younger Conservatives as were other aspects of penal policy.  
Socially liberal reformism was more naturally a Labour concept, but it 
received support from a significant minority of younger Conservatives. With 
regard to abolition, it is likely that they were more heavily influenced by the 
secularised, liberalising and civilising ethos within the Commons than by their 
Party’s orthodoxies on capital punishment. The desire to create a civilised, liberal 
society certainly was a prominent cause of many abolitionists’ beliefs that 
executions had to stop. The two-fold belief that capital punishment was 
uncivilised and that it did not accord with the liberal elite’s vision for modern 
Britain was the manifestation in policy of the overriding belief that, in the words 
of Callaghan and Ross, the death penalty was ‘barbarous’. As Callaghan’s and 
Ross’ memorandum exhibits, the need to liberalise and civilise society did not 
override the general disgust that the abolitionists felt towards capital punishment 
as the cause of their beliefs, but it was an important, connected theme that was an 
aspect of many of their beliefs. 
 The previous chapter of this thesis identified that the increased 
prominence of abolitionism amongst the Conservative MPs who were born after 
1920 enabled abolitionism to become entrenched within the Commons. The 
section of that chapter on the class of the 1920s provided some hypotheses 
regarding the formative causes of the young Conservatives’ abolitionism, taking 
into account the political culture that developed in the 1950s and 1960s and the 
increasing evidence that capital punishment was an unnecessary punishment that 
had been used mistakenly in the recent past. Mark Jarvis identifies the reform to 
capital punishment through the Homicide Act as part of the liberalising reforms 
that R.A. Butler supported as Home Secretary. Stuart Hall has associated this 
Conservative liberalising mentality with what he calls the Right Progressive 
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element of the Party.319 However, as the next chapter explains, Butler was a 
committed retentionist. Hall does not provide a definition or identity for the Right 
Progressives within his chapter. In the absence of this, this thesis uses Butler, their 
recognised figurehead, as an indicator for their wider opinions. This is not ideal, 
as there would have been many variations of opinion amongst this group, but the 
time available for this thesis has not permitted further investigation into the Right 
Progressives. It would be wrong to presume, though, that the abolitionism of the 
younger Conservatives was solely born out of the liberalising ethos of the Right 
Progressives. Conservative abolitionism existed beyond the liberal reformism of 
Butler and the Right Progressives. It was more radical than both the Party’s 
traditional orthodoxies on capital punishment and some of its members’ 
liberalising attitudes. It was more closely associated with Labour’s prevailing 
attitudes towards socially liberal reforms.  
Evidence for the lack of central support for abolition from the 
Conservative Party can be found by comparing the Party’s archive with Labour’s. 
Capital punishment barely features within the Labour Party archive, whereas 
there are a greater number of relevant sources within the Conservative Party 
archive, particularly from 1969 when the Conservative Leader’s Consultative 
Committee frequently discussed the Labour government’s attempt to make 
abolition permanent.320 This demonstrates that the Conservative abolitionists 
took a position that differed from the Party’s accepted morality on the death 
penalty. The Conservative elite were sufficiently committed to their belief that the 
death penalty should be retained that in 1969 they attempted to persuade their 
Party’s abolitionists to avoid supporting the measure, albeit in a gentle manner 
and whilst not infringing on their free vote. The notable exception to this gentle 
approach occurred before the third reading of the Homicide Bill, to which the 
Conservative government applied its whips.321 The Right Progressives’ liberal 
reformism, which included reform to penal policy, certainly was an important 
aspect of the political environment in which the Conservative abolitionists’ beliefs 
fostered. The liberal reformism also included the legalisation of suicide and a 
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relaxation of the laws relating to gambling, licensing and Sunday Observance.322 
It is clear, though, that other factors must have had a greater influence upon the 
Conservative abolitionists to account for their divergence from the Party’s 
traditional support for capital punishment. 
The penal reforms that have been associated with the Right Progressives 
were aimed at liberalising the British system of crime and punishment. They 
involved research into the causes of crime in the wake of the crime wave within 
affluent Britain, new methods to deal with juvenile delinquency and rebuilding 
many of the older prisons. 323  The Right Progressives embraced this new 
criminological research, although this did not provide conclusive evidence for or 
against the death penalty.324 Some Right Progressives supported both retention 
and the liberalisation of other aspects of penal policy. Furthermore, a number of 
the Conservatives who did support abolition in 1956, which may have included 
some Right Progressives, were pressured by their Party to support the 
government’s Homicide Bill. James Christoph stated that Conservative 
abolitionists were pressured by the Chief Whip, Edward Heath, to support the 
Homicide Bill, citing popular knowledge rather than governmental records due to 
the chronological proximity of his study to the events of 1956 and 1957. He wrote 
that those MPs from safe seats who were ‘less personally indispensable’ were 
treated more harshly than the others. According to Christoph, ‘several dozen’ of 
the 48 Conservatives that supported Silverman’s Bill were persuaded in this 
manner to vote for the government’s compromise legislation.325 It is apparent, 
therefore, that some of the more liberalising Conservative MPs in the mid-1950s 
voted for retention through the Homicide Bill because of party pressure rather 
than for more principled reasons. 
The professional backgrounds of the 37 committed abolitionist 
Conservatives who were born after 1920 were similar to those of their older Party 
colleagues. Twenty-three of them had either served in the military or were 
company directors. These were careers which were common to many 
Conservatives and which were dominated by Conservatives. The young 
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Conservatives did not have noticeably different occupational backgrounds, 
therefore, to provide them with alternative experiences to those of their older 
Party colleagues. With little evidence of other variations in experience, the notable 
difference in the backgrounds of the younger abolitionist Conservatives appears to 
have been generational. These Conservatives born during or after the 1920s 
politically matured and entered Parliament at a time when Britain’s law and 
politics were becoming increasingly secularised. The liberalising and civilising 
ethos that became ever more dominant in the Commons within this period 
appears to have had a greater influence on a number of these younger 
Conservatives’ beliefs and attitudes towards abolition than did their Party’s 
traditional support for the death penalty. 
It is possible to improve the understanding of the young Conservatives’ 
abolitionism by looking again at the votes on abortion. Eight of the 37 young 
Conservative abolitionists voted in the second reading of the Medical 
Termination of Pregnancy Bill. Seven supported the reform, whereas only one 
opposed it, thus mirroring the general pattern amongst the abolitionists who took 
part in this division. Furthermore, 14 of the 17 who voted during the second 
reading of the Sexual Offences Bill voted for the legalisation of homosexuality. 
What is apparent from these statistics is that, as with all abolitionist MPs, these 
young Conservative abolitionists were driven more by a sense that abolition 
would liberalise Britain rather than by a belief in the sanctity of life. It is fair to 
presume that both were important to the disgust felt towards capital punishment. 
The overwhelming support for liberalisation over the sanctity of life, though, from 
those who voted in the abortion debate, and the further support for liberalisation 
during the Sexual Offences Bill, demonstrates that the majority of these young 
Conservative abolitionists believed that there was a need to reform British society 
along the lines of Roy Jenkins’ civilising programme. This, therefore, can be seen 
as a driving force behind their abolitionist beliefs.  
The vast majority of Labour MPs voted for abolition in all capital 
punishment debates, except for the abolition amendment to the Criminal Justice 
Bill in 1948 when Attlee’s Labour government supported retention. Furthermore, 
most abolitionists were members of the Labour Party. It is necessary, therefore, to 
look at the nature of the Party in order to understand why so many of its members 
demanded abolition. Stuart Hall and Kevin Manton explain that there was a 
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revisionist strand to the Labour Party that developed during the twentieth 
century. The members aligned with this strand tended to be more inclined to 
support liberalising reforms than the more traditional Party members.326 Hall 
assigned the label ‘revisionist’ to this wing of the Labour Party, while Manton 
identifies a post-Second World War shift towards abolition amongst the Labour 
leadership.327 The extent to which abolitionists can be seen as social liberals is 
examined in the next section of this chapter. However, this identified divide in the 
Party cannot be extended to abolition as Manton has done, as there was a desire 
to remove the death penalty amongst almost all Labour MPs throughout this 
period regardless of their age. Abolition was more than just a liberalising reform 
for Labour MPs. It adhered to the Party’s non-conformist identity. Interestingly, 
Hall does not analyse abolition in the same depth as the other reforms that he lists 
within his study. This is potentially because abolition was not just a liberalising 
issue, but that humanitarian ideas concerning the sanctity of life were also 
important. As such, it does not quite fit in with the other liberalising reforms. 
Attlee’s government opposed the dominant abolitionism of the Labour 
Party through its support for capital punishment in the 1940s. This point, though, 
should not be overemphasised to suggest that a significant proportion of the 
Labour Party were retentionists at this time, in the manner of which Manton is 
guilty. Seventy-four per cent of Labour MPs who voted against the abolition 
amendment to the Criminal Justice Bill in 1948, including a number of ministers, 
voted exclusively for abolition in the later debates. Their retentionism can be 
ascribed to the response to the rising crime rate during the social dislocation after 
the Second World War and to the government’s fear of appearing soft on crime, 
as Manton notes.328 After the war, the crime rate rose steadily from 2,967 offences 
against the person in 1947 to 3,707 in 1951.329 With the increase in incidents of 
violent and sexual crime and a lack of evidence to show that capital punishment 
was not a unique deterrent to murder, which arrived with the publication of the 
Royal Commission’s report in 1953, the abolitionists did not have sufficient 
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evidence to persuade all of the typically abolitionist Labour MPs to vote against 
the wishes of their government. Manton, however, overlooks the fact that 
although 74 Labour MPs voted against the abolition amendment in 1948, 214 
defied their government to vote for abolition. In the same vote, only 14 
Conservatives voted for abolition, with 157 supporting the government in 
rejecting the amendment.330 This thesis’ database of MPs’ votes has identified that 
87 per cent of Labour MPs voted exclusively for abolition throughout this period, 
and 87 per cent of committed abolitionists were members of the Labour Party. 
The notion of Labour becoming the party of full enjoyment, which 
required the abolition of capital punishment, was a departure from traditional 
Labour thinking and was not universally popular within the Party. Jeremy Nuttall 
notes that the relaxation of the law in areas of personal behaviour ‘stressed the 
promotion of individual liberty more than the importance of duty.’331 Men, such 
as Crosland and Jenkins, were vocal proponents for an evolving, socially liberal 
morality that embraced the new lifestyles of the British public, which were 
perceived to be the product of the affluent society. Some members of the Party 
treated with skepticism the growth in affluence and permissiveness. Aneurin 
Bevan, Richard Crossman and Michael Foot argued that increasing affluence 
bred vulgarity whilst George Brown, amongst others, was uneasy with the 
permissive reforms enacted during Wilson’s premiership. 332  Nuttall quotes 
Jenkins’ criticism within The Labour Case of those who opposed these reforms: 
‘those who themselves enjoy living standards which are above average should be 
extremely cautious about pointing out to others the corrupting effects of the 
motor-cars or the refrigerators which they themselves have long possessed’.333 
Although the vast majority of Labour MPs supported abolition, the wider 
framework of full enjoyment, extolled by Jenkins and Crosland, did not appeal to 
all within the Party. The wide support for these reforms, though, suggests that 
most party members did adhere to this framework. 
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There was no predominant religious morality governing many of the 
beliefs of either the abolitionists or the Labour Party to rival that that was 
identified within Conservatism by Quintin Hogg, which is examined in the 
following chapter.334  Peter Catterall explains that Labour had a history of 
involvement from the Free Churches and other nonconformist sects, which 
helped to shape the Party’s social liberalism: 
This nonconformist presence was not perhaps reflected in the 
minutiae of party policy. It can, however, be discerned in the stress 
on moral ends, the tendency to see the Labour Party as a vehicle of 
righteousness and the Biblically-flavoured sense of moral outrage 
that coloured the party’s ideology, self-image and rhetoric.335 
Catterall’s study ends before the Second World War, but it establishes a morality 
and mentality that, it may be inferred, was a more traditional framework for 
beliefs within the Labour Party. Harry Potter suggests that this radicalism from 
the established state Anglicanism was recognised by many within the Party during 
the inter-war years as being an influential background that enabled them to enact 
their desired reforms.336 This religious culture within the Labour Party can be 
presumed to have contributed to the liberalising ethos of the post-war decades, 
even though it went too far for some of its members. The Quakers were 
particularly influential within the abolition movement. They established a Penal 
Reform Committee and were amongst the early abolitionist leaders, most notably 
Roy Calvert who formed the NCADP. 337  Along with the nonconformists, 
Catholics were also often attracted to the Labour Party. These religious groups, 
who were prominent within the Party, were all prepared to dissent from the 
established Church of England with regard to abolition. The Conservatives, on 
the other hand, represented much of the dominant Anglican community.338 The 
Conservatives’ defence of the established order and Labour’s inclination to move 
away from and reform orthodoxy within religion can be translated to their social 
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policies and general approaches to capital punishment. Although these religious 
backgrounds were not necessarily a direct reason for the abolitionism of most 
Labour Party members or for the retentionism of the majority of Conservatives, 
the cultures that they created and supported within these parties would have 
influenced their wider attitudes towards liberalisation and reform. 
Peter Richards has examined these backgrounds for the vote on 
Silverman’s abolition Bill in December 1964 and for the debates on 
homosexuality, abortion, divorce and Sunday entertainment between 1966 and 
1969. Richard’s data was split into six groups: Roman Catholic, Anglican, Free 
Churches, Jewish, atheist/agnostic and no information. For all six groups there 
was a significantly higher percentage voting in favour of abolishing the death 
penalty than there was in favour of any other liberalising reform. Although there 
was no information for well over half of the MPs who voted on abolition in 
December 1964, there was clear support for abolition from the Roman Catholics, 
Free Churches, Jews, atheists and agnostics. Between 69 per cent and 89 per cent 
of each of these groups voted for abolition. The exception was the Anglicans. This 
was the largest religious group, of whom 41.1 per cent voted for abolition 
compared to 42.6 per cent against. The Anglicans provided the smallest 
proportion of supporters for all of these liberalising reforms, with the exception of 
abortion and divorce for which there was less support from the Roman Catholics. 
The other groups’ support for abolition was much stronger than that of the 
Anglicans.339 There was a desire to support liberalising legislation from many of 
those MPs who practised non-established religions or who had no religious 
background. This trend was particularly strong for abolition. In general, it was the 
Anglicans who opposed this liberalisation. This corresponds with the generally 
accepted party divide on capital punishment and liberalisation and adds to the 
theory that the desire for widespread social reform that was common amongst 
Labour politicians was a reason for many of their abolitionist beliefs. 
Furthermore, the declining influence of Anglicanism through legal and political 
secularisation can be expected to have had some influence amongst the younger 
Conservative abolitionists. This would have removed or reduced the influence of 
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a moral framework that had traditionally provided a level of support for the 
retention of the death penalty. 
As explained earlier, there existed a minority of abolitionists who were 
more sympathetic to the perceived need for the death penalty, often voting at least 
once for its retention. It is fair to presume that many of these felt a moral 
repugnance towards capital punishment that led them to vote for abolition. 
However, their feelings of repugnance towards the death penalty do not appear to 
have been as strong as those of the committed abolitionists, as they were willing to 
support its retention because of a belief that it was a necessary sanction against 
murder. They required more convincing than the committed abolitionists that the 
death penalty was not necessary to allow their dislike of capital punishment to 
direct their votes. One of the most prominent politicians to change his opinion on 
capital punishment was Henry Brooke, the former Conservative Home Secretary 
who became an abolitionist as a result of his experiences in that department. He 
outlined his abolitionism, and the reason for it, during the second reading of the 
Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Bill in 1964: 
I hope that I shall carry the House with me in saying that the taking 
of life is so grave a matter that the onus of proof must be on those 
who very sincerely believe that the death penalty should be 
retained. I do not share the view that the taking of life by the State 
is contrary to moral principle. I think that if it can be shown that by 
retaining the death penalty for some or for all types of murder one 
is materially lessening the likelihood of innocent people suffering 
death by murder, then there is no ground of moral principle on 
which one should dismiss the death penalty as utterly out of date in 
the present age. But I believe that retention of the death penalty 
can be justified only on the ground that it is a unique deterrent. If it 
is a unique deterrent, there is justification for it. If it is not, I do not 
think that the case for it can be upheld.340 
Brooke was explicit in placing the primary causalist reason for supporting 
abolition, deterrence, ahead of any moral justifications. Previously in his speech 
he had argued that the anomalies of the Homicide Act rendered it impossible to 
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successfully separate murders into capital and non-capital offences and that the 
necessary reform was abolition. Brooke was one of the minority of abolitionists to 
base his beliefs on such causalist issues. Others drew their abolitionism from the 
Royal Commission’s report and from the evidence from foreign countries.341  
Another factor that convinced some politicians who were not firm 
abolitionists to support the reform was the perceived failure of the Homicide Act. 
A number of politicians cited their perception that the Homicide Act was 
unworkable as their reason for supporting abolition. Hubert Parker, the Lord 
Chief Justice from 1958 to 1971, demonstrated this position in the Lords debate 
on the second reading of the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Bill: 
I am in favour of abolition not, I am afraid, on any moral ground, 
but merely because of the working of the Homicide Act 1957. I 
confess, looking back eleven years, that if anybody had then said 
that I should come out as a full-blooded abolitionist, I should have 
been surprised. But during that time, and particularly during the 
last seven years when I have held my present office, I have seen the 
complete absurdities that are produced, and have been completely 
disgusted at the result.342 
Parker’s support for abolition was set apart from the majority of abolitionists in 
that it was based upon legal practicalities rather than a specific desire to remove 
the death penalty. Others shared this reason for supporting or accepting abolition. 
The perceived failure of the Homicide Act did not convince a significant number 
of politicians to oppose the death penalty, as many were abolitionists before 1957 
and had reached their conclusions on this matter for a variety of other reasons. 
However, it was a factor that was especially relevant to a few abolitionists who, 
like Parker, were previously sympathetic to the retentionist case. 
Similarly, the impact of the executions of Evans, Christie and Ellis could 
be expected to have had a significant impact upon the abolitionist beliefs of MPs 
who previously were not committed to this reform. However, the sole retentionist 
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victory in the Commons occurred a few years after the executions of Evans and 
Bentley, when there was already public doubt concerning the justifications for 
their executions.343 These cases did not persuade a sufficient number of MPs to 
support abolition at this time on the basis of the fear of a miscarriage of justice, 
though these cases and the wider fear of such a miscarriage were mentioned 
occasionally within the debates. As with public opinion, and to a lesser extent 
deterrence, these cases did not have a decisive influence on the majority of 
abolitionists’ opposition to capital punishment, most of whom were unwavering in 
their opinion across the various debates. The shifts towards abolitionism occurred 
within the House of Commons after general elections, when younger politicians 
replaced older members, and within the House of Lords following the passage of 
the Life Peerages Act. The election of an abolitionist Labour government further 
supported these shifts. Harold Wilson, in particular, increased the number of Life 
Peers and both he and Harold Macmillan added a significant number of Labour 
members into the House in order to balance somewhat its party demographic. 
These new Labour peers tended to be particularly active within the House.344  
There is little evidence of politicians stating that the fear of making a 
mistake was of central importance to their opposition to the death penalty. The 
significant number of politicians who advocated abolition and supported other 
issues of conscience indicates that there was a wider moral desire to initiate a 
programme of reform under the banners of civilisation and liberalisation. 
Causalism was the root of a number of politicians’ abolitionism, but it was less 
influential overall than the moralist factors.  
 The primary cause of the abolitionists’ beliefs was a moral disgust towards 
executions, which is almost impossible for a historian to measure. Within this was 
the perceived need to civilise and liberalise Britain and the desire to preserve the 
sanctity of life. The voting record of the abolitionists on abortion demonstrates 
that liberalisation was a greater driving force behind their beliefs than was the 
sanctity of life, at least in the latter half of the 1960s. Both, though, were key 
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aspects of their beliefs and could be encapsulated within the concept of 
civilisation. Abolitionism was a manifestation of Labour radicalism and non-
conformism, and was supported by many of the Party members’ religious 
backgrounds. The younger abolitionist Conservatives, though, were more 
influenced by the increasingly secularised, liberalising and civilising ethos that was 
developing within the Commons than they were by their Party’s traditional 
orthodoxies on capital punishment. There was some support for this abolitionism 
from the Right Progressive movement within the Party, which has been associated 
with Butler. However, many of the Right Progressives, notably Butler himself, 
were not abolitionists. These young abolitionist Conservatives split further from 
the party orthodoxy than did Butler and his like-minded liberalisers. A minority of 
abolitionists needed more convincing that capital punishment was not a necessary 
sanction to murder in order to feel able to vote in accordance with their feelings of 
disgust towards the death penalty. Nevertheless, their desires to remove the death 
penalty can be presumed to have followed the same principles as those of the 
committed abolitionists. The perceived need to civilise Britain was a moral and 
emotional belief that was at the heart of abolitionism and wider social 
liberalisation. However, the place of abolition within this liberalisation, in 
particular alongside the permissive reforms, requires detailed examination. 
 
Were the abolitionists social liberals? 
Politicians and academics have associated abolition with the liberalising legislation 
of the 1950s and 1960s somewhat unquestioningly. This association cannot be 
accepted without qualification. Permissiveness was a dominant aspect of the 
liberalising legislation of the 1950s and 1960s and was present within the 
legalisation of homosexuality and abortion and the relaxation of the laws 
concerning theatre censorship, divorce and contraception. These reforms all 
permitted behaviour that was previously illegal or considered to be immoral. 
However, permissiveness was just one expression and outcome of the liberalising 
mentality that was common amongst many Labour MPs and a number of 
Conservatives. In other areas, notably penal policy, liberalisation manifested itself 
in the guise of relaxed punishments for certain crimes, such as murder, and 
improved prison conditions. In order, therefore, to assess whether the abolitionists 
were social liberals, it is necessary to address why it was a liberalising reform and 
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whether it was a permissive reform before examining the contemporary political 
links between the permissive legislation and abolition. This final area of 
investigation includes a study of the personnel involved in these reforms and 
finishes by examining the liberalising credentials of Jim Callaghan. It challenges 
Manton’s assertion that Callaghan was a determined abolitionist and examines his 
opinions on the permissive society in order to add an extra dimension to the 
affiliation between the abolitionists and the permissives. 
Abolition was a liberalising reform through its role in reducing the severity 
of Britain’s penal policy. There was a general shift from viewing the purpose of 
punishment as being deterrence and retribution to seeing it as being prevention 
and reform. R.A. Butler’s support for Britain’s first Institute of Criminology at the 
University of Cambridge in 1959 was a sign that penal policy was an intended 
target for the liberalising ethos that flourished in the 1950s and 1960s.345 These 
reforms to penal policy, though liberalising, were certainly not permissive as they 
did not legalise any act that was previously outlawed. The abolition of capital 
punishment occurred within the context of the emerging permissive society, but it 
was not part of the permissive reforms. This differentiation has not been 
recognised explicitly within the historiography, although Matthew Grimley 
alludes to this point in his article “Law, Morality and Secularisation”. Grimley 
lists abolition amongst the legal reforms in which the Church of England played 
an important campaigning role, but crucially does not then include it later when 
discussing the permissive legislation that was passed from 1966 onwards. By 
looking at the legislation passed from the year after the death penalty was 
abolished for murder, Grimley separated abolition from the permissive reforms.346  
 A characteristic of a permissive reform is that it reduced the level of state 
control over a certain area. Abolition can only be considered to be a permissive 
reform if one accepts that it provided a uniquely effective deterrent to murder and 
that without capital punishment the murder rate would have increased. This is a 
loose connection with permissiveness as, unlike the legalisation of homosexuality 
and abortion, abolition did not permit murder or make it a more acceptable form 
of behaviour. Instead, a belief in capital punishment’s unique deterrent effect 
would mean that abolition was permissive in the sense that those supporting 
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abolition were wilfully accepting that their actions might encourage more people 
to commit murder. The label ‘permissive’ does not apply, though, to the vast 
majority of abolitionists. Most believed that capital punishment was not a unique 
deterrent to murder. Their position was supported by the Royal Commission’s 
report and by evidence from foreign abolitionist countries. It would be difficult to 
identify an abolitionist who supported the reform in the belief that, as a result, 
more people would become victims of murder. As such, abolitionists should not 
be classified as permissives. They were social liberals, though, through their 
support for a relaxation of the punishment for murder. The abolitionist position 
on this issue would have seen this reform as removing an unnecessary penalty 
without reducing state control over society.  
Christie Davies, however, has argued that the relaxation of penal policy, 
and in particular abolition, was permissive rather than just liberalising: 
Even for those acts that remained the subject of strong legal 
sanctions permissiveness prevailed in that punishments were 
reduced and to that extent such actions became more permissible. 
Perhaps the most important change in this last category was the 
abolition of the death penalty for murder.347 
Davies’ argument that murder became increasingly permissible and forgivable 
after abolition is curious, given that he published this study long after the Royal 
Commission had found that the unique deterrent effect of capital punishment 
could not be proved. There was no evidence to support his assertion that murder 
had become more permissible. Although Britain was experiencing a high level of 
violence associated with Northern Ireland when Davies published this work in 
1975, the death penalty had not been used at all in connection to The Troubles, 
despite it remaining on the statute book for the province until 1973.348 Although it 
is becoming apparent that there were numerous extra-judicial killings taking place 
during this time, the fact that the state did not utilise capital punishment at all 
indicates that it was not deemed to have had a useful deterrent effect.349 Of 
course, the context in Northern Ireland in the 1970s was markedly different to 
that in Britain between 1947 and 1969. Nevertheless, even within this context 
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there was no evidence to support Davies’ assertion that capital punishment kept 
the murder rate lower, as it was not used to tackle the murder rate in Northern 
Ireland. 
An interesting issue within the use of morality during the capital 
punishment debates can be found in the Hart/Devlin debate. The permissive 
reforms within the socially liberalising corpus of legislation followed H.L.A. Hart’s 
principle that personal morality should be outside the remit of the law. 
Homosexuality, abortion and theatre censorship, amongst others, were not 
deemed to be detrimental to society and thus were removed from the remit of the 
law.350 Capital punishment was a different issue, as since 1868 executions had 
taken place within prisons.351 According to Hart’s principle, an execution was a 
personal matter that took place in private between the condemned and the state. 
Of course, this was entirely different to the other examples due to both the 
involvement of the state and the improbability of consent from all parties involved 
in the execution. Nevertheless, capital punishment certainly could not be 
characterised as an issue of morality concerning behaviour in public that should 
remain within the remit of the law, as was the case for prostitution.  
The desire for abolition fitted more closely with Lord Devlin’s theory that, 
by permitting acts that were deemed to be immoral, societal morality was 
degraded.352 According to the abolitionists, executions damaged the morality of 
society by being carried out in any place, including in private.353 This chimes with 
the civilisation discourse, which suggested that British society was tarnished by the 
continuance of the death penalty. The abolitionists wanted a practice that they 
deemed to be immoral to be severely limited by the state, placing it at odds in this 
respect with much of the liberalising legislation. There is not a perfect relationship 
between Devlin and the abolitionist arguments for some of the same reasons as 
with the relationship with Hart. However, Devlin’s theory did correspond more 
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closely with the arguments for abolition than did Hart’s. This is an example of the 
complex relationship between abolition and the corpus of liberalising legislation. 
There were a number of politicians and campaigners who were important 
within the abolition campaign and other liberalising debates and agitating 
movements. The links in personnel with the agitating campaigns, mentioned in 
this thesis’ chapter identifying the retentionists and abolitionists, indicate that 
there was a particular mentality and ambition amongst this corpus of activists. 
This was demonstrated particularly clearly by the 147 members and sympathisers 
of the CND who took part in the capital punishment debates all voting for 
abolition on every occasion that were involved in a division. The same is true for 
the 92 per cent of the abolitionist MPs who voted in favour of reform in the 
second readings of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Bill and Sexual 
Offences Bill. One must not homogenise the MPs and campaigners who were 
active in these movements or presume that supporters of some measures and 
campaigns necessarily supported the rest of these causes within the broadly 
defined civilising, liberalising programmes, or even that they recognised the 
existence or desirability of such a programme. There were, however, a significant 
number of activists who subscribed to multiple aspects of this programme. There 
was no official policy encompassing abolition, permissiveness and anti-violence 
organisations nor any well-established framework that set out to achieve these 
goals under one united ambition beyond the published personal, albeit partisan, 
musings of Jenkins and Crosland. The fact that there was a correlation between 
the activists for these various causes demonstrates that a significant proportion of 
the abolitionists subscribed to a broader liberalising agenda.  
In Jenkins’ and Crosland’s visions, a liberalised society was one based 
upon gaiety and full enjoyment. This included the permissive legislation but also 
the removal of aspects of the penal policy that were deemed to be repulsive, 
notably capital punishment. Jenkins framed his programme of reforms around the 
concept of civilising Britain.354 Abolition’s place within the corpus of socially 
liberal legislation is justified, therefore, through its consistency with the shift in 
attitudes towards penal policy and through the collective concept of civilisation 
that many liberalisers believed was present within all of the reforms. Its lack of 
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permissiveness separated it from many of the other reforms in The Labour Case, but 
it did not preclude abolition from being liberalising. 
The majority of the abolitionist MPs were members of the Labour Party. 
The same was true for the supporters of permissive legislation and other agitating 
causes. However, this identity was not appropriate for all Labour MPs. Peter 
Thompson explains that some Labour MPs were ambivalent towards 
permissiveness, linking it to their discomfort with the affluent society that they 
blamed for the rise of this culture.355 Hall claims that the Revisionist Labour MPs 
and Right Progressive Conservatives were conceptually closer to each other than 
they were to the ‘traditionalist’ factions within their own parties. According to 
Hall, the socially liberal reformism during Wilson’s premiership was largely 
limited to the Home Office rather than the whole government. He explains that it 
‘was Wilsonian not revisionist modernisation which secured the political centre 
and gained the slender electoral majority in 1964’.356 Thompson notes that 
permissiveness did not ‘dominate Labour thinking’. He explains that Gaitskell and 
Wilson were unimpressed with a progressive draft of Labour’s 1961 policy 
statement, Signpost, noting that the passage endorsing the Wolfenden Report’s 
findings on homosexuality might lose the Party six million votes.357 A.J Davies 
records that George Brown, a Labour cabinet minister under Wilson who 
opposed legalising homosexuality, remarked on this reform to Barbara Castle: 
‘This is how Rome came down.’358  However, such views were uncommon 
amongst the majority of abolitionists and Labour MPs and became less prevalent 
amongst the younger members of the Conservative Party, as was demonstrated in 
this thesis’ chapter identifying the retentionists and abolitionists. It is, however, a 
reminder that not all abolitionists supported the permissive reforms. 
One of the principal abolitionists who was unconvinced by the permissive 
society was James Callaghan. Callaghan also appears to have been somewhat 
unenthused by abolition, despite his prominent role in making the reform 
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permanent. Manton has portrayed Callaghan as one of the most important 
abolitionists in the post-war decades.359 This judgement warrants investigation.  
Callaghan’s portrayal of capital punishment, quoted in the title of this 
thesis, was unambiguous in its support for abolition, though this was in part a 
presentation of the abolitionists’ beliefs in general.360 Furthermore, as Home 
Secretary, Callaghan had a central role in guiding through Parliament the 
government’s resolution to make abolition permanent in December 1969. One of 
his tactics to achieve this was to pledge to resign as Home Secretary if the 
resolution was not passed.361 Historians have used this as evidence for his 
commitment to removing the death penalty. Kenneth Morgan, in his biography 
of Callaghan, includes this promise when describing his ‘very powerful’ speech 
during the debate on the resolution.362 However, Callaghan did not mention 
capital punishment in his autobiography.363 This would be a surprising omission 
from a devoted abolitionist. If capital punishment were such an important issue 
to Callaghan that he would gamble his ministerial office on the successful passage 
of an abolitionist resolution, then one would reasonably expect that it would be 
mentioned in his autobiography. The fact that it is not suggests that Callaghan 
neither viewed abolition as a major issue nor felt that his pledge to resign was a 
significant risk to his office. Rather, it was a safe tactic to absolutely guarantee 
that enough abolitionists from his own Party refused to adhere to the 
Conservative attempts to delay the vote to make abolition permanent. As this 
thesis has explained, abolitionism was already entrenched within the Commons 
by 1969. 
Manton is correct to argue that Callaghan’s activity was important in 
order to ensure that the matter was concluded before the New Year, after which 
it would have risked becoming an electoral issue. This matter of timing, though, 
did not render Callaghan’s activity as being as decisive as Manton suggests for 
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ensuring that the resolution passed through Parliament.364 The overwhelmingly 
retentionist Conservative Leader’s Consultative Committee were informed by the 
Party’s Research Department in November 1969 that they should not expect to 
defeat the resolution.365 There were only two Labour MPs in each of the capital 
punishment debates in December 1964 and December 1969 who voted for 
retention. Furthermore, 77 Conservatives backed abolition in 1964 and 52 in 
1969. The reduced support for abolition from the Conservatives in 1969 can be 
explained in part by the more partisan nature of this debate as a result of 
Callaghan’s pledge. His pledge was not as decisive as Manton and Morgan have 
suggested. He did not put his tenure at the Home Office at risk in ensuring that 
the resolution passed through Parliament before it could become an election 
issue. 
 This thesis’ challenge to Manton’s and Morgan’s portrayal of Callaghan 
as an especially determined abolitionist goes beyond his role in the 1969 debate. 
Morgan argues that Callaghan ‘had always been a vehement and enlightened 
supporter of abolition’, while Manton credits him with being a driving force 
behind the abolitionist resolution of 1969. 366  This role was, of course, 
understandable for the Home Secretary of an abolitionist government. These 
accounts, though, create a false impression of the level of Callaghan’s passion for 
abolitionism. Peter Kellner and Christopher Hitchens note that Callaghan did 
not vote during the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Bill, quoting him as 
saying that the debates were ‘opportunities for getting on with other things.’ 367 
Callaghan was undoubtedly a committed opponent of the death penalty, a point 
that Kellner and Hitchens agree with, but this quote demonstrates that he was 
not the determined and active abolitionist that is portrayed by Morgan and 
Manton.  
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Further to this point, Kellner and Hitchens highlight Callaghan’s 
opposition to some permissive reforms, emphasising that the abolitionists must 
not be homogenised with the supporters of the permissive society: 
As for the other reforms: [quoting Callaghan] ‘Abortion, yes as it 
finally came out; homosexuality I was indifferent to.’ He referred 
several times to the vital role of his ‘God-given common sense’ and 
remarked ‘of course, I cannot bear the young men with hair 
hanging over their shoulders.’’368 
Callaghan was not cut from the same liberalising cloth as Roy Jenkins. His 
disdain for men with long hair was indicative of his ambivalence towards the 
burgeoning permissive youth culture of the 1960s. He was unconvinced by some 
aspects of the liberalising legislation that were enacted by his predecessor at the 
Home Office. Indeed, his opinions on the permissive legislation may allow him to 
be labelled as a modernised social authoritarian. He supported without vigour 
some relaxation of state control over society, including the abolition of capital 
punishment, in some cases because this was the prevailing desire of the Party that 
he represented.  
In the 1940s and 1950s, the social authoritarian position towards 
permissiveness and broader liberalisation took the form of straightforward 
opposition. By the late 1960s it was increasingly represented instead by the 
ambivalence of men such as Callaghan. Such a lack of enthusiasm and occasional 
opposition towards permissive legislation was not dominant amongst the 
abolitionists, the majority of whom favoured such reforms when they participated 
in the relevant debates. However, the presence of more socially authoritarian-
minded politicians such as Callaghan is a reminder that not all abolitionists can 
be grouped together with the supporters of the permissive society. 
 Abolition was a liberalising reform through its relaxation of penal policy. 
As such, abolitionists were social liberals. This did not mean that they were 
permissives. Indeed the abolitionists should not be portrayed as permissives, as 
they did not accept that capital punishment was a unique deterrent to murder 
and thus did not believe that their actions would encourage more murders to be 
committed. A significant proportion of the abolitionists were also supporters of 
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the permissive society. This emphasised that together these liberalising reforms 
were necessary for the majority of them to realise their collective vision of a 
civilised society. As exemplified by politicians such as Callaghan, though, not all 
abolitionists shared this vision. 
 
 
Why did the abolitionists succeed? 
The abolitionists’ success can be attributed to the increasing secularisation of 
Britain’s law and politics, the demographic shift within Parliament whereby more 
opponents of the death penalty entered Parliament, the liberalisation of criminal 
punishment and of society in general, the evidence that supported their 
deterrence argument and the failure of public opinion, in any form, to direct the 
opinions of politicians. These are all examined within this final section of this 
chapter.  
The impact of legal secularisation was important for reducing the 
influence of Anglican morality over politicians’ arguments and beliefs on 
abolition. This resulted in fewer politicians, especially the younger Conservatives, 
adopting a retentionist position supported by traditional Anglican morality. The 
reduced influence of this morality allowed deterrence to become the principal 
issue within the parliamentary debates, thus enabling the abolitionists’ arguments 
to triumph over those of the retentionists due to the supporting evidence for 
abolition from the Royal Commission’s report and from foreign abolitionist 
states. 
This thesis’ chapter identifying the retentionists and abolitionists explained 
that a significant number of Conservative MPs who were born after 1920 joined 
the vast majority of Labour MPs in supporting abolition. This was a major factor 
behind the abolitionists’ success. From 1955 onwards, the arrival in the Commons 
of younger Conservatives, a significant minority of whom were more sympathetic 
to abolition and other liberalising reforms than were their older Party colleagues, 
meant that a majority of the Commons supported abolition, regardless of which 
party was in government. Abolitionism persisted after this period, as every vote on 
capital punishment after 1969 resulted in an abolitionist victory.369 In September 
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1964 Henry Brooke, the Conservative Home Secretary, told the Prime Minister 
that abolition was likely to occur after the general election of that year, irrespective 
of the party that would be victorious: ‘The Homicide Act is unworkable in its 
present form and the next Home Secretary, of whatever party, will have to end 
the death penalty.’ The Prime Minister’s response was simply that the matter ‘will 
probably take care of itself’.370 The Commons’ continued opposition to the death 
penalty during various Parliaments provided the environment in which abolition 
could be successfully realised. The parliamentary environment that was conducive 
to abolition was supported further by the passage of the Life Peerages Act 1958, 
which allowed abolitionists gradually to enter the largely Conservative House. 
Most of these new abolitionist Labour peers were active members of the Lords. 
This meant that by the end of the 1960s there were a similar number of 
Conservative and Labour peers who participated regularly in debates.371 By the 
1960s, therefore, Parliament had become more favourable to abolition. 
Silverman’s Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Bill, which had the tacit support 
of the Labour government, was debated in a House of Lords that was more 
supportive towards this reform than it was in 1948 and 1956, as a result of this 
demographic change.  
 The culture of reform within the Home Office was an important context 
for the abolition of capital punishment even though some of those involved in the 
reforms, notably Butler, favoured retaining the death penalty. Jarvis credits 
Butler with leading ‘an imaginative programme of penal reform’ that went 
beyond the achievements of Labour’s Criminal Justice Act 1948.372 Butler’s 
arrival at the Home Office and his subsequent reforms occurred after the 1955 
general election, which resulted in an increased number of younger 
Conservatives entering the Commons, many of whom were more inclined to 
support abolition and other liberalising, civilising reforms. The Conservative 
governments and Party, therefore, were becoming influenced to a greater extent 
by members who were favourable to liberalisation, of whom Butler was the most 
notable for this study, albeit a retentionist one. He helped to create an 
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environment that was conducive to Hall’s ‘legislative moment’ within the Home 
Office.373 Indeed Butler, when referring to his appointment of ‘modern-minded 
officials’ whilst he was Home Secretary, said that he had brought ‘into the work 
of the Home Office the same spirit of reform and zeal for progress as [he] had 
called into being [for] the Education Act of 1944.’374 Even Roy Jenkins praised 
Butler’s achievements at the Home Office, albeit in a restrained and partisan 
manner, in The Labour Case, published before the 1959 general election:  
It may be thought that Mr Butler’s reforming zeal in this 
department has cleared most of them [Home Office questions] out 
of the way…But its effect should not be exaggerated. He has made 
a start with prison reform. He operates with moderate humanity 
the unsatisfactory Tenby compromise [Homicide Act] with the 
clearly expressed view of the House that hanging is a barbaric and 
useless penalty…he has overcome his colleagues’ objection to a 
mild reform of the archaic and vague laws relating to the 
censorship of literature and has encouraged this to proceed as a 
Private Members’ Bill. And he has so far resisted the ardent desire 
of the Conservative Party militants that flogging should be 
reintroduced into our penal code.375 
Considering that Jenkins was a leading member of the party in opposition to the 
government, this outline of a Labour vision for a civilised Britain is relatively 
complimentary towards Butler’s tenure as Home Secretary. 
 Jenkins, though, felt that Butler’s penal reforms did not go far enough and 
should be extended to include the abolition of capital punishment. He continued 
immediately from the quote above: 
All this [Butler’s reforms] is something. But it is certainly not 
equivalent to the wholesale reform of which the Home Office is still 
in urgent need. The ghastly apparatus of the gallows continues to 
exist, and is used much more often than was thought likely when 
the Homicide Act was passing into law.’376 
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Jenkins’ extension of liberalisation to include abolition and the permissive reforms 
deliberately went beyond Butler’s achievements at the Home Office, thus creating 
a more radical programme than what was already in place when his book was 
published. Some of the liberalising reforms desired by Jenkins, notably concerning 
licensing and suicide, were enacted after the publication of The Labour Case whilst 
Butler was at the Home Office.377 Jenkins consciously placed the extension of this 
programme within the framework of Butler’s reforms up to 1959. The 
liberalisation at the Home Office during Butler’s tenure as Home Secretary, 
therefore, provided the liberalising environment for the development of 
abolitionism within the broadly accepted civilising programme.  
 The liberalisation of penal policy was an aspect of the wider determination 
of MPs to civilise society through a programme of legislation. This chapter has 
examined the place of capital punishment within the liberalising programmes 
constructed by Roy Jenkins and Anthony Crosland. The successful realisation of 
Jenkins’ programme and many parts of Crosland’s demonstrated their widespread 
appeal amongst politicians. This thesis’ chapter identifying the retentionists and 
abolitionists examined the strong correlation between the MPs who voted for 
abolition and those who supported the legalisation of homosexuality and abortion. 
The politicians’ belief that legal and cultural liberalisation was required, including 
the abolition of capital punishment, provided a framework in which these reforms 
could succeed. Although the abolitionist case was based primarily on the merits of 
removing the death penalty separate from its place within a necessary programme 
of reform, this widely recognised programme was the most important conceptual 
framework for abolition. It was of great value, therefore, to the abolitionists’ 
success. 
 The Royal Commission’s report was one of the most important 
developments in the capital punishment debates because of its conclusion on 
deterrence, which provided support for the abolitionists’ case. The Royal 
Commission’s report provided further evidence from foreign countries that helped 
the abolitionists’ case to succeed. It found that no country that had abolished the 
death penalty had experienced subsequently a significant increase in the 
                                                   
377 Jenkins, The Labour Case, 137; Jarvis, Conservative Governments, 76-9; 93-6. 
 168 
incidences of murder or violent crime.378 Ultimately, the Royal Commission’s 
report, the examples from foreign abolitionist countries and the experience of the 
Homicide Act provided the abolitionists with evidence to support their causalist 
arguments. The retentionists lacked such evidence. As the abolitionists’ and 
retentionists’ moral arguments could not disprove or outweigh each other and 
Britain’s legal and political discourse was becoming increasingly secularised, the 
causalist issue of deterrence became the dominant theme within the arguments on 
abolition. The evidence available supported the abolitionists’ case, thus securing 
their victory within the arguments on both deterrence and the wider abolition 
question. 
 Like the publication of the Royal Commission’s report, the Homicide Act 
was another development that aided the abolitionists’ case. As a result of the 
gradation of murders, the abolitionists were able to portray capital punishment as 
being illogical and impractical in its application. There was a widespread 
perception that the law had to be changed again. As Parliament had begun to 
liberalise the use of the death penalty, and with abolitionism becoming entrenched 
within the House of Commons, further reform of the law of murder was always 
likely to result in abolition. This was recognised by Douglas-Home and Brooke 
during their meeting in September 1964, quoted earlier.379 
 The final reason for the abolitionists’ success was the negligible influence of 
public opinion during the capital punishment debates. This thesis’ chapter on 
public opinion examined this issue in detail. Politicians’ negation of the various 
representations of public opinion, in particular that represented through the polls 
that consistently supported retention, removed a significant obstacle to the 
abolitionists’ case, as they did not feel it necessary to justify their actions despite 
their lack of popular support. The abolitionists’ division of opinion into informed 
and uninformed groups was a useful device for counteracting the retentionists’ 
uses of opinion polls in the capital punishment debates. All forms of public 
opinion, though, including the opinions of experts, failed to find much influence 
over politicians’ judgements. It was the increasing prominence of abolitionism 
amongst MPs, therefore, that led to capital punishment being abolished rather 
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than any pressure or influence from non-parliamentary individuals, organisations 
or the public. 
The abolitionist case was based primarily on moralist beliefs but was 
fought successfully in Parliament using causalist arguments that were supported by 
evidence. It was largely framed around the concept of civilisation and was linked 
to the wider desire to liberalise British society. Its success was the result of a 
number of factors, but the abolitionists’ enduring victory was born out of the 
entrenched abolitionism that developed within the House of Commons after the 
1955 general election, at which moment a number of younger abolitionist 
Conservatives entered the House. It was in the Commons that the abolitionists’ 
case was won. 
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Chapter Four: The retentionist case 
 
 At the beginning of the debate on the government’s motion to retain the 
death penalty but modify its application, Gwilym Lloyd-George, a former 
abolitionist who was Home Secretary within a retentionist Conservative 
government between October 1954 and January 1957, reminded MPs that the 
supporters of capital punishment had beliefs that were held as earnestly as those 
of the abolitionists: 
There are those who believe that it is wrong to take life in any 
circumstance, either in war or in peace. That is a view that I 
respect, and for those who hold it the way is clear. For the rest of us 
it is not so clear, for we must wrestle with arguments on one side 
and another. I hope that those who take their stand on moral 
absolutes will believe that we are no less conscientious in our 
approach to the problem than they.380 
The debate on 16 February 1956 provided many of the finest examples of the 
various arguments for and against capital punishment that were raised in 
Parliament. It was the first debate on capital punishment after the influx of 
younger Conservative MPs at the 1955 general election, which has been 
recognised in this thesis as the moment that abolitionism became entrenched in 
the Commons. Prior to this election, the Commons had voted against an 
abolitionist amendment to the motion recognising the Royal Commission’s 
report. 381 Yet, during a cabinet meeting three months before the debate in 
February 1956, the Conservative government acknowledged that the Commons 
was unlikely to reject abolition again.382 The abolitionists were victorious in 1956 
despite there being a Conservative majority in the Commons and a retentionist 
government tabling the motion. Since then, the Commons has always voted for 
abolition whenever the issue was debated.383 The retentionists’ defeat was caused 
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in part by the demographic shift amongst Conservative MPs after the 1955 
general election. 384  After this election there was a sufficient number of 
Conservative MPs, many of whom were young, who voted consistently with the 
vast majority of Labour MPs to provide an abolitionist victory in every capital 
punishment debate, regardless of the party in government. However, it is 
important to look beyond the abolitionists to examine the retentionists’ case in 
order to understand why capital punishment was abolished. This has been largely 
neglected within the historiography. As Lloyd George stated, like the abolitionists 
their opinions were based upon a moral framework. Furthermore, a few adhered 
to a causalist belief that the death penalty was a unique deterrent to murder. 
This chapter addresses the gap in the historiography by examining the 
retentionists’ arguments, their reasons for wanting to retain capital punishment, 
whether they can be viewed as social authoritarians and why they failed. The 
retentionists’ case in Parliament was unable to overcome the abolitionists’ 
argument on deterrence, which was supported by evidence. This was the 
principal factor behind the defeat of their arguments in the parliamentary 
debates. Their beliefs that the death penalty should be retained, though, were 
rooted more deeply in a morality that capital punishment was either the desirable 
penalty for murderers or the justifiable sanction that was necessary to protect the 
public. It is difficult to quantify how many retentionists adhered to either belief, 
in part because their arguments would not have been aided by stating publically 
that they wanted murderers to die. Thus, few politicians made such statements. 
 
How did the retentionists argue their case? 
The retentionists’ arguments can be divided into moralist and causalist 
categories, as outlined by Davies.385 Davies is correct in stating that causalism, as 
embodied by the issue of deterrence, became the principal factor during the 
parliamentary debates, especially after the publication of the Royal Commission’s 
report in 1953. This provided evidence for the abolitionists’ argument that the 
retentionists could not counter. However, moral arguments were also a feature of 
the debates throughout this period. This section examines the retentionists’ 
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moralist and causalist arguments before considering their uses and interpretations 
of civilisation. Whereas the abolitionists had strong arguments based upon 
deterrence, there was no aspect of the retentionists’ arguments that was uniquely 
convincing or irrefutable. They had to engage with the arguments on deterrence 
but relied on their moral justifications, as they could not provide evidence to 
counter-balance that which supported the abolitionists’ causalist arguments. 
 Christie Davies explains that morality became less important during the 
debates on what he perceives to be the key permissive reforms in post-war 
Britain.386 It is true that deterrence became the principal issue during the capital 
punishment debates, especially after the publication of the Royal Commission’s 
report. However, secularisation was by no means complete and morality 
remained a common feature of retentionists’ arguments throughout this period. 
During the House of Lords debate on the abolition amendment to the Criminal 
Justice Bill, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Geoffrey Fisher, argued that Anglican 
morality supported the state’s right to execute murderers. His speech 
demonstrated moral support for capital punishment: 
the Church…recognises the full right of the civil magistrates, on 
certain conditions, to take away life whether in the case of a just 
war, or for heinous and grievous offences…Murder is such an 
outrage upon society, so heinous a breach of social living and so 
ultimate in its effect upon the victim, that its penalty shall be death. 
It is not that each murderer is treated thus so as to act as a 
deterrent to other possible murderers. It is the proclamation of a 
law by which every man, if he becomes a murderer, shall be 
judged, and to which he shall know himself to be liable; it is the 
public recognition that murder is, in one sense, the worst, and 
certainly the most irreversible, of crimes. 387 
Earlier in his speech, Fisher claimed to look beyond the simplistic ‘eye for an eye’ 
argument, which he suggested was a case for restraint in punishment rather than 
vengeance, and instead argued that the state had a right and sometimes a duty to 
take life. He claimed that the Church should support the state and be concerned 
with the spiritual redemption and reformation of the condemned person in order 
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to convert him before he dies. James Stuart stated during a cabinet meeting in 
July 1956 that he had met with Fisher, who was firmly of the view that capital 
punishment was a necessary deterrent.388 This moral and causalist justification 
for capital punishment was provided by Britain’s senior cleric and could be 
expected to have had a particularly powerful impact upon the debate. Viscount 
Stansgate expressed his appreciation for the Archbishop’s contribution during the 
same debate, although he adopted an opposing view on capital punishment.389 
Fisher was able to find Biblical support for capital punishment, although the 
abolitionists too could draw upon Christian doctrine to counteract these claims, 
as was demonstrated in this debate by Lord Rochester:  
I was at a loss to understand why the most reverend Primate 
should pray in aid of his argument Exodus, Leviticus, and 
Deuteronomy in the Old Testament—"An eye for an eye and a 
tooth for a tooth"—and should omit all reference to the words of 
Jesus Christ himself… that ye love your enemies and bless them 
that curse you.390 
The abolitionist uses of morality and Christian doctrine were examined in this 
thesis’ chapter on their case. However, this quote demonstrates that Christian 
morality offered no uniquely effective justification or evidence for the 
retentionists’ position. The abolitionists always had a counter-point to refute their 
arguments on morality. It was difficult for an argument to be won using a moralist 
proposition that conflicted with the morality of others. Nevertheless, such morality 
was a feature of the retentionists’ arguments throughout the abolition debates.  
 Fisher’s argument was centred upon Anglican morality supporting the 
actions of the state in maintaining law and order. Other politicians also used 
Christian morality to justify state action. On 16 February 1956 R.A. Butler, who 
was at this time the Lord Privy Seal, referred to Christian morality as he 
concluded the debate on the government’s motion to retain the death penalty but 
modify its application. He completed his closing statement by saying: 
The Government have a very serious responsibility. They have a 
responsibility for the sanctity of human personal life, and that is 
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where the Christian ethic comes in. They also have a responsibility 
for society. I am not going to quote the Christian ethic in support 
of the Government's case. I am a Christian myself, and I believe in 
the retention of the death penalty. I say, at the same time, that my 
duty to society makes me say that under present circumstances it 
would be unwise for this House, without waiting for the 
amendments the Government suggests, to abolish the penalty of 
death for murder.391 
Butler’s refusal to state the ‘Christian ethic’ that justified this position implied that 
the MPs in the House knew, or were expected to know, the ethic to which he was 
referring. Furthermore, in closing his long speech to the House with this religious 
argument, Butler demonstrated that Christian morality was an important and 
persuasive factor in the justification of issues of both law and order and individual 
conscience, at least in the opinion of the government. As this was his final point, 
Butler would have been confident that it would have a significant impact upon 
MPs before they divided, which he hoped would persuade them to support the 
government’s motion. This indicates that Christian morality was recognised as 
still being influential within parliamentary debates. Legal and political 
secularisation was certainly not total at this time. 
By 1965, the abolitionists were using Christian morality more frequently 
than were the retentionists, in part because the culture in both Houses of 
Parliament had become favourable to abolition. Within this context, Lord 
Ailwyn sought to demonstrate that Christian doctrine justified retention. Unlike 
the Archbishop of Canterbury in 1948, Ailwyn cited support for capital 
punishment from the New rather than Old Testament, thus addressing Lord 
Rochester’s objection, and those of other abolitionists, that the retentionists only 
employed Old Testament, old-fashioned doctrinal evidence:392 
I will give one example from the New Testament. This is a well-
known passage which I seldom hear quoted and which has always 
seemed to me to transcend all other Bible passages in this 
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connection, and, moreover, to be incapable of misunderstanding. 
In three out of the four Gospels it is recorded that Our Lord 
himself, in pronouncing his detestation of those who offended little 
children, used the words “It were better for him that a millstone 
were hanged about his neck and that he be cast into the depths of 
the sea.” Will any abolitionist dare to refute such unequivocal 
words from the lips of the Founder of the Christian religion? The 
Man without sin, the Man destined to become the victim of the 
greatest single crime in the history of the world? Remembering that 
crimes—bestial crimes—against young children are among the 
most prevalent at the present time, your Lordships may think that 
that quotation from three separate contemporary witnesses is at 
least significant, and might be taken as a fairly strong justification 
of the views of retentionists.393 
Ailwyn’s conclusion that this quote from three of the gospels did ‘transcend all 
other Bible passages in this connection’ was dubious considering that many of the 
passages from the Gospels that were quoted during these debates opposed his 
argument. He offered no compelling justification to support his conclusion on this 
point. Ailwyn used Biblical doctrine to justify the morality of taking a criminal’s 
life. This was at odds, though, with the dominant interpretation of Christian 
morality within these debates. It did little to persuade politicians who were not 
firm supporters of capital punishment to oppose abolition. 
The moral arguments within these debates were not based solely on 
Christian doctrine, although, as Quintin Hogg argued, this morality was 
influential within Conservatism, a principle to which the majority of retentionists 
subscribed.394 Gwilym Lloyd George, in introducing the government’s motion to 
retain the death penalty but modify its application, demonstrated a non-religious 
moral argument: 
In taking life, the State performs its most solemn function; solemn 
not only because taking life must always be a terrible thing, and not 
least when it is done deliberately under the law, and with all the 
solemnity that the law confers; but solemn also because, in 
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executing the capital sentence, the State pronounces the moral 
judgment of society on murder. In what circumstance, if any, 
society is justified in exacting the extreme and irrevocable penalty 
is a problem which rightly exercises the minds and consciences of 
civilised and responsible people everywhere. It is something which 
exercises the conscience of everyone of us.395 
The basis of Lloyd George’s concept of ‘the moral judgement of society’ could 
have been rooted in Christian doctrine. However, if this was his meaning then the 
association was implied rather than explicit. Lloyd George continued this point: ‘I 
hope that those [abolitionists] who take their stand on moral absolutes will believe 
that we are no less conscientious in our approach to the problem than they.’396 
Lloyd George used a notion of moralism that was unassigned to a specific source, 
such as Christianity, to add weight and humanity to the desire to retain the death 
penalty. This unidentified morality was an attempt to place a concept of society’s 
judgement in support of retention. In this respect it was similar to the abolitionists’ 
uses of civilisation, though this had a better-defined conceptual framework than 
did Lloyd George’s ‘moral judgement of society’. 
 The sanctity of life was a common theme within the arguments of both the 
retentionists and abolitionists. Both claimed that they were preserving and 
improving the sanctity of life within Britain by either retaining or abolishing 
capital punishment. During the capital punishment debate of 16 February 1956, 
Sir Knox Cunningham founded part of his retentionist argument on this issue: 
The State and we in this House owe a duty to innocent people, old 
and young, who go about their jobs in the world peacefully. There 
is too much of violent crime today. Innocent people are being 
killed because the criminal believes that his right is might; he has 
no regard for the sanctity of human life, and I believe we must see 
that the Queen’s peace is kept and that right and law are the rule 
in this land.397 
Cunningham’s argument concerning the sanctity of life was twofold. He suggested 
that capital punishment was necessary to preserve the sanctity of life and that 
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those who had ‘no regard’ for it should be removed from society. This argument 
portrayed capital punishment as a tool to protect society’s morality in terms of its 
respect for the sanctity of life. This moral judgement relied upon an acceptance of 
the perceived deterrent effect of the death penalty, which would maintain the 
‘Queen’s peace’. Arguments such as this were necessary for the retentionists to 
attempt to refute the abolitionists’ claims concerning the sanctity of life. As with 
many issues of morality, though, the abolitionists could produce a counter-
argument that was no less justifiable than that of the retentionists. The 
retentionists’ uses of the sanctity of life offered no uniquely persuasive argument in 
favour of the death penalty. 
 A few retentionists argued a more extreme moral position that capital 
punishment was the desirable penalty for murder. A.M. Kraft, a retentionist 
contributor to the Labour periodical Socialist Commentary, stated that murderers 
should be put to death even if the penalty was proven to have no unique deterrent 
value: 
We should insist upon capital punishment even if it were proved by 
the abolitionists that such punishment was quite inadequate to 
safeguard human life…The categorical demand for the death 
penalty in the case of murder has an ethical root. Just as justice 
demands that a man ought not to inflict upon another an evil 
which he himself would not be prepared to suffer, a man who has 
committed murder ought to accept for himself a like measure of 
evil as, in defiance of the law, he has inflicted upon a fellow 
citizen.398 
Kraft was unusual in arguing that deterrence should be disregarded as a factor in 
the capital punishment debates. However, he was not alone in advancing this 
argument. During the debate on the second reading of the Death Penalty 
(Abolition) Bill in the Lords, Viscount Kilmuir, the Conservative Lord 
Chancellor and former Home Secretary, drew upon the arguments of other 
retentionists before arriving at his own argument: 
[Quoting Lord Justice Denning] “The ultimate justification of any 
punishment is not that it is a deterrent, but that it is an emphatic 
                                                   
398 A.M. Kraft, “Should Capital Punishment be Abolished?,” Socialist Commentary 12, no. 7 (Apr. 
1948): 156-8. 
 178 
denunciation by the community of a crime: and from this point of 
view, there are murders which, in the present state of public 
opinion, demand the most emphatic denunciation of all—namely, 
the death penalty.”…That is an important start. I myself would go 
further. I believe that the “emphatic denunciation” of a crime does 
more than mark the State’s disapproval. It causes individuals, and, 
indeed, the whole people, to regard that crime with detestation.399 
Kilmuir’s moral justification for the death penalty was concerned more with 
encouraging society’s revulsion towards murder rather than ensuring that the 
murderer received the retributive penalty, as was the case with Kraft’s argument. 
Both men separated their arguments from deterrence to focus upon other moral 
reasons for the desirability of capital punishment. As mentioned earlier, Kraft 
acknowledged that the retentionists could not win an argument based upon 
deterrence. It was necessary for the retentionists to have arguments based upon 
other issues, therefore, in their attempt to succeed within the capital punishment 
debates. Few retentionist politicians mimicked Kraft and Kilmuir in arguing 
publically that capital punishment was desirable. Another who did, Brigadier 
Terence Clarke, is examined in the next section of this chapter. Such an 
argument found little support within the broadly abolitionist House of Commons. 
The more common moral argument used by the retentionists was that capital 
punishment was a justifiable necessity. This would have been a more appealing 
argument for those politicians who disliked capital punishment but who might 
have been willing to accept that the death penalty was an unpleasant necessity.400 
Unfortunately for the retentionists, such moral arguments did little to convince 
their opponents to change their minds on capital punishment. These arguments 
did not greatly assist the retentionists’ case. 
 Unlike the abolitionists, many of the leading retentionists within 
Parliament were in the House of Lords. Prior to the Life Peerages Act, the vast 
majority of the Lords held more traditional, conservative values. It was after the 
passage of this Act that there was a gradual influx of peers who were affiliated 
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with the Labour Party and were predominantly abolitionists.401 William Jowitt, 
the Lord Chancellor during Attlee’s premiership, was a retentionist leader despite 
being a member of the Labour Party. Jowitt was previously a member of the 
Liberal Party who joined Labour shortly after the 1929 general election, after 
which he was appointed Attorney General.402 Deterrence was at the centre of his 
retentionist argument. He introduced the second reading of the Criminal Justice 
Bill in the Lords as the representative of the government and thus was obliged to 
vote in favour of it. He did not feel comfortable, though, with supporting the Bill 
because of his retentionism. He voiced his displeasure with the abolition 
amendment during his speech in the Lords: 
Of course, a hanging is a grim and horrible business. And so, my 
Lords, is murder. I feel that there is only one possible justification 
for retaining capital punishment—namely, that one believes that 
capital punishment acts as a deterrent, and therefore cuts down the 
number of murders which otherwise would be committed. It is 
because I believe that that I am opposed to the abolition of capital 
punishment. I cannot prove it. In the nature of things, no one can 
ever prove it. It must be a matter of impression and of one's own 
personal opinion.403 
Jowitt’s portrayal of the deterrent effect of capital punishment was common 
amongst many of the retentionists who took part in the post-war abolition 
debates. Yet, Jowitt acknowledged that the retentionists were unable to prove the 
deterrent effect of capital punishment. This became increasingly problematic for 
the retentionists, who would never overcome this issue. Indeed, in 1948 A.M. 
Kraft admitted that the abolitionists had won the argument concerning 
deterrence, even though they did not have yet the supporting evidence from the 
Royal Commission’s report.404 This was the most important reason for the defeat 
of the retentionist arguments in Parliament. 
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 The Royal Commission’s report provided the retentionists with no 
evidence to support their arguments on deterrence. The report has been 
recognised by politicians and academics as being of particular importance to the 
understanding of the complexities within the application of capital punishment, as 
is mentioned in this thesis’ chapter on public opinion. The retentionists could not 
ignore the report. They had to persuade other politicians that they had 
misunderstood it in finding that it supported the abolitionists’ case. Gwilym Lloyd 
George attempted this in February 1956: 
The Commission did not say that capital punishment was not a 
uniquely effective deterrent. Indeed, in some respects the 
Commission thought it was. What the Commission said was simply 
that the figures provided “no reliable evidence one way or the 
other.”…It [the impracticality of statistics within arguments for 
abolition] is of the greatest importance in relation to the argument 
that because in a number of countries where the death penalty has 
been abolished there has not been an increase in murder, the death 
penalty, therefore, makes no difference. There is no statistical 
foundation whatever for that contention…The abolitionist case, as 
I understand it, is that since the death penalty cannot be proved by 
statistics to be a uniquely effective deterrent therefore it is not a 
uniquely effective deterrent. Personally, I do not believe that what 
cannot be proved by statistics cannot be true.405 
Lloyd George tailored his argument around the critique of the abolitionists’ use of 
deterrence in an attempt to refute their claim of having evidence that supported 
their argument. This quote, taken from Lloyd George’s speech opening the 
debate on the government’s motion on 16 February 1956, set the tone for the 
arguments on deterrence within the subsequent abolition debates. The 
retentionists claimed that capital punishment was a unique and necessary 
deterrent but could not find evidence to support this assertion. Though they 
decried the abolitionists’ claims of evidence as being spurious, they could not 
disprove them. The publication of the Royal Commission’s report made the 
retentionists’ argument on deterrence less convincing. The general perception 
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within the Commons was that it was they rather than the abolitionists who were 
required to prove their argument on deterrence in the light of the evidence that 
emerged from the Royal Commission’s report. 
 Occasionally, the retentionists attempted to use the context provided by 
the rising crime rate after the Second World War to justify their argument that 
capital punishment was a necessary deterrent. Moss Turner-Samuels argued thus 
during the Common’s debate on the abolition amendment to the Criminal Justice 
Bill: 
In those circumstances [judges believing that they have to pass 
down more severe sentences in response to the increasingly 
frequent incidents of criminals using firearms], and having regard 
to the unsettled state of the country, which, everyone admits, is 
leading to serious crime - and this is largely due to the effect of the 
war; everyone realises that respect for life and property has become 
very much less since the war - we must take all this into account 
when we are being asked to lessen and weaken the sanctions of 
criminal punishment. The Home Office, at this moment, are 
opposing the abolition of capital punishment because of these very 
reasons…In the light of the increase in crime in the country, to say 
that that grave factor is not a decisive matter to be taken into 
consideration is surely a statement bordering on irresponsibility.406 
Turner-Samuels’ argument did not attempt to prove that capital punishment was 
a deterrent. Instead, he relied on the notion that MPs might accept that the post-
war social dislocation had created a situation in which it was inappropriate to 
abolish the death penalty. This was a common retentionist argument, which was 
replicated for the rising crime rate in the 1950s and 1960s. Turner-Samuels 
hoped to supersede abolitionist arguments on deterrence by drawing upon the 
doubt that was connected to this issue. He used this doubt and the rising crime 
rate to argue that capital punishment should not be abolished at that time. The 
majority of MPs, though, were not convinced by his attempt to delay their 
judgement on the issue.  
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Retentionist MPs failed to convince many abolitionists to believe their 
interpretation of deterrence prior to the publication of the Royal Commission’s 
report, as most politicians based their judgements on abolition upon their own 
morality. The retentionists’ arguments, though, were no less convincing than the 
abolitionists’ before the publication of the report. The emerging evidence that 
supported the abolitionists’ case, both from foreign abolitionist countries and 
from the Royal Commission’s report, meant that the retentionists became even 
less able to present a sufficiently persuasive argument based upon deterrence. 
 As with the abolitionists, there were a number of retentionists who drew 
upon the concept of civilisation in support of their arguments. The general 
premise for these arguments was similar to those connected to the sanctity of life: 
that capital punishment was necessary to preserve or improve the status of 
Britain’s civilisation. Unlike the abolitionists’ uses of civilisation, though, it was 
not associated with liberalisation. One retentionist to use such an argument was 
Lord Teviot: 
We look about the world today and what do we see? We see the 
rule of law, as always understood by civilised nations, being 
usurped by the rule of murder. We all know the meaning of the 
word “liquidation.” There seems to me to be no question whatever 
that the weakening on penalties of this sort is just pandering to 
those in the world who carry on their vicious persecution of people 
and rule by fear.407 
Teviot viewed the rising murder rate of the late 1940s as threatening Britain’s 
civilisation by diminishing the rule of law. He argued that abolishing capital 
punishment would enable this trend to continue. His was one of a number of 
retentionist arguments that were founded upon the same theme. However, the 
retentionists did not use civilisation as frequently within the parliamentary debates 
as did the abolitionists. This was in part because the retentionists lacked a 
conceptual framework that was comparable to the abolitionists’ to support and 
justify their arguments. Prominent abolitionists, notably Roy Jenkins and Anthony 
Crosland, placed abolition within a wider framework of liberalisation that would 
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create a more civilised society.408 These programmes supported the abolitionists’ 
uses of civilisation within their arguments and were adhered to by a large number 
of MPs who voted both for abolition and for other liberalising reforms. There 
were no similar published programmes to support the retentionists’ understanding 
of civilisation. This severely restricted the persuasiveness of their interpretations of 
civilisation within the capital punishment debates, which was demonstrated 
through the abolitionists’ more frequent use of the concept. 
 In general, the retentionists attempted to frame their arguments around 
the notion that they were sensitive to the unpleasant nature of capital punishment 
but felt that it was a necessary deterrent against murder. They could not afford to 
be portrayed as being out of touch with the liberalising political culture, which 
included penal policy. A good example of this was Hogg’s The Case for Conservatism 
and the later edition The Conservative Case, quoted in this thesis’ chapter identifying 
the retentionists and abolitionists, wherein the boy who stole apples was punished 
with the birch in 1947 and with the slipper in 1959.409 This was indicative of the 
retentionists’ need, and indeed the need of all politicians, to present their 
arguments in the manner that was most persuasive to their audience. Hogg 
outlined identical arguments in both editions, but diminished the penalty for the 
apple-stealing boy to reflect contemporary attitudes. 
 As with Hogg, many retentionists had to present their arguments carefully 
in order to appeal to an audience that, in the House of Commons at least, was not 
sympathetic to their cause. This meant that few retentionists argued that capital 
punishment was desirable, instead claiming that it was justifiable and necessary. 
However, they were unable to formulate any argument that succeeded in 
convincing a sufficient number of abolitionists or abstaining MPs to change their 
opinions on the issue. The retentionists’ arguments were hampered by a lack of 
evidence to refute the abolitionists’ evidence. This, along with the abolitionism of 
a significant minority of younger Conservative MPs and the arrival of new 
abolitionist peers in the House of Lords, meant that the parliamentary culture 
during this period became less conducive for the retentionists to present a 
convincing argument. 
                                                   
408 Crosland, The Conservative Enemy, 131; Crosland, The Future of Socialism, 521-2; Jenkins, The 
Labour Case, 135-7. 
409 Hogg, The Case for Conservatism, 22; Hogg, The Conservative Case, 26. 
 184 
Why did the retentionists believe that capital punishment should be 
retained? 
As with their arguments, the morality that drove the retentionists’ belief can be 
divided into two categories. The first group were those who believed that the 
death penalty was the desirable punishment for murder. They rarely expressed 
these views within the parliamentary debates due to the liberalising, abolitionist 
mentality that became increasingly entrenched within the House of Commons 
during this period. The committed retentionism of many politicians after both the 
publication of the Royal Commission’s report and the notable executions 
indicates that their beliefs were based more upon a desire for the retributive 
function of capital punishment than they exhibited within their arguments. The 
second group had more sympathy with abolition, exhibiting disgust towards the 
death penalty. They supported retention, though, because they believed that 
capital punishment was a necessary deterrent to murder. Their disgust towards 
executions was not strong enough to counter balance a moderate belief or even an 
uncertainty in the deterrent effect of capital punishment. This retentionist belief 
was demonstrated predominantly by those MPs who changed their votes from 
retention to abolition at various stages during this period and by those who, 
though firm retentionists, spoke openly of the conflict that they felt on this issue. It 
should be noted, though, that some politicians who claimed to find capital 
punishment disgusting but necessary may have done so in order to make their 
arguments more persuasive. It is not possible for a historian to weight accurately 
the extent to which statements made in Parliament were accurate depictions of 
politicians’ beliefs, as some statements would have been tailored to be persuasive 
rather than genuine outlines of the causes of one’s opinions.  
 Both the support for the retribution offered by the death penalty and the 
recognition of the necessity of capital punishment were linked to aspects of 
traditional Conservative and Anglican morality. This section also examines the 
retentionists’ opposition to abolition with reference to the belief in the sanctity of 
life, the rising crime rates and the wider liberalisation of the post-war decades. 
 The retentionists who sympathised with abolition but opposed it for 
causalist reasons included members of Attlee’s government and a large minority 
of Labour backbenchers during the debates on the Criminal Justice Bill in 1947 
and 1948. Many of these politicians only voted for retention at this time and 
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supported abolition in the subsequent debates. For this government, there was the 
additional causalist fear of appearing soft on crime, which could have had an 
impact on their electoral performance. As was mentioned in this thesis’ chapter 
on public opinion, any potential electoral impact was a largely unknown factor at 
this time due to the infancy of psephology as a scientific discipline. 
 One of the few retentionist politicians to express publically a view that the 
death penalty was the desirable punishment for murder was Brigadier Terence 
Clarke. During the second reading of the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Bill 
in December 1964, Clarke tabled a wrecking amendment: 
I beg to move, to leave out “now and at the end of the Question to 
add” upon this day six months". I understand that this is the 
parliamentary way of saying, “Tear the Bill up and let us hear no 
more of it”. That is what I should like to do…If murderers want to 
commit suicide, I would not stop them. It would save a lot of 
bother later on…I am certain that the death penalty is a deterrent. 
I believe the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne admitted that it 
was, and certainly the former Home Secretary, my right hon. 
Friend the Member for Hampstead (Mr. Brooke), said that it was. I 
was not quite sure what the new Home Secretary said. He seemed 
to be almost as weak with the criminal as the two Home Secretaries 
who preceded him [R.A. Butler and Henry Brooke, the 
Conservative Home Secretaries who oversaw penal reforms 
including the compromise Homicide Act]. I do not know what 
happens to people when they become Home Secretaries. They get 
so wet that they ought to be hung up. This is a deterrent. A 
murderer should most certainly hang. If there is a matter of doubt 
in anyone's mind, I have no doubt whatever…I am perfectly happy 
if a mistake has been made, or if in the next five or ten years a 
mistake is made if it means that we save the life of one child, as I 
believe retaining the death penalty would do 410 
The deterrence aspect of Clarke’s belief within this quote is examined later in this 
section. Clarke expressed his moral support for capital punishment by placing the 
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life of a child, which was portrayed as the absolute innocent victim, above that of 
a person who is executed mistakenly. This rather extreme example was rooted in 
the belief that capital punishment was the desirable penalty for murderers and 
that it was essential for preserving order within society. He demonstrated this 
desire further by claiming that he would not stop a murderer from committing 
suicide. Clarke’s belief that a murderer should die was expressed clearly in this 
speech, along with his assertion that capital punishment was a unique deterrent to 
murder.  
 Clarke’s belief was a product of a traditional theory of punishment that 
was based upon deterrence and retribution, which was out of keeping with the 
liberalising ethos that became prominent in penal policy and wider social 
liberalisation. Clarke distanced himself from the abolitionists’ use of evidence and 
expert opinion, stating disparagingly: ‘I know that lawyers and statistics can prove 
practically anything’, a quote that drew groans from other MPs.411 This approach 
to capital punishment adhered to what David Garland has termed the 
‘traditional’ way of thinking about crime, where ‘experience and ideology’ were 
more important than ‘systemic empirical enquiry’.412 For Clarke, the experience 
came in part from his military service, from which he drew two supporting 
examples, and the ideology from his Conservative background, which Jarvis has 
termed as ‘representing tradition’.413 Clarke’s speech, however, was markedly out 
of touch with the tone of the debate. He accused those who supported either 
abolition or a reduction in the application of capital punishment as being ‘weak’ 
and ‘wet’.414 These were familiar accusations linked to emotionalism, a theme 
which was used by both retentionists and abolitionists to attack the beliefs and 
arguments of their opponents.415 Clarke’s speech was extreme, but its ridiculing 
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by other MPs was indicative of the fact that the retentionists’ moral and causalist 
beliefs were held only by a minority of MPs in a House dominated by 
abolitionists. 
 Clarke was more vociferous than most retentionist politicians in his 
defence of both the desirability of and justification for the death penalty. His stern 
support for capital punishment was out of keeping with the entrenched 
abolitionism within the Commons in the 1960s. Because of this, his aggressive 
rejection of abolition can be presumed to represent his belief that capital 
punishment was the desirable penalty for murderers, as such an argument could 
not have been expected to be successful at persuading abolitionists to support 
retention. No politician would have used this as a persuasive tool if their attitude 
towards capital punishment was more liberal than the stated position. However, 
the number of committed retentionists throughout this period indicates that many 
politicians would have agreed with Clarke, but displayed more political awareness 
in not expressing their views in such stark terms. Clarke’s misjudgement of the 
tone of the debate was evident by the groans and laughter that greeted a number 
of his statements. He was dismayed by these reactions: ‘I do not know why hon. 
Gentlemen think this is funny. I am desperately serious.’ 416 Clarke was not unique 
in believing that capital punishment was desirable. It was unwise of him, though, 
to raise it in this manner within the House of Commons, which by this time was 
firmly abolitionist and was supported in this belief by the government. 
 Those retentionists who maintained their position after the publication of 
the Royal Commission’s report can be presumed to have continued to vote for 
retention largely because of a moral belief that it was the deserved penalty for 
murder. If most had voted for retention because they believed capital punishment 
to be an unwanted but necessary deterrent to murder, then one would expect to 
find far fewer retentionists after 1953 than before, as after this year the available 
evidence suggested that the death penalty could not be proved to be a unique 
deterrent. Yet, the proportion of retentionists in the Commons divisions in 1948 
was almost identical to that in 1956, as is mentioned in this thesis’ chapter on 
public opinion. Furthermore, the only retentionist success in the Commons was in 
1955 during the motion to recognise the Royal Commission’s report. Indeed, 83 
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per cent of the total number of committed retentionists who took part in at least 
one capital punishment debate between 1947 and 1969 voted for retention after 
the Royal Commission’s report was published in 1953. It is apparent, therefore, 
that many of the committed retentionists were not supporting the death penalty 
reluctantly because of the perception that it was a unique deterrent. It is probable 
that most wanted murderers to be executed.  
 Many politicians’ retentionism, though, was based upon their belief that it 
was justifiable to take the life of a murderer in order to preserve law and order, 
even though some of these politicians disliked the death penalty. In this respect, 
their moral feelings on the death penalty were outweighed by their interpretation 
of the causalist issue of deterrence. The causalist aspect of this belief placed capital 
punishment as a necessary sanction against murder. The moral aspect placed it as 
being justifiable for this reason. Archbishop Fisher demonstrated this belief in his 
contributions to the parliamentary debates on capital punishment and in his 
witness statement to the Royal Commission in 1950. His statement contained 
three main points: that the state could legitimately take life in murder cases to 
protect lives and order within society, that it was dangerous to consider abolition 
during the on-going post-war crime wave and that the public generally agreed 
with this view.417 His final point is not considered within this section, as this thesis’ 
chapter on public opinion has already explained that the electorate’s views did not 
influence greatly the judgements of politicians. Many politicians connected the 
post-war crime wave to the social dislocation that followed the end of the Second 
World War. This belief that the time was not right for abolition can be translated 
to many of the retentionists throughout this period who felt that the death penalty 
was necessary to protect society. Fisher was of the opinion that capital punishment 
was not desirable, but his belief that it was a uniquely effective punishment meant 
that he supported retention. This belief was demonstrated by his view that capital 
punishment needed to be limited to fewer murders to ensure that very few 
convicts were sentenced to death only to receive a reprieve at a later date.418 This 
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was a slight change of opinion from his speech in 1948, quoted earlier, in which 
he appeared to view capital punishment as a more desirable punishment than he 
did in the 1950s.419 This perhaps indicates that he presented his retentionism in a 
manner that he believed would be most appealing to his audience. Nevertheless, 
in the 1950s Fisher appeared to distance his retentionism from a view that it was 
the desirable punishment for murder. 
The belief that capital punishment was an undesirable yet necessary 
penalty was often linked to the rising crime rates in the 1940s and in the 1950s 
and 1960s. In the late 1940s and early 1950s the crime rate rose steadily from 
2,967 offences against the person in 1947 to 3,707 in 1951. There was a more 
pronounced rise from the mid-1950s into the 1960s. Offences against the person 
rose from 4,238 in 1956 to 6,025 in 1961. The incidents of this type of crime 
remained above 5,000 throughout the 1960s.420 This second rise was associated in 
particular with increasing affluence and the degradation of the traditional 
Christian, Anglican morality. Jarvis explains that the perceived decline of 
Christian morality was seen by many Conservatives to be the primary reason for 
the crime wave.421 For many retentionists these increases in the incidents of 
crimes against the person were an important reason for retaining the death 
penalty. They believed that capital punishment would reduce the crime rate.422  
Viscount Kilmuir argued that capital punishment would maintain law and 
order within society during a cabinet meeting in February 1955. He stated that he 
was ‘fully convinced that the death penalty acted as a powerful deterrent and that 
its removal would prejudice the maintenance of the Queen’s peace’.423 Jarvis 
argues that this theory was solidified for many Conservatives during the crime 
wave of the 1950s and 1960s, with many Party delegates demanding the 
restoration of capital punishment for all murders at the Party conferences after the 
Homicide Act limited the application of the death penalty.424 Indeed Butler, in a 
government memorandum written in 1961, noted that the rising crime rate had 
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led to a number of Conservatives demanding the reintroduction of capital 
punishment for all murders.425 This belief in the deterrent effect of capital 
punishment was demonstrated also in Archbishop Fisher’s statement to the Royal 
Commission, which he made near the end the first post-war crime wave.426 This 
was a common reason given by retentionists for not supporting abolition. It is 
difficult to ascertain how many of the retentionists in Parliament believed that 
abolition was possible in the future but not appropriate whilst the crime rate was 
rising. Butler and Macmillan appeared to accept that abolition was likely, though 
not inevitable, during their meeting with the NCACP in 1962.427 Some may have 
used the crime rate as a tool in debates to defeat other aspects of the abolitionists’ 
case that they could not refute, notably deterrence. Nonetheless, the reactions to 
the rising crime rate demonstrate that a number of retentionists viewed capital 
punishment as a uniquely effective deterrent, as they believed that it was 
necessary to reduce the incidents of crime.  
During the Lords’ Committee on the Criminal Justice Bill in June 1948, 
Lord Llewellyn moved that the amendment for abolition be removed from the 
Bill. As with Jowitt, quoted earlier in this chapter, he too placed deterrence at the 
heart of his retentionist belief: 
First of all, I believe it to be a deterrent. If it is not a deterrent, why 
do we keep it on our Statute Law for treason? Why did we take 
part in the Nuremberg Trials, if we did not think that by convicting 
international criminals, as we all believed Goering, Ribbentrop and 
the others to be, we were deterring other people from taking 
similar actions?428 
Llewellyn introduced the context provided by the trials of the Nazi war criminals 
as evidence that the British state had recently viewed capital punishment as a 
necessary deterrent, though it is probable that for many people these executions 
were retributive. This was not evidence that proved the unique deterrent effect of 
capital punishment. However, it demonstrated that the British state was active in 
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seeking the death penalty for the worst criminals, including the strongly 
abolitionist Attorney General, Sir Hartley Shawcross, who served as Britain’s 
Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg.429   
 Quintin Hogg believed that it was wrong to protect the lives of murderers 
following both the deaths of countless soldiers and civilians and the British 
involvement in the executions of Nazi war criminals: 
We have just concluded a great world war, in which we took 
millions of human lives quite deliberately in order to protect things 
which we thought more valuable… We have just been hanging our 
defeated enemies after the trials at Nuremberg… I am asking the 
House to try to give itself some kind of consistency of moral 
purpose here.430 
As Langhamer explains, the executions of the Nazi war criminals had led to the 
British public becoming more accustomed to capital punishment, thus adding to 
the argument associated with the rising crime rate that the late 1940s was an 
improper moment to abolish the death penalty.431 The increased prominence of 
killing in societies throughout Europe convinced a number of retentionists that the 
measures to improve the sanctity of life should not begin with murderers.  
 A career in the military appears to have influenced the retentionist beliefs 
of many MPs. Seventy per cent of MPs who had careers in the military were 
committed retentionists. This demonstrates that the experiences of war did 
encourage politicians to support retention, although 84 per cent of the MPs with 
military careers were Conservatives and, therefore, likely to have been inclined to 
support retention in any case. Retentionism, though, was not supported 
universally by those with military experience. Having been a peer for 18 years 
previously, the Earl of Harewood delivered his maiden speech to the House of 
Lords during the debate on the second reading of the Murder (Abolition of Death 
Penalty) Bill. He used his experience of war, and in particular of being a prisoner 
of war, to explain why he supported abolition.432  
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 Sir Patrick Spens’ experiences of war and of judicial and colonial service 
informed his belief that death was a deterrent. During the debate on the 
government’s retentionist motion in February 1956, Spens explained his belief: 
What I have to say to the House is partly, but not very greatly, 
founded on my experience as a judge in India…It is partly from 
that experience that I, myself, am convinced that the death penalty 
is a deterrent in certain cases…but every one of us knows— knows 
inside himself—whether violent death is a deterrent to us and 
whether it will deter us from doing certain things. Masses of hon. 
Members in this House have served in the Armed Forces. I do not 
believe a single one if he says that he has never been deterred by 
bullets or bombs. Of course we have been deterred by bullets and 
bombs. I am not ashamed to confess that I have been gravely 
deterred, almost to the length of turning my back and not going 
forward when I ought to be going forward433 
Spens’ use of personal experience as a reason for his belief was not uncommon. 
This was demonstrated by Terence Clarke, as examined earlier. It is difficult to 
ascertain how far the general experience of war influenced individual MPs’ 
emotional reactions to capital punishment. For some it would have increased their 
repugnance towards any form of killing. For others, such as Spens, it convinced 
them that death was a unique deterrent. Yet more, such as Hogg, felt that the 
lives of murderers should not be preserved when so many others had recently lost 
their lives in war. It is not possible to distinguish a general reaction towards the 
death penalty that was based upon experiences of war or colonial service. 
Nevertheless, these experiences were influential factors behind the retentionism of 
a number of MPs. 
 The majority of Labour ministers in the late 1940s were retentionists, 
although, as this thesis’ previous chapter explained, this was largely due to their 
concerns regarding deterrence and the Party’s future electoral performances. The 
majority of these Labour retentionists were politicians who supported the death 
penalty for causalist reasons, which outweighed their dislike of capital 
punishment. Kevin Manton identifies that a number of the senior Labour 
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politicians were concerned about being portrayed as sentimental, a synonym for 
soft on crime. He argues convincingly that their support for capital punishment 
came from a desire to appear to be tough on crime.434 Although Manton does 
undervalue the strength of abolitionism within the Labour Party, as is mentioned 
in this thesis’ chapter on the abolitionist case, he is correct to identify and explore 
the retentionist nature of much of the Labour leadership in the 1940s, notably 
Herbert Morrison, although he too voted for abolition in 1956.435 Indeed, the fact 
that five of the nine cabinet ministers who voted for retention in April 1948 voted 
for abolition in 1956 indicates that their defence of the death penalty during the 
passage of the Criminal Justice Act was not based upon a belief that capital 
punishment was desirable.  
 For many of the retentionists in this Labour government, the decision to 
oppose abolition can be seen as the outcome of both the post-war crime wave and 
political expediency. James Chuter Ede, the Home Secretary under Attlee, saw 
the social dislocation as a method to defeat any abolitionist amendment to the 
Criminal Justice Bill. In the final paragraph of a three-page memorandum for the 
cabinet on the difficulty with avoiding abolition, he mentioned that an argument 
based upon the notion that the time was not right for reform might succeed.436 
For Ede, who was an abolitionist forced to adopt a retentionist position while in 
government, the crime rate was a persuasive tool to justify the continuance of the 
death penalty rather than a reason in itself to believe that capital punishment 
should be retained. Given his abolitionism, it is unsurprising that he struggled to 
present a firm belief in favour of retention. He viewed the crime rate purely as a 
political device rather than as a reason for wanting the death penalty to be 
retained, which would have been the reaction of many retentionists. In a meeting 
on 18 November 1947, the cabinet voted by ten to five in favour of the time not 
being opportune for the reform. Ede stated that he would vote for abolition in the 
debate if he were a private member and that in voting for the government line he 
was acting against his conscience. For Ede, it was the responsibility of 
representing the government that led to him voting for retention. Other 
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abolitionist ministers present at this meeting wanted to vote in accordance with 
their consciences, notably Stafford Cripps and Aneurin Bevan, although they 
compromised by abstaining from the division.437 For a number of abolitionists in 
the Labour cabinet, party pressure rather than retentionist sympathies led them to 
vote for the death penalty. 
 During the Commons debate on capital punishment on 16 February 
1956, Sir Knox Cunningham stated that ‘I am in favour of its retention, and I 
have come to this conclusion because I believe in the sanctity of human life.’438 
Cunningham, like Terence Clarke, believed in the deterrent effect of the death 
penalty and presumed, therefore, that by executing a number of murderers each 
year the total number of lives taken, or at least lives taken illegally, within the 
country would be lower than if capital punishment were abolished. He believed, 
therefore, that the sanctity of life within the country would be preserved by 
maintaining the death penalty, thus meaning that capital punishment was morally 
justifiable.  
Many retentionists, notably Clarke, argued that capital punishment was 
necessary to preserve the sanctity of life within society because they believed that 
fewer innocent people would die. Other retentionists believed that a long term of 
imprisonment showed less regard for the sanctity of life than the death penalty. 
Moss Turner-Samuels, who was one of the few committed Labour retentionists, 
explained his position: 
Everyone agrees that imprisonment for longer than 12 years 
destroys physical life. I say to the House that if we are to get rid of 
capital punishment we have no right to substitute for it a slower 
and more refined form of the death penalty. If punishment in 
prison is made to extend beyond 12 years it destroys physical life, 
and if we did that we should be doing something which, I submit, 
this House ought not to countenance.439 
A number of retentionists throughout this period echoed these points. However, 
although some retentionists did argue in these ways, the majority of MPs did not 
conform to the idea that state executions protected the sanctity of life. Indeed, 
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many argued that by hanging criminals the state was reducing this sanctity, as 
they believed that executions normalised the taking of life, as was argued by John 
Hynd, quoted in the previous chapter of this thesis.440 
 The concept of the sanctity of life was a more developed aspect of the 
abolitionists’ beliefs than it was of the retentionists’. The retentionists’ notion that 
one must take life to preserve its sanctity was slightly more convoluted than the 
abolitionists’ belief that by not taking life one diminished the culture in which 
unnatural death could become normalised within society. The abolitionists’ 
position was supported by evidence that suggested that capital punishment did not 
offer a unique deterrent to murder. Furthermore, the sanctity of life linked 
abolition to other causes, notably the CND and, for a small number of politicians, 
the opposition to the legalisation of abortion. The abolitionists had a greater 
conceptual framework than the retentionists to support their beliefs and 
liberalising programme based upon the sanctity of life. The sanctity of life was a 
factor behind the beliefs of a number of retentionists who viewed capital 
punishment as morally justifiable. Yet, it was not the interpretation of the sanctity 
of life that was common amongst most politicians. 
 As with the examination of the abolitionists in the previous chapter of this 
thesis, a study of the committed retentionists’ votes on the Medical Termination 
of Pregnancy Bill and the Sexual Offences Bill can indicate how far the 
retentionists’ support for capital punishment was based upon either their belief in 
the sanctity of life or their opposition to wider liberal reformism. Although a belief 
in the sanctity of life would not necessitate opposition to the legalisation of 
abortion, the previous chapter noted that this concept did cause a number of 
politicians to support abolition and oppose abortion. Eleven committed 
retentionists voted against the legalisation of abortion, whereas 31 supported it. 
This suggests that the need to protect the sanctity of life was not an especially 
common characteristic of the retentionists’ beliefs. Furthermore, their opposition 
to liberalisation was more evident. This inference is supported by the fact that 18 
committed retentionists supported the legalisation of homosexuality, whereas 76 
opposed it. It appears, therefore, that a common background for the retentionists’ 
beliefs was that they opposed the relaxation of state control. This is explored 
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further in the next section of this chapter. Whether they approved of the 
retributive function of capital punishment or felt that it was a necessary sanction 
against murder, their beliefs were manifestations of the more old fashioned 
theories of punishment that were based upon deterrence and retribution. 
 The belief in the justification of the death penalty was rooted in 
Conservative morality and supported by elements of Anglican morality. This is no 
surprise considering that 91 per cent of the committed retentionists were members 
of the Conservative Party. The traditional Conservatives were largely consistent in 
their support for capital punishment. Philip Norton and Arthur Aughey, writing 
in 1981, defined Conservatism as: 
…an acceptance of the social and political institutions that exist at 
any one time, an acceptance which though not rationalist is not 
unreasoned…It is a measure of how things are, the conveniences, 
but also the inconveniences, of a style of living. As the recognition 
of imperfection as an ineradicable fact of the human condition 
Conservatism means a limited conception of the changes that may 
be achieved by political activity.441 
This interpretation of Conservatism, in particular the reluctance to instigate 
dramatic change through political activity, can be attributed to the traditional 
Conservatives in the two decades after the Second World War. Most of them 
defended the institution of capital punishment, as they did with their on-going 
support for the continued criminalisation of sinful acts, as supported by Christian 
doctrine. Indeed, 70 per cent of the MPs to vote against the second reading of the 
Sexual Offences Bill in 1966 were committed retentionists. Only 11 per cent were 
committed abolitionists (see Figure 7.1, Appendix). 442  This link with social 
authoritarianism is examined in the next section of this chapter. However, it 
indicates that there was a traditional Conservative mentality common to a large 
number of retentionists. 
 Quintin Hogg established a firm Christian background for his 
interpretation of Conservatism in The Conservative Case. He placed an emphasis on 
the centrality of Christian doctrine for the governance of state and society. 
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Although he focused on the economy rather than social or penal issues, the 
philosophical framework that he described can be applied across many aspects of 
British life. Hogg explained that it was important for society to remain governed 
by both the law of God and the state: 
The policy of that [celestial] Cabinet is well known. It is to tell 
human creatures of certain rules which they ought to follow – 
truthfulness, kindness, chastity, respect for parents, and, above all, 
worship of God, and to leave them more or less free to follow them 
or not. Our ancestors learned and taught that a disregard of these 
rules brought calamity upon our heads… The plain fact about war, 
poverty, persecution, and most disease, is that they are caused by a 
deliberate disregard of the natural law – which in its simplest and 
most universal form teaches man to love his neighbour as himself. 
This view is in my judgement inseparable from the religious view of 
life. 
Hogg states briefly at the end of his chapter on religion in society that these views 
were his own, that they did not represent all Conservatives and that such views 
were not restricted exclusively to Conservatives. Rather, he saw them as ‘an 
essential part of Conservatism’.443 Jarvis explains that Christianity was of central 
importance to the Conservatives’ ‘moral framework’, and in doing so supports 
Hogg’s interpretation of this relationship between Christianity and 
Conservatism.444  
 Through his analysis of the 1964 Commons debate on the second reading 
of the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Bill, Peter Richards has identified 
that, of all identified religious groups within the House of Commons, the 
Anglicans had by far the highest proportion of retentionists amongst their 
number. Almost half, 42.6 per cent, of the Anglicans within the House voted 
against the Bill. The religious group with the second highest percentage of 
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retentionists was the Roman Catholics, of whom 11.5 per cent opposed the 
Bill. 445  Laurence Kotler-Berkowitz has identified that the Conservatives 
represented the majority of the Anglican community.446 Anglicanism was one of 
the common characteristics of both Conservatism and retentionism. Senior 
groups within the Church of England were slower than other Christian groups in 
declaring themselves to be in favour of abolition, although this can be attributed 
partly to the established nature of this Church. The Lower and Upper 
Convocations of Canterbury passed motions in favour of abolition in 1961 and 
1962 respectively, after many of the Free Churches had already declared their 
support for this reform. These Free Churches were more prominent within the 
Labour Party.447 The later increase in support for abolition from the Church of 
England was demonstrated in the two memorials circulated by the NCACP. In 
1956, 13 Bishops signed the memorial in support of abolition. Thirty-nine 
Bishops signed the 1962 memorial.448 Harry Potter notes that of the 29 diocesan 
bishops in the Province of Canterbury in 1962, 21 had been appointed since 
1956.449 This arrival of younger abolitionist bishops mirrored the demographic 
change within the Conservative Party that took place at the same time. This late 
shift towards abolition from the leaders of the Church of England, coincident 
with the substantial appointment of new bishops, demonstrated that the more 
traditional elements of its leadership were more inclined to support capital 
punishment than were those from other Churches within Britain. It is reasonable 
to assume, therefore, that through the recognised link between Anglicanism and 
the Conservative Party, the retentionism of the established Church that was 
prevalent until the latter years of the abolition process was a reflection of and an 
influence upon the beliefs of a number of the retentionists.  
 Morality was the primary reason for the retentionists’ beliefs. Many 
believed that murderers deserved to die, as demonstrated through their continued 
opposition to abolition, though few expressed such views in as bold a manner as 
Terence Clarke. Other retentionists believed that capital punishment was 
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necessary and therefore morally justifiable, even where they disliked executions. 
Anglican and Conservative morality and a belief in the sanctity of life were 
influential for many politicians’ retentionism. Other factors, though, were 
important in shaping the retentionism of others, notably the high crime rate and, 
for Attlee’s Labour government, the need to adopt a tough position on crime. 
Finally, this section has inferred, through studying the retentionists’ votes during 
the second readings of the Bills to legalise homosexuality and abortion, that a 
wider opposition to liberalisation was a significant background for many 
politicians’ retentionism. This link between retentionism and social 
authoritarianism requires further investigation. 
  
Were the retentionists social authoritarians? 
The place of abolition within the corpus of liberalising legislation was established 
in the previous chapter of this thesis. Although abolition was not a permissive 
reform, despite being portrayed as such by some historians, it was liberalising due 
to its role in relaxing Britain’s penal policy. The previous chapter explained that 
the abolitionists were social liberals but that they were not permissives, although 
a significant proportion of them also supported the permissive reforms. In the 
same vein, it is necessary to consider whether retentionists were social 
authoritarians and anti-permissives and examine whether there were any links 
between the retentionists and those who adopted socially authoritarian positions 
on other issues. In doing so, it is possible to ascertain whether the retentionists 
opposed abolition in part because of their broader opposition to social 
liberalisation.  
 Through their opposition to the liberalisation of penal policy in the form 
of abolition, the retentionists can be categorised as social authoritarians. They 
favoured the maintenance of the strict punishment for murder through the belief 
that the death penalty was either the deserved or necessary sanction against this 
crime. As such, they believed that society required strong social control through 
the retention of this penalty. As with the abolitionists, their links to the issues 
surrounding the permissive society require greater investigation. The opposition 
to liberalisation, though, became increasingly difficult to justify within the climate 
of political and legal secularisation, as was demonstrated by the Hart/Devlin 
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debate and the raft of permissive legislation in the late 1950s and 1960s, all of 
which contributed to this liberalisation. 
The abolitionists could not be considered to be permissives because very 
few, if any, of their number would have believed that capital punishment was a 
unique deterrent to murder. Many retentionists, though, did believe in its unique 
deterrent effect and feared that an element of social control would be lost 
through abolition, thus causing an increase in the murder rate. Opposing this 
reform in order not to encourage further murders was, therefore, loosely anti-
permissive. 
Archbishop Fisher adopted an anti-permissive position when arguing that 
the death penalty was necessary for the ‘public recognition’ of murder as an 
especially heinous crime.450  Society’s revulsion at incidents of murder was 
important for many retentionists, as they believed that it deterred homicide. 
Furthermore, if the state’s apparatus, in the form of the death penalty, 
maintained society’s revulsion towards murder then it would be a necessary 
device for social control. His argument, therefore, suggested that capital 
punishment was a necessary deterrent to murder. It can be inferred from this that 
he believed that abolition would reduce the level of repugnance felt towards 
murder within society and, as a result, would encourage further murders to be 
committed. This was an anti-permissive argument.  
However, as this chapter has already explained, although many 
retentionists adhered to this view, the majority desired the death penalty for the 
retributive punishment of death for murder. This was demonstrated by the fact 
that 83 per cent of the total number of committed retentionists throughout this 
period voted for retention after the publication of the Royal Commission’s 
report, indicating that the evidence against the unique deterrent effect of capital 
punishment did not deter most retentionists from supporting the death penalty. 
They valued the element of vengeance that was provided by the death penalty. 
As such, some, but not most, of the retentionists can be considered to be anti-
permissives, as deterrence was not the determining factor for the retentionist 
beliefs of the majority. They were all social authoritarians, though, because of 
their opposition to the relaxation of penal policy. 
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It is possible to assess the links between the retentionists and those who 
adopted socially authoritarian positions on other matters by returning to the 
evaluation of the votes cast by retentionists during the second readings of the 
Sexual Offences Bill and Medical Termination of Pregnancy Bill, both in 1966. 
The Sexual Offences Bill passed its second reading by 164 votes to 107.451 Of the 
107 MPs that opposed the Bill, 76 were committed retentionists, nine had 
predominantly supported retention and four had voted roughly equally for and 
against hanging. Only 12 of the 107 were committed abolitionists, with four 
other abolitionists voting for retention once. Furthermore, of the 85 MPs 
opposing this Bill who always or mostly voted for retention, only four were from 
the Labour Party and two from the Ulster Unionists. Seventy-nine of the 107 
MPs who voted against the legalisation of homosexual acts were retentionist 
Conservatives. Only 29 MPs opposed the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Bill 
at its second reading, with 223 supporting it.452 Of those 29 MPs, roughly half 
were retentionists and half abolitionists. It is interesting, though, that every 
Labour MP who voted against this Bill was an abolitionist whereas only one 
Conservative MP had voted exclusively for abolition. Another two Conservatives 
voted for abolition on most occasions, while the rest were retentionists. Many of 
the opponents of the Sexual Offences Bill were retentionist Conservatives. There 
was a clear party divide between the retentionists who voted against the Medical 
Termination of Pregnancy Bill, who were all Conservatives bar one Liberal, and 
the abolitionists, who were almost all Labour MPs. This pattern indicates that 
there were ideological frameworks associated with the two main political parties 
that influenced the voting behaviour of MPs on issues of moral conscience. This 
resulted in most retentionists adopting socially authoritarian positions towards 
permissive reforms when they took part in such debates. 
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Right Progressive members of 
the Conservative Party have been portrayed as liberalisers. Yet, they were not all 
abolitionists, as demonstrated by Butler. Some conformed to their Party’s 
traditional retentionist stance. It would be wrong to expect that all Right 
Progressives were dramatically out of line from the Conservative Party’s 
prevailing sentiments towards issues such as capital punishment, as they were part 
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of the same organisation despite being seemingly more sympathetic to the 
liberalising movements in criminology and penal policy. 
 Jarvis and Hall have described R.A. Butler, who is used in this thesis as an 
indicator of Right Progressive thought, as one of the principal liberalisers within 
the Conservative Party in the post-war decades.453 As such, he is an interesting 
man to focus upon for the strength of his convictions as a retentionist. His views 
on capital punishment were somewhat ambiguous. Butler had to defend and 
enable a compromise between those Conservatives who supported abolition and 
those who did not. The compromise Homicide Bill did not need to appeal to the 
Labour MPs, as the Conservative majority after the 1955 general election was 
sufficient for the legislation to pass through Parliament with the use of the 
whips.454 During a cabinet meeting, Duncan Sandys stated that the government 
must expect to lose all Labour support when introducing the Homicide Bill.455 
Butler had always voted for retention during previous debates on the death 
penalty, but it is unclear whether his views changed to support degrees of murder 
or whether he was simply following the party line. 
Butler dedicated a few pages of his memoir, The Art of the Possible, to his 
time at the Home Office. This was published after capital punishment was 
abolished for murder. He dedicated roughly a page to prison reform and 
corporal punishment and another page to capital punishment. His discussion of 
the death penalty was focused on the ‘hideous responsibility’ that he faced when 
reaching a decision on appeals for mercy. He outlined at the start of his section 
on capital punishment that he felt that the death penalty should be retained in 
order to protect law enforcement officers. The rest of the narrative, however, was 
directed towards a portrayal of him as a supporter of reform. He mentioned how 
he ordered the removal of a ‘grisly text’, placed in the Home Secretary’s office by 
his predecessor John Simon, which was intended to remind ‘himself and his 
successors of their duty when considering a capital sentence.’ He continued by 
outlining the difficulty he faced when deciding whether to make a 
recommendation for mercy: ‘Each decision meant shutting myself up for two 
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days or more, with only the Office, the Judiciary, and occasionally my old friend 
David [Viscount] Kilmuir, the Lord Chancellor, to counsel me.’ He then 
mentioned a couple of cases where he did recommend mercy before concluding 
that capital punishment could not continue and that later Home Secretaries were 
‘well relieved of the terrible power to decide between life and death.’456 In this 
short account of his role concerning the death penalty, Butler briefly established 
his position as a retentionist before attempting to distance himself from the label 
by showing that he did all he could to avoid hanging murderers.  
Butler did not mention any case in which he refused to recommend 
mercy. Gerald Gardiner’s papers from the NCACP, though, indicate that Butler 
frequently rejected reprieves. The NCACP often petitioned him to reprieve 
murderers. Butler’s response was usually a refusal.457 This is not evidence that 
Butler was comfortable with the death penalty. Indeed, Gardiner wrote in a letter 
to Doris Gundry, a member of the Women’s International League, that Butler’s 
successor as Home Secretary, Henry Brooke, ‘is less sympathetic to our view than 
Mr Butler was.’458 Rather, it is interesting that Butler was keen to draw upon the 
more liberal aspects of his work on capital cases, whilst retaining a broadly 
Conservative belief that the safety of police and prison officers was of paramount 
importance. This was the stance taken by the Party when they objected to the 
Labour government’s successful attempt to make permanent the Murder 
(Abolition of Death Penalty) Act in December 1969, two years before Butler’s 
memoir was published.  
Butler’s narrative did not portray his role accurately, as he was a 
committed retentionist, despite Dominic Sandbrook’s claim to the opposite effect. 
Sandbrook uses the same passage from The Art of the Possible that is referred to 
above to arrive at the incorrect conclusion that Butler became an abolitionist.459 
Butler stated that future Home Secretaries were lucky to be free of the burden of 
deciding whether or not to recommend mercy, but this does not translate to 
support for abolition. Butler’s committed retentionism and stated desire at Party 
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conferences, albeit to staunchly retentionist audiences, for capital punishment to 
be extended to more murders, highlights that he did not support abolition. 
Rather, his memoir demonstrated his desire to be more closely associated with 
abolition after it had become permanent in Britain than was the case while he 
was an MP, perhaps because abolitionism had become an established expression 
of progressiveness and civilisation within Parliament. Butler’s reputation as a 
liberaliser would be tarnished somewhat if he appeared to be vehemently 
opposed to the liberalism of the majority of politicians on this matter. 
Butler was no abolitionist and, despite his portrayal by Hall and Jarvis, 
was no keen reformer of the death penalty. He demonstrated this in his speech at 
the Conservative Party’s annual conference in 1958, where he stated his desire for 
murderers who killed their victims by poisoning and other methods to suffer the 
death penalty.460 The murders to which he referred were no longer capital 
offences under the Homicide Act. It has not been possible within the research for 
this thesis to judge how far other Right Progressives embraced the compromise 
Homicide Act, as it is difficult to identify them within their Party. Some might 
have embraced the limited application of the death penalty that fitted the new 
requirements of post-war Britain. Others, like Butler, could have wanted to retain 
capital punishment in its previous state, with perhaps more minor amendments, 
but voted for compromise to keep capital punishment in some form rather than 
suffer abolition. This latter view was shared with some of the traditional 
Conservatives. 
Retentionism was a socially authoritarian position because of its 
opposition to the liberalisation of penal policy and the belief that the strict social 
control provided by the death penalty should remain. The retentionists were not 
automatically anti-permissives, although a number of them were because of their 
fear that abolition would encourage more people to commit murder. These 
retentionists should only be labelled loosely as anti-permissives, as this fear did 
not demonstrate the same anti-permissiveness as those who opposed the 
legalisation of homosexuality and abortion, which actively permitted new 
behaviour. A large number of those who opposed abolition were opponents of 
the permissive reforms, although anti-permissiveness was not a reason for most 
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retentionists’ opposition to abolition. Their opposition to liberalisation, though, 
placed them at odds with the dominant political culture. 
 
Why did the retentionists fail? 
This chapter has examined the nature of and reasons for the retentionists’ 
arguments and beliefs. This final section brings together the analysis within this 
chapter to explain why the retentionists failed to retain capital punishment for 
murder. This thesis’ chapter on public opinion established that the electorate’s 
will did not influence the decisions of MPs in any significant way during the 
capital punishment debates. The support from the electorate did not enable the 
retentionists to avoid defeat in Parliament. There were other reasons for the 
retentionists’ failure, notably the Royal Commission’s conclusion on deterrence, 
the liberalising moment within the Commons in the latter half of this period that 
was associated with Labour MPs and younger Conservatives, and the 
unpopularity of the Homicide Act. 
 The Royal Commission’s report was perceived to support the 
abolitionists’ case rather than the retentionists’, as it concluded that the unique 
deterrent effect of the death penalty could not be proved.461 The debate on the 
Conservative government’s retentionist motion in February 1956 featured both 
retentionists and abolitionists claiming that, following the publication of the 
report, the burden of proof was on their opponents to justify their case. Gwilym 
Lloyd George, in the opening speech of this debate, attempted to place this 
burden upon the abolitionists: ‘Personally, I do not believe that what cannot be 
proved by statistics cannot be true’.462 Although Lloyd George did not state 
explicitly that the abolitionists rather than the retentionists had to prove their 
position on deterrence, George Rogers and Sydney Silverman inferred this 
message from his argument.463 Silverman was explicit in his response to the 
Home Secretary: 
The onus [of proving the deterrent effect of capital punishment] 
surely is not on those who wish to abolish the death penalty. The 
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onus is on those who wish to retain it. Every jury is told, “Do not 
convict this man if you have a reasonable doubt of his guilt.” We 
are entitled to say to the House of Commons, “Do not retain the 
death penalty if you have a reasonable doubt of its effectiveness.”464 
Lloyd George’s failure to convince the majority of MPs to agree with his 
argument was symptomatic of the insurmountable problem for the retentionists 
that resulted from the support that the abolitionists derived from the Royal 
Commission’s report. With both sides demanding that the other prove their 
argument, further evidence was required to justify each position. Lloyd George 
and the retentionists’ failure in the parliamentary debates resulted from the lack 
of evidence to support their case. The abolitionists, on the other hand, had 
further evidence from foreign countries that had removed the death penalty 
without experiencing a significant rise in the murder rate. Although Lloyd 
George and other retentionists disputed the relevance of this evidence for Britain, 
they did not have any counter-evidence to justify their argument.465 However, 
this failure merely compounded the retentionists’ defeat, which was secured by 
their opposition to a reform that was part of the Commons’ liberalising ethos. 
This ethos was supported by the vast majority of Labour MPs and a sufficient 
number of younger Conservatives to enable abolitionism to become entrenched 
within the Commons. 
Hall and Jarvis have placed capital punishment at the heart of the 
liberalising reforms of the 1950s and 1960s. Capital punishment is the first of the 
reforms listed by Hall, even though it does not receive the analytical attention 
that he afforded to the others. It is possible that this was the result of the awkward 
relationship between abolition and the permissive reforms. Jarvis, in dedicating a 
chapter to capital and corporal punishment, placed the same importance on 
these reforms as he did on those for drinking, gambling, obscenity and pirate 
radio.466 The retentionists can be considered to have been social authoritarians, 
but only some can be labelled anti-permissives on this issue. This latter group 
opposed abolition because they believed that the reform would encourage more 
people to commit murder. The correlation between the opponents of abolition 
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and the opponents of the legalisation of homosexuality demonstrates that there 
was a prevailing socially authoritarian morality amongst many retentionists, 
which disapproved of the widespread relaxation of social control. This attitude 
was out of touch with the dominant feeling of the House of Commons. The legal 
and political secularisation during this period, which helped the development of 
liberalisation, diminished the influence of traditional Anglican morality within 
political arguments and beliefs. This hampered the retentionists’ case, as they had 
derived an element of support from Anglicanism and from senior Anglican 
leaders, although the Church of England’s leadership became more strongly 
abolitionist in the early 1960s.  
By the early 1960s, the liberalising culture had extended to the Church of 
England. The abolitionist Michael Ramsey replaced the retentionist Geoffrey 
Fisher as Archbishop of Canterbury in 1961 and by 1962 the Upper and Lower 
Convocations of Canterbury had endorsed abolition.467 Ramsey supported and 
encouraged the reduction of the Church of England’s influence within politics 
and political decision-making. 468  Although Church leaders did not greatly 
influence politicians’ judgements, as noted in this thesis’ chapter on public 
opinion, this shift in support from the leaders of the Church of England 
demonstrated that there was an increasing recognition that this liberalising ethos 
was present within the established Church. Many other churches had already 
publically supported the removal of capital punishment. 469  It should be 
remembered, though, that secularisation was primarily a legal and political 
phenomenon rather than a determined societal shift away from the Church.470 
The increased separation of Church and state was an important factor behind 
the retentionists’ failure, as their arguments and beliefs based upon Anglican 
morality had reduced in value within the abolition debates. In opposing 
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abolition, the retentionists placed themselves at odds with the liberalising ethos of 
the Labour MPs and a number of the younger Conservatives, which became 
dominant within Parliament and was increasingly difficult to contest using 
Christian doctrine. The fact that their religious arguments and beliefs might have 
found greater support amongst the general public did not matter, as the 
electorate was disenfranchised from the capital punishment debates. 
The final reason for the retentionists’ failure was the unpopularity of the 
Homicide Act. The Conservative government feared that, unless they proposed 
legislation to reform the use of the death penalty, the abolitionists within their 
Party would vote again in accordance with their consciences, as they had in 
February and March 1956, and would succeed in removing the death penalty. 
Lloyd George expressed this fear in a cabinet meeting in September 1956, saying 
that the alternative to the government’s bill was ‘Silverman’. It is indicative of 
Sydney Silverman’s central role in the campaign to remove capital punishment 
that his name became synonymous not only with his Death Penalty (Abolition) 
Bill but also with abolition itself.471 The continuation of the death penalty after 
1957, therefore, relied upon the success of the Homicide Act. Unfortunately for 
the retentionists it was universally unpopular. Even the Conservative government 
that tabled the Homicide Bill felt that it was a bad idea. Lloyd George wrote in 
May 1956: ‘Contrary though this may be to our wishes, I think it [abolition] 
would be better than a Bill incorporating the principle of degrees of murder’.472 
The Conservative government that was formed after the 1959 general election 
accepted that any further alteration to the law of murder would involve either 
restoring capital punishment for all murders or total abolition. They 
acknowledged that the latter was more likely. In 1962, a memorandum for Henry 
Brooke, the new Home Secretary, from an unknown author within the 
government or civil service outlined that the government recognised that these 
were the alternatives to the Homicide Act. In order to restore capital punishment 
fully the government felt that it would have to prove the deterrent effect of the 
death penalty, but recognised that there were no statistics to support such an 
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argument.473 Two years later Brooke told the Prime Minister, Alec Douglas-
Home: ‘The Homicide Act is unworkable in its present form and the next Home 
Secretary, of whatever party, will have to end the death penalty.’ The Prime 
Minister’s response was that it ‘will probably take care of itself’.474 This was an 
admission of defeat from the retentionist Conservative government. Many others 
outside the government agreed that the Homicide Act was a failure, including 
Baroness Wootton: ‘I think that it will be common ground among many that the 
compromise has not worked.’475 The perceived failure of the Homicide Act 
necessitated further legislation on capital punishment.  
The abolitionism of a minority of younger Conservative MPs that diluted 
the traditional retentionism of their Party caused both abolitionism to become 
entrenched within the Commons and, as a result, the retentionists’ failure. This 
failure was prolonged until 1965 because of the entrenched retentionism of the 
House of Lords prior to the passage of the Life Peerages Act and the refusal of 
the retentionist governments to use the Parliament Act to force abolition onto the 
statute book after the Commons had voted in favour of the reform. The author of 
the memorandum for Brooke in 1962 was perceptive in recognising, though, that 
reform to the law on murder would be required and that that reform would be 
abolition. With a firmly abolitionist House of Commons, an increasingly 
abolitionist House of Lords and, from 1964, an abolitionist government, the 
retentionists had little hope of success, especially after the Homicide Act had 
failed to satiate the abolitionists’ demands for reform. Within a year of Brooke’s 
meeting with Home, capital punishment was abolished for murder. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has examined why capital punishment was abolished in Great Britain 
despite the consistent opposition to the reform from the majority of the public. It 
has placed abolition within the context of the legal liberalisation of the 1950s and 
1960s and is based upon an analysis of the role of public opinion within the 
parliamentary debates and an assessment of politicians’ arguments and beliefs. 
This analysis has led to the conclusion that capital punishment was abolished 
because the majority of Labour politicians, and a significant minority of 
Conservatives who were born after 1920, believed that it was a reform necessary 
to civilise Britain after the end of the Second World War. The belief that 
executions were barbaric and repugnant was a feature of the non-conformist, 
radical Labour morality and became prevalent within the Commons’ 
increasingly secularised, liberalising and civilising ethos, which was a greater 
influence amongst a number of younger Conservatives than were their Party’s 
orthodoxies on penal policy. On a conceptual level, capital punishment did not 
accord with the vision of a civilised Britain that was most common amongst 
politicians, as outlined by Jenkins and Crosland. The support for abolition from 
the younger Conservatives enabled an opposition to capital punishment to 
become entrenched within the House of Commons, regardless of the party in 
government. This abolitionism persists in the Commons to this day.  
The retentionists’ beliefs can be identified broadly with either the sense 
that it was the desirable penalty for murderers, placing retribution above 
rehabilitation as the purpose of punishment, or with the belief that, though 
undesirable, it was necessary to maintain law and order in society. Their beliefs, 
though, found little support within the Labour Party and diminishing support 
amongst the younger Conservatives who adhered to the dominant liberalising 
ethos within the Commons. This ethos was in part a product of the secularisation 
of the law and the declining influence of traditional Anglican morality.  
The Royal Commission’s conclusion that capital punishment could not 
be proved to have a unique deterrent effect against murder was the most 
significant factor behind the success of the abolitionists’ arguments within the 
parliamentary debates, as unlike for issues of morality the retentionists had no 
equally convincing responses or evidence to support their arguments. Within a 
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context of legal and political secularisation, the influence of morality within the 
political discourse on capital punishment diminished somewhat. The causalist 
issue of deterrence became increasingly important for this reason, thus meaning 
that the retentionists’ lack of evidence damaged their arguments. Deterrence was 
not a determining factor, though, behind the beliefs of most abolitionists and 
retentionists.  
Public opinion did not have a significant influence on the decisions of 
politicians, who continued to work within the Burkean principle that 
democratically elected representatives owed the electorate their judgement. 
Politicians expected that the electorate would consent to this interpretation of the 
parliamentary system, and made little attempt to engage with the public on a 
national scale or to explain why they were neglecting their opinions. 
This thesis has implications for the understanding of both Britain’s 
abolition process and the social reforms under Butler’s and Jenkins’ tenures at the 
Home Office. To start with the abolition process, this thesis has demonstrated 
that the majority of politicians adopted the abolitionist interpretation that there 
were two groups that existed within the public: informed and uninformed. No 
expression of public opinion, though, impacted upon the formation of policy for 
this issue of conscience. This is an extension of Laura Beers’ conclusion, which 
concerns the lack of influence of public opinion over party policy, into a subject 
for which politicians tended to be afforded a free vote.476 This thesis’ addition to 
the historiography of public opinion is original in its application of Beers’ theory 
onto an issue of conscience and in the variety of sources that it uses from this 
period to examine public opinion. 
 The abolitionist beliefs of the vast majority of Labour MPs are well 
established within the historiography of capital punishment. To date, though, 
there is no study that appreciates the nuances within the abolitionists’ 
demographic, with the exception of Kevin Manton’s article on the retentionist 
Labour elite. The crucial development for the success of abolition was the 
increase in support for this reform from a significant minority of younger 
Conservatives. The impact of this change took effect after the 1955 general 
election. Since then, the House of Commons has voted for abolition on every 
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occasion the matter was debated, regardless of which party was in government. 
Furthermore, the Lords became more supportive of abolition following the 
passage of the Life Peerages Act, after which there was a gradual increase in the 
number of Labour peers, most of whom were inclined to vote for reform. These 
demographic shifts within both Houses of Parliament created an environment in 
which it was conducive for abolition to occur.  
 No historian has analysed closely politicians’ arguments and beliefs on 
capital punishment. This thesis’ examination of the content of their arguments, 
its explanation for their successes and failures and its hypotheses for the reasons 
that directed their votes are original additions to the historiography. The 
demographic change within Parliament occurred during a period of increased 
legal and political secularisation, resulting in a reduction of the influence of 
religious morality, and in particular traditional Anglican morality, within the 
debates. This was a significant factor behind the retentionists’ defeat in the 
parliamentary debates. This thesis has provided the first examination of the 
impact of the changes in the demography and discourse in Parliament on the 
capital punishment debates. The further examination of the demography of the 
retentionists and abolitionists within this thesis’ chapter identifying these groups 
has demonstrated that the strong party identity of Labour abolitionists and 
Conservative retentionists, which has been recognised by other historians, applies 
only for those born before the 1920s, as retentionism became less common 
amongst the younger Conservatives.  
There were remarkably strong links with some groups that were 
traditionally associated with certain parties. Notably, all of the politicians who 
were listed by the CND as being members of or sympathetic to their cause were 
committed abolitionists. These and other links have been identified through the 
database of MPs’ votes, which has informed much of the analysis within this 
thesis. The database has exposed the backgrounds that were common to the 
retentionist and abolitionist politicians. This research has identified a number of 
the reasons behind politicians’ beliefs on capital punishment, which is one of this 
thesis’ most significant additions to the historiography. It has identified that party 
identity and the Commons’ liberalising ethos helped to shape politicians’ beliefs 
on this issue of conscience. The abolitionists’ and retentionists’ occupational and 
organisational backgrounds largely adhered to the established party divide. 
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Furthermore, the database has enabled events outside Parliament to be assessed 
in terms of their influence on the outcome of the debates. The notable example 
of this is the politicians’ negation of public opinion when deciding how to vote on 
capital punishment, including after notable murders and executions, as there was 
little change in the proportions of abolitionists to retentionists between the 
debates in 1948 and 1956 and between those in 1964 and 1969. This database 
will become an invaluable tool for any future historical investigation into 
abolition. 
This thesis’ chapters on the retentionists’ and abolitionists’ cases 
examined the reasons for politicians’ beliefs that capital punishment should be 
retained or abolished. A number of abolitionists believed that society and the 
British state required liberalisation, which included abolition, and a number of 
retentionists believed that it needed protection within the context of rising crime 
rates. There were other fundamental reasons, though, for their beliefs. Morality 
was the key component of the beliefs of both the retentionists and abolitionists. 
Most abolitionists had a strong moral objection to the state taking life, as was 
demonstrated beyond the abolition campaign through the involvement of many 
of their number within the CND. The moralist support for the death penalty had 
two guises. Many retentionists believed that it was the desirable punishment for 
murder, thus abiding by the old fashioned theories of punishment. Others 
believed that capital punishment was morally justifiable as it was the necessary 
deterrent to murder. Both the retentionists and abolitionists believed that they 
were protecting or improving the sanctity of life within Britain, although as with 
civilisation it was the abolitionists who had the more sophisticated conceptual 
framework to support this. It has been difficult to ascertain the beliefs of 
individual politicians, as very few records exist in private papers or memoirs to 
explain the reasons for their opinions on capital punishment. Instead, these 
conclusions have been taken from the collective identification of the retentionists 
and abolitionists and from the broader ideologies and beliefs that were present 
within dominant parties, groups and vocal proponents from each side. This is the 
greatest precision that can be achieved in the analysis of their beliefs without 
engaging in the impractical task of accessing the formative causes of the opinions 
of every individual politician. 
 214 
 The recognition of the demographic change within Parliament, which 
included the younger Conservatives’ generation who were more influenced by 
the emerging liberalising ethos within the Commons than were their older Party 
colleagues, is a component of this thesis’ implication for the understanding of the 
socially liberal reforms of this period and the place of abolition amongst them. 
The generation of politicians that abolished the death penalty were also at the 
heart of many of the liberalising reforms of the late 1950s and 1960s. Abolition 
was part of the liberalising reforms of the 1950s and 1960s through its relaxation 
of penal policy. It was not a permissive reform, though, as some historians have 
suggested. This thesis has provided the first qualification of this label with regard 
to the death penalty, which has hitherto been attached unquestioningly to 
abolition. One must not overlook, though, Roy Jenkins’ and others’ uses of the 
concept of civilisation to link abolition to the permissive reforms. The abolition of 
capital punishment was part of the broad wave of liberalising reformism that 
swept through Parliament in the two decades after the end of the Second World 
War.  
 There was a strong correlation between the abolitionists and the 
supporters of the permissive reforms. Similarly, a high proportion of the 
opponents of these reforms were retentionists, although this correlation was not 
as strong. The abolitionists and most of the retentionists should not be portrayed 
as permissives or anti-permissives respectively, though, purely on the basis of 
their stance on abolition. The exception was those retentionists who opposed 
abolition principally because they believed that capital punishment was a 
necessary deterrent to murder. They can be portrayed loosely as anti-permissives, 
as they supported the maintenance of state control over society to prevent an 
increase in murder and violent crime. This does not account for the majority of 
retentionists, though. Furthermore, no abolitionist suggested that capital 
punishment should be abolished even if it would cause an increase in the number 
of murders committed. Those abolitionists who were willing to support retention 
because of the death penalty’s uniquely effective deterrent against murder were 
satisfied by the examples from foreign abolitionist countries and by the Royal 
Commission’s report that any uniqueness of the penalty was too negligible to be 
proven. However, the abolitionists can be labelled as social liberals and the 
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retentionists as social authoritarians because of their stances towards this issue of 
liberalisation. 
 This thesis’ identification of the abolitionists and retentionists, its 
examination of their arguments and beliefs and its explanation for their negation 
of public opinion are all original additions to the historiography that are essential 
for understanding why capital punishment was abolished in Britain. The research 
for this thesis, in particular the database of MPs’ votes and backgrounds, are 
resources that will be useful for any future study into the death penalty in Britain. 
However, the impact of this thesis, and of the capital punishment debates, 
extends beyond the history of abolition. Outlined below are three aspects of 
history and politics within which this thesis’ research can claim an impact. 
 The first is its impact on the ‘culture wars’ of the 1960s and beyond. It is 
apparent that the liberals were prevailing in the 1960s, creating what has been 
termed a permissive society. Norman Tebbit’s 1985 Disraeli Lecture, referenced 
in this thesis’ introduction, demonstrates that the liberals won by blaming their 
social reforms for the perceived ills of the day.477 Abolition was a prominent 
reform within this liberalisation. The restoration of capital punishment was 
debated in the Commons in 1973, 1974, 1975, 1979, 1982, 1983, 1987, 1988, 
1990 and 1994.478 All of these bills were defeated by a large majority, similar to 
those during the debates in the 1960s. The numerous unsuccessful attempts in 
the Commons to restore the death penalty demonstrate both that abolition 
continued to attract attention from those who opposed this liberalisation and that 
those opponents were incapable of overcoming the entrenched abolitionism of 
the House. This thesis provides evidence that, even for an issue that had a 
different character to the raft of permissive legislation of the 1950s and 1960s, the 
liberalising ethos prevailed. It is further support for the enduring liberal victory in 
the culture wars. 
Margaret Thatcher’s stance on capital punishment can be better 
understood by this thesis’ conclusions. Thatcher’s record on capital punishment 
is evidence of the fact that the political culture in Parliament had shifted 
                                                   
477 The Times, 14 Nov. 1985. 
478 Twitchell, “Abolition of the Death Penalty,” 337; HC Deb 11 Dec. 1974 vol. 883 cc. 518-
640; HC Deb 11 May 1982 vol. 23 cc. 608-86. Twitchell fails to include the debates in 1974 and 
1982 within his list and claims erroneously that there were two debates in 1987. 
 216 
determinedly towards liberalisation. Thatcher ensured that there was no 
ambiguity over her desire for the death penalty to be restored. However, she 
never used any of the political machinery at her disposal, such as the whips, to 
force the restoration of capital punishment into law. 479  Thatcher had no 
intention of acting to restore the death penalty, as she demonstrated in her 
memoir when explaining that she never appointed a Home Secretary who agreed 
with her on her principal moral beliefs. This claim followed her discussion of 
capital punishment, making it apparent that she was referring to the death 
penalty in particular.480 Furthermore, when the tellers returned an abolitionist 
victory following the division on the 1983 Bill to restore the death penalty, James 
Prior and Douglas Hurd have recorded that Thatcher seemed relieved that the 
death penalty would not return so that she did not have to deal with the 
practicalities of its application. It appears that Thatcher may not have had much 
intention of actually restoring the death penalty. It was a useful populist device to 
gain the backing of her grassroots supporters who clamoured for the death 
penalty at the party conferences. The Commons was firmly abolitionist by the 
1980s, as was much of Thatcher’s own front bench.481 Whether or not Thatcher 
had sufficient conviction in her belief to actually want to see the death penalty 
restored, as opposed to merely vocalising this opinion to improve her support 
from the Party faithful, the culture within both Parliament and her own party 
would not have permitted a retentionist victory. This thesis’ examination of 
abolition explains why this culture existed in Parliament, which precluded 
Thatcher from abolishing the death penalty. 
 The extent to which abolitionism had become entrenched within the 
Commons is highlighted by the failure of the restoration bills during the on-going 
sectarian violence and homicide in Northern Ireland and occasionally in the rest 
of the United Kingdom. The death penalty remained in place in Northern 
Ireland until 1973, although it was not used after 1961, and the sharp increase in 
deadly violence refocused the subsequent debates upon terrorism. Terrorism was 
cited frequently in all of the debates after 1973, with the exception of the Bill in 
1994 when it was mentioned only a handful of times. Furthermore, it is no 
                                                   
479 Vinen, Thatcher’s Britain, 99-100. 
480 Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993), 307-8. 
481 Vinen, Thatcher’s Britain, 99-100; 280. 
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coincidence that the final parliamentary debate to restore capital punishment 
occurred in 1994, as the violence in Northern Ireland continued to subside from 
this year onwards amid a number of ceasefires.482 
The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 abolished capital 
punishment in the province. During the Bill’s second reading William Whitelaw, 
the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, and other politicians were clear that 
capital punishment in Northern Ireland was a separate issue from capital 
punishment in Britain.483 The retentionist Iain Paisley disagreed. He felt that the 
Commons’ entrenched abolitionism would not be overcome to consider the 
peculiarities of the context in Northern Ireland: 
The House has on various occasions expressed itself on the issue of 
capital punishment, and the overwhelming vote has been for its 
abolition. Therefore, I do not think that any speeches today by 
those who feel that in the present situation in Northern Ireland the 
death penalty should be retained will carry weight.484 
One can understand Paisley’s argument, which appears to have been proved 
correct as the abolitionists won the debate by 253 votes to 94.485 This is not too 
dissimilar from the abolitionist victory in the Commons in December 1969, which 
was by 343 votes to 185. Indeed, 209 of the MPs who voted during the Northern 
Ireland debate had voted during the December 1969 debate. Of these, only three 
MPs who had voted to make abolition permanent in Britain supported retention 
for Northern Ireland. Sixteen who had opposed the December 1969 motion 
supported abolition for Northern Ireland.486 This indicates that the increasingly 
numerous acts of domestic terror did little to persuade the abolitionists within the 
Commons to support retention. This is further evidence, therefore, that 
abolitionism had become entrenched within the Commons. Abolitionism became 
entrenched during the period studied for this thesis. Even a high number of 
                                                   
482 For a general chronology of the Northern Ireland conflict see: Marie-Therese Fay, Mike 
Morrissey and Marie Smith, Northern Ireland’s Troubles: the Human Costs (London: Pluto Press, 1999), 
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483 HC Deb 14 May 1973 vol. 856 cc. 1028-9. 
484 HC Deb 14 May 1973 vol. 856 c. 1052. 
485 HC Deb 14 May 1973 vol. 856 c. 1142. 
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incidents of murder and terrorism could not provide a reason to convince MPs to 
vote against their abolitionist morality. 
 The third area in which this thesis’ research could have an impact is 
within the contemporary abolition debates in the USA. The British abolition 
process has already had some influence in Canada, New Zealand and the USA. 
Following the Parliament of Canada’s capital punishment debates in 1966 and 
1967, which resulted in the death penalty being retained, the Canadian 
government published two volumes detailing the information relevant to the issue. 
Included within this were comprehensive descriptions of both Canada’s recent 
capital punishment debates and the 1964 and 1965 debates from the British 
Parliament.487 Pauline Engel suggests that the restoration of capital punishment in 
New Zealand in 1950 was in part influenced by the failed abolition amendment to 
the Criminal Justice Bill in Britain. Engel cited the executions of Evans, Bentley 
and Ellis and the report of the Royal Commission as having a particular influence 
within the capital punishment debates in New Zealand. She claimed that the 
Homicide Act in Britain was sufficient evidence to prove that murders should not 
be divided into capital and non-capital offences.488 Finally, in the USA the Royal 
Commission’s report was cited within the Supreme Court Justices’ decision on 
Furman v. Georgia, which declared that capital punishment was unconstitutional. 
Mr Justice Marshall, in his concurring opinion on the case, cited the report ten 
times.489  
These examples demonstrate that the influence of Britain’s capital 
punishment debates extended beyond its borders into a number of its former 
colonies, in particular the white settler dominions. This influence could continue 
into the contemporary abolition debates within many states in the USA. Britain 
provides an example for how abolition can occur when the electorate opposes the 
reform. The fact that after abolition Britain did not experience an immediate 
increase in the murder rate, that there were not a large number of police officers 
killed and that it appears that no politicians lost their seats as a result of abolition 
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13 Jan. 2012]. 
 219 
might encourage some American politicians who are sympathetic to the reform to 
support the abolition of capital punishment.490 There is already a slow trend 
towards abolition within a few of the states.491 The different political culture in the 
USA, though, might hinder any potential impact of the British example on these 
abolition debates. Issues of conscience and religious morality, such as abortion, 
are more heavily politicised in the USA than in Britain.492 Nevertheless, this thesis 
might provide some inspiration to and example for those abolitionists in the USA 
who want to abolish capital punishment despite facing opposition to this reform 
from the electorate. 
There is scope for further research extending beyond the remit of this 
thesis, including in the three areas outlined above. The analysis within this thesis 
could be extended to include constituency and regional newspaper sources and 
the private papers of a larger number of politicians, including those of Roy 
Jenkins which are currently closed to the public for cataloguing. The opinions and 
actions of different religious denominations, and of smaller groups therein, also 
warrant further investigation. The time available for this thesis was insufficient to 
engage in this research. Furthermore, this examination of capital punishment 
within Britain could be extended to include the debates either side of this period 
and the abolition process for Northern Ireland. They have not been included 
within this thesis, as the context for these debates was markedly different to that 
which existed for the debates between 1947 and 1969. 
 The abolition of capital punishment in Britain culminated from the 
determination of Labour MPs and a significant minority of Conservatives born 
after 1920 to remove the death penalty as part of a broader programme of 
reforms that were intended to civilise and liberalise Britain. Their progress was 
unfettered by the electorate’s opposition to this reform. Despite the retentionists’ 
protestations and the disapproval of the majority of the electorate, most politicians 
                                                   
490 Criminal Statistics England and Wales 1970: Statistics relating to Crime and Criminal Proceedings for the 
year 1970, Cmnd. 4708 (London: HMSO, 1971). 
491 The Times, 24 Nov. 2011. 
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were satisfied that by Christmas 1969 they had finally removed the barbarous 
penalty that no community had a right to exact.493 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
493 TNA:PRO, Confidential memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Home Department 
and the Secretary of State for Scotland on the Permanent Abolition of Capital Punishment for 
Murder, CAB/129/141, C(69) 48, 6 May 1969. 
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